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INTRODUCTION 
One of the oldest American prejudices is anti-
catholicism. From the first landing of the pilgrims to the 
deistic principles embodied in the Declaration of 
Independence, Americans formed a cultural tradition with an 
inherent hostility toward Catholicism. The Puritans of the 
Reformation and the Founding Fathers of the Enlightenment 
provided the emotional and intellectual basis for America's 
anti-Catholicism. They portrayed the Catholic Church as 
authoritarian, anti-democratic, superstitious, intolerant, 
and statist. Catholicism was the foremost enemy of 
religious and individual liberty. It became and simply was 
anti-American. Intrinsic in this anti-Catholic tradition 
was the exclusion of any Catholic from the highest office in 
the land, the presidency of the United States. 1 
In such a hostile environment and determined to 
become first-class citizens, Catholics settled, survived, 
and thrived in the United States in spite of numerous 
outbursts of bigotry. Roughly one hundred years after the 
Constitutional Convention, the inconceivable, or impossible, 
1James Hennesey, s. J. American Catholics (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 36-39. 
1 
2 
happened. Char le s O' Con or became the country ' s first 
catholic presidential candidate in 1872. O'Conor, a 
prominent New York attorney, was unexpectedly nominated as a 
result of internal dissension within the Democratic party. 
A splinter group, which broke away from the Democratic party 
after it nominated Horace Greeley at its national 
convention, selected O'Conor as its candidate. The election 
results proved the futility of O'Conor's protest candidacy. 
The first Catholic presidential candidate collected only 
29, 000 votes compared to 3 million for Greeley and 3. 5 
million for Grant. 2 Fortunately the unfeasibility of 
O'Conor's candidacy mitigated the fires of anti-Catholicism 
and failed to raise the ugly head of bigotry. One political 
analyst has noted, "Because the contest was really between 
Greeley and Grant, O'Conor's candidacy did not produce a 
flood of vitriolic anti-Catholic literature comparable to 
that thrown against Al Smith in 1928. 113 
Fifty years later, the second Catholic presidential 
candidate, Al Smith, emerged, and unlike O'Conor, he was the 
viable presidential candidate of the Democratic party. 
Governor of New York and representing the new constituency 
of urban ethnics and Catholics that emerged as a result of 
the great wave of immigration at the turn of the century, 
2 Lawrence H. Fuchs, John F. Kennedy and American 
Catholicism (New York: Meredith Press, 1967), p. 153. 
3 Ibid. 
3 
smith posed a serious challenge to the tradition of "No 
catholic in the White House." Protestant Americans 
perce~ved Smith's candidacy ~s a threat to the virtues of 
Americanism. If he were elected, Protestants feared the 
pope would take over the country, destroying the country's 
heritage of separation of church and state and of religious, 
political, and individual freedom. The editor of the 
Christian Century, a non-denominational journal, summarized 
Protestant hysteria over a Catholic in the White House. 
"They (Protestants) cannot look with unconcern upon the 
seating of the representative of an alien culture, of a 
medieval Latin mentality, of an undemocratic hierarchy, and 
of a foreign potentate in the great office of the President 
of the United States. 114 
The intolerant decade of the 1920's that produced 
the Red Scare and revived the Klu Klu Klan intensified the 
religious rancor, hysteria, and hate in this presidential 
campaign. "It was a field day for bigots," observed James 
Hennesey, S. J., a leading Catholic historian. The result 
was a crushing defeat for Al Smith. In the popular vote, 
Smith received 15 million ballots to Herbert Hoover's 
21.5 million. Smith was resoundingly overwhelmed by an 
4 Fuchs, John F. Kennedy and American Catholicism 
pp. 67; Hennesey, American Catholics, pp. 252-253. 
4 
5 
electoral college vote of 444-87. In hindsight, historians 
have reinterpreted the reason for Al Smith's defeat. 
Anti-Catholicism was not the explanation. Even if Smith had 
been Protestant or if the Democratic party had chosen 
another candidate, there was no possibility of beating the 
opponents major appeal -- "Republican prosperity." Smith's 
less than American (urban-ethnic) public image, his stalwart 
support of anti-prohibition forces, and his association with 
the corrupt politics of urban machines also contributed to 
his downfall. Finally, Smith exacerbated the religious 
issue by failing to respond to anti-Catholic accusations. 
Regretfully, the few times that he did break his silence 
ended up being defensive and wrathful harangues, which only 
gave more credence to the "Popish Plot. 116 
Whatever the final judgment scholar/g-7 will make 
concerning Smith's defeat in 1928, Smith and the American 
Catholic Church and community were convinced that the major 
culprit was anti-Catholicism. Frightened, humiliated and 
deeply hurt, Catholic-Americans, inheriting a psychological 
scar that they were undesirable and disloyal aliens, took up 
a posture of bitter retreat and a mentality of defensive 
5 Hennesey, American Catholics, pp. 252-2531 Albert 
J. Menendez, John F. Kennedy: Catholic and Humanist (New 
York: Prometheus Books, 1982), pp. 18-19. 
6 Menendez, John F. Kennedy, pp. 18-191 Fuchs, 
Kennedy and Catholicism, pp. 69-70, Richard Hofstadter, 
"Could a Protestant have beaten Hoover in 1928?," Reporter, 
March 17, 1960. 
ghettoism. Catholics were convinced that America was, and 
would be, a Protestant country with a Protestant president. 
Contrary to this pessimistic forecast of his 
5 
religious community and contrary to the country's centuries 
old anti-Catholic tradition, John Fitzgerald Kennedy became 
the first Catholic president of the United States only 30 
years later. Kennedy's victory in 1960 seemed to have 
accomp:J-ished the impossible. It denied and shattered the 
seemingly inherent logic of the cultural tradition in 
American history. It is this great break with the past that 
this study will scrutinize. Simply put, how and why did 
John F. Kennedy become the first Catholic president in 1960? 
How did he avoid another 1928? How was the campaign of 1960 
different from that of 1928? Historians have failed to 
address adequately these questions. By narrowly focusing on 
the candidate himself, and the Protestant dimension of the 
religious issue, they have overlooked completely the 
Catholic issue and its indispensable role in John F. 
Kennedy's election victory. 7 This study defines the 
7Elias Macropoulos, "The Treatment with Reference to 
the Roman Catholic Issue, of the Democratic Candidates in 
the Presidential Elections of 1928 and 1960," (Ph.D. New 
York University, 1966); Beryl McClerren, "The Southern 
Baptist State Newspapers and the Religious Issue during the 
Presidential Campaigns of 1928 and 1960," (Ph.D. Southern 
Illinois University, 1963); David Smith, "Al Smith and JFK: 
The Religious Issue during the Presidential Campaigns of 
1928 & 1960," (Ph.D. Southern Illinois University, 1964); 
Teddy Lisle, "The Catholical Impediment: JFK and the 
Religious Issue during the 1960 Presidential Campaign," 
6 
catholic issue as the reactions of the American Catholic 
hierarchy and press to Kennedy's pursuit of the highest 
office in the land.* Ultimately, these reactions allowed 
Kennedy to avoid a remake of 1928 and to succeed where Smith 
failed. Lastly, the study will reveal the impact Kennedy's 
campaign and election had upon the Catholic community as 
well as religious relations in the United States. 
(Ph.D. University of Kentucky, 1982); Patricia Barrett, 
Religious Liberty and the American Presidency, (New York: 
Herder & Herder Co., 1963); Dulce, Berton. Religion and the 
Presidency, (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1962); Lawrence 
Fuchs, John F. Kennedy and American Catholicism, (Des 
Moines: Merideth Press, 1967); Paul Lopatto, Religion and 
the Presidential Elections, (New York: Praeger Studies, 
1985); Albert Menendez, John Fitzgerald Kennedy: Catholic 
and Humanist, (New York: Prometheus Books, 1978); Albert 
Menendez, Religion at the Polls, (Philadelphia: The 
Westminister Press, 1977); In fact, the only time the 
Catholic issue emerged was to stress the antagonism between 
Kennedy and the Church. See Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 122-127. 
*See Appendix. 
CHAPTER I 
AN AMERICAN CHURCH AND CANDIDATE 
America between the years 1945-1960 was different 
from Al Smith's America. Protestant America was being 
metamorphosed. Demographic, social and economic changes of 
postwar America presaged the demise of the cultural hegemony 
of Protestantism and the emergence of a new pluralism. By 
the end of this period, Anglo-Protestants consisted of only 
one-third of the country's 171 million population, while 
Catholics had more than doubled in numbers to comprise 26% 
or roughly 40 million of the nation's inhabitants. 1 
Catholic Americans experienced economic and social success 
and acquired a new found confidence in their political 
future. Will Herberg, journalist and sociologist, observed 
in 1955 that "American Catholicism has successfully negotiated 
the transition from a foreign church to an American religious 
community. It is now part of the American way of Life. 112 
1Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1960 
(New York: Pocket Books, 1961), pp. 270-271. 
2
will Herberg, Protestant, Catholics and Jew, (New 
York: Doubleday and Co., revised 1960), pp. 175. 
7 
Aroericanization coupled with social acceptance spawned the 
necessary breeding ground for the rise of the America-
catholic politician, John Fitzgerald Kennedy. It made it 
possible for a Catholic to consider once again running for 
the highest office in the land and to transform his faith 
into a political asset in 1956. 
After Al Smith's defeat, the American Catholic 
Church turned its attention away from politics to the 
building of a structurally sound and efficiently run 
administration to meet the educational and spiritual needs 
of its membership. This brand of "brick and mortar" 
8 
Catholicism reached its "zenith" in the 1950's, culminating 
in a great outburst of devotionalism and boosterism. 3 
Having fought bravely in World War II and being a direct 
beneficiary of the G. I. Bill of Rights, Catholics 
encountered economic and social upward mobility, became a 
part of America's middle-class suburbia, and for all intents 
and purposes, were Americanized. By the end of the decade, 
theologian Gustave Weigel opined that this good fortune had 
created an "American" church. 
At the present moment the American Catholic Church is 
neither a harassed minority nor a belligerent group. 
It is more prone to conservatism than radical change. 
Its tendency is toward American chauvinism rather than 
anything anti-American. It is rather contemptuous of 
3Jay Dolan, The American Catholic Experience (New 
York: Doubleday and Co., 1985), pp. 352-260. Don Brophy, 
ed., The Story of Catholics in America (New York: Paulist 
Press, 1978), pp. 123-130. 
9 
what is foreign, even when visible in the Church 
elsewhere. Its generosity, activism, 4and optimism are probably more American than Catholic. 
Catholics had become 100% American. Their pure 
Americanism propagated a smugness and self-importance in the 
catholic community in terms of its role in American society. 
They began to see themselves as the last reservoir of 
spiritual and moral values for both American and Western 
civilization. As the last spiritual bastion against godless 
secularism and materialism, the American Catholic Church 
implemented a vigorous missionary policy throughout the 
country. The saving of souls became a patriotic duty. To 
be a true Catholic was also to be a good American. f'nlton 
J. Sheen's television program, "Life Is Worth Living," 
spearheaded this drive to save America by making it 
Catholic. This conversion drive peaked in 1960 when nearly 
150,000 Americans converted to Catholicism. 5 
Pure Americanism also led Catholics down the path of 
politics again with a new found confidence and purpose. 
During these years of the Cold War, the Church's hierarchy 
became stalwart supporters of Senator Joseph McCarthy and 
fervent leaders in the anti-communist crusade. 6 Thomas T. 
4Gustave Weigel, "Protestant-Catholic Dialogue," 
Catholic Mind, Vol. 57, Sept.-Oct. 1959, pp. 390-391. 
5Dolan, The American Catholic Experience, pp. 
391-394.6 
One should consult, Donald Crosby, God, Church and 
Flag: Senator Joe McCarthy and the Catholic Church (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978). 
10 
McAvoy, historian and priest, exhorted fellow Catholics that 
only second to presenting the Christian gospel to fellow 
Americans was the primary responsibility of Catholic 
Americans to participate in the political and social life of 
the nation. Catholic political activism, McAvoy believed, 
would imbue society with Catholic social principles and 
values. McAvoy's call was heeded. By 1955, seventy-two 
catholics sat in the House of Representatives and ten 
catholics had been elected to the United States Senate. 
catholics such as Edmund Muskie, Eugene McCarthy, Robert 
Wagner, and John F. Kennedy became leading national 
politicians. McAvoy was especially pleased with the 
appearance of such Catholic leadership in American political 
life. "It marks the emergence of many Catholic political 
leaders who found no conflict between their Catholicism and 
their Anglo-American tradition. 117 
The increase of Catholic power and influence in 
American politics was not looked favorably upon by all 
American citizens. Non-Catholics--Protestants, secularists, 
and liberals--feared the impact this rise in political power 
would have upon the country 1 s tradition of individual 
liberty and religious freedom. They were still apprehensive 
about an institution they thought symbolized persecution, 
dogmatism, authoritarianism, and conformity. Paul Blanshard, 
7 Thomas T. McAvoy, CSC, "This American Catholicism," 
Catholic World, Vol. 190, November 29, 1959, pp. 118-119. 
11 
a congregational Minister, lawyer, and leading Protestant 
propagandist, capsulized the bigoted anxieties, doubts, and 
misconceptions of anti-Catholicism in his work, aptly 
entitled, American Freedom and Catholic Power. Blanshard's 
major:_!:!:iE!.l?~s __ !/.CiS that the CaU1olic Church was an inveterate 
--------' . 
enemy of American freedom. In this regard, it was second 
o~ly to Communism. Blanshard envisaged the crushing of 
American freedom and the First Amendment by Catholic 
authoritarianism. He depicted Catholic Americans with two 
allegiances, one to the pope, the other to the constitution. 
When the two loyalties conflict, Blanshard argued, papal 
obligations would take precedence over constitutional 
principles. Finally, when the Catholic Church had acquired 
enough political power, he foresaw it, at the behest of the 
pope, rescinding the constitution and coercively imposing 
upon the country Catholic beliefs and morals. 8 
Thirty percent of his fellow Protestants agreed with 
Blanshard that under no condition did they desire a Catholic 
in the White House. 9 The remaining seventy percent did not 
espouse the bigoted beliefs of Blanshard but did entertain 
some legitimate fears and concerns about Catholicism's 
compatibility with American democracy. Will Herberg in his 
8Paul Blanshard, American Freedom and Catholic Power 
(Boston: Beacon Press, revised 1952), pp. 1-30. 
9Albert J. Menendez, John F. Kennedy: Catholic and 
Humanist (New York: Prometheus Books, 1982) p. 25. 
12 
book, Protestant, Catholic and Jew, presented a sociological 
explanation for Americans' anti-Catholic response to the 
emergence of Catholics into the mainstream of American life. 
He characterized contemporary American society as one based 
upon a "transmuted Pot" of three cultures, Protestant, 
10 
catholic, and Jew. Religion was the foci of these three 
cultures, defining a member's identity, and delineating his 
or her purpose in life. According to Herberg, religion in 
this sense was the soul of one's social and cultural 
identity, and ultimately the reconciler of Americanism with 
the country's religious and economic diversity. Such a 
tripartite division in culture, Herberg contended, explained 
the increase in Catholic power and symbolized the end of 
Protestant America, a demise Protestants attempted to thwart 
by anti-Catholic protests. 
What seems to be disturbing many Protestants is the 
sudden realization that Protestantism is no longer 
identical with America, that Protestantism has, in 
fact, become merely one of three communities with 
equal status and equal legitimacy in the scheme of 
things. This sudden realization, shocking enough when 
one considers the historical origins of American life 
and culture, appears to have driven Protestantism into 
an essentially defensive posture, in which it feels 
itself a f'fre minority threatened with Catholic 
domination. 
It also explained the Protestant defensiveness that made 
Blanshard and others "vehement champions of an extreme 
10Herberg, Protestant, Catholic and Jew, pp. 
102-103. 
11
rbid. I P• 251 
13 
doctrine of the separation of church and state" and that 
portrayed Catholics as "un-American, undemocratic, 
American ways, and prone to place loyalty to the 
alien to 
Church 
d . 12 above loyalty to state an nation. 
some Catholics responded to these unfounded 
accusations of disloyalty with the same bitterness and 
defensiveness of Al Smith. A new generation of Catholics, 
however, sought to understand the foundations of Protestant 
fears. They concluded that such fears were based upon past 
and present misconceptions of the American Church and its 
doctrines, and that a campaign was needed to demonstrate to 
concerned non-Catholics that the true principles of 
Catholicism were compatible with the constitution. James M. 
O'Neill, a Catholic layman and scholar, participated in this 
campaign of understanding by providing the definitive reply 
to Blanshard' s charges in his Catholicism and American 
Freedom. In this book, O'Neill undermined Blanshard' s 
argument point by point, concluding that it was more a 
fictional account of what Blanshard had envisioned Catholic 
America to be, than what it actually was. 13 John Courtney 
Murray, S. J., a leading American theologian, provided the 
rational Catholic response to anti-Catholicism in his work, 
12 Herberg, Protestant, Catholic and Jew, pp. 
251-253. 
13James O'Neill, Catholicism and American Freedom 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), pp. 246-268. 
14 
We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflection on the American 
-ftoposition. In his preface, Murray confidently approached 
the compatibility controversy. 
The question is sometimes raised, whether Catholicism 
is incompatible with American democracy. The question 
is invalid as well as impertinent; for the manner of 
its position inverts the order of values. It must, of 
course, be turned around to read, whet:ffr American 
democracy is compatible with Catholicism. 
Murray argued that, contrary to popular opinion, 
most Catholics fully supported the First Amendment. He and 
fellow Catholics realized the importance of prohibiting an 
established state religion in order to keep civil and 
religious peace in America's pluralistic society. "It is in 
fact the only view that a citizen with both historical and 
15 
common sense can take." Murray reassured non-Catholics 
that if ever the day would come when Catholics would 
represent a political majority in the country, there would 
be no Catholic take over of America. The pope would not sit 
in the White House. A Catholic-American president, like 
previous presidents, would be limited in his actions by the 
constitutional and institutional limitations built in the 
American system of government. Murray further insisted that 
Catholic obedience to the clause of the First Amendment was 
based upon a moral imperative to promote the common good in 
society: 
14 James Courtney Murray, S. J., We Hold These 
Truths (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960), p. ix. 
15Ibid., p. 23 
15 
He, the American.-Catholic, takes the highest ground 
available in this matter of the relations between 
religion and government when he asserts that his 
commitment to the religion clauses of the Constitution 
is a moral commitment r~ them as articles of peace in 
a pluralistic society. 
while O'Neill and Murray attempted to demonstrate 
the theoretical and rational compatibility of Catholicism 
and American democracy, Catholic politicians such as John F. 
Kennedy undertook the more difficult task of demonstrating 
this compatibility in concrete actions and words to the 
American electorate. In 1946, John F. Kennedy, a decorated 
war veteran, successfully ran for Congress in Massachusetts. 
Six years later, he became a United States Senator. In 
1956, when Kennedy considered the possibility of being Adlai 
Stevenson's vice-presidential running mate for the 
Democratic party, he encountered the anti-Catholic ghost of 
Al Smith and nag to weigh for the first time the political 
liabilities of his Catholic faith. His father, employing 
the religious issue as his rationale for his son not to run 
for the vice-presidency, insisted that Stevenson would lose, 
and with his son on the ticket, political analysts would 
attribute the defeat to his Catholic faith which could only 
hinder his future chances for national office. 17 Theodore 
Sorensen, advisor and friend, as well as other members of 
16 Murray, We Hold These Truths, p. 78. 
17James MacGregor Burns, Kennedy: A Profile (U.S. 
Information Service, 1960), pp. 60-61. 
16 
J{enne dy 's staff, prevailed upon him the necessity to run. 
such an opportunity would catapult him into the national 
political limelight, increasing 
presidency in 1960.18 
his chances for the 
Determined to seek and win the vice-presidential 
candidacy, Kennedy publicly defended the compatibility of 
catholic and American principles. More importantly, he 
endeavored to convince fellow politicians that his faith 
would not be a liability to the Democratic ticket, as it was 
purported to be in Al Smith's campaign of 1928. In two 
separate memorandas, one composed by Sorensen and the other 
by John Bailey, a leading figure in Connecticut Democratic 
politics, Kennedy divulged his theory that his Catholicism 
was, in fact, a political asset. 19 He first undermined the 
mythology surrounding Al Smith's defeat. He argued that it 
was fallacious to believe that Smith lost because of his 
faith. It was "Republican Prosperity" and the candidate's 
wet, urban, and ethnic background that defeated the 
Democratic party in 1928. 2° Kennedy insisted that his 
candidacy possessed none of Smith's deficiencies. He 
18 Burns, Kennedy: A Profile, pp. 60-61. 
19 Theodore Sorensen, "Memorandum for Democratic 
Nominee in 1956," (John F. Kennedy Library: 
Pre-Presidential Papers, Senate Files, 1956), Box No. 810; 
John Bailey, "The Democratic National Ticket: An Analysis 
of Available Data and Polls," (John F. Kennedy Library: 
Pre-Presidential Papers, Senate Files, 1956), Box No. 810. 
20 Ibid. 
17 
·ntained that he could win the election for the Democrats 
ma1 
by attracting the large Catholic vote that had switched to 
Eisenhower in 1952 and that was strategically placed in 
states with the largest electoral votes. With him on the 
ticket, it meant the winning of 14 key states and 261 
electoral votes for the Democratic party because "Catholics 
voted not as union members or farmers or women or old people 
but as Catholics. There is or can be a Catholic vote." 21 
Sorensen concurred with Kennedy's Catholic scenario: 
"Kennedy, on the ticket, would attract all of these voters, 
particularly the Catholics, back to the Democrats. If 
Stevenson can carry the South and if Kennedy can get the 
Catholic Democratic vote back, the Democratic party will win 
22 in November." 
A Kennedy, thus, adeptly disarmed his anti-Catholic 
opponents by transforming his faith into a political asset 
for himself and his party. He went to the Democratic 
Convention in Chicago as a "Catholic vote-getter." After 
Adlai Stevenson had won the presidential nomination of his 
party, he announced that the convention delegates would 
decide who his vice-presidential running mate would be. 
21 Theodore Sorensen, "Memorandum for Democratic 
Nominee in 1956," (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-
Presidential Papers, Senate Files, 1956), Box No. 810;John 
Bailey, "The Democratic National Ticket: An Analysis of 
Available Data and Polls," (John F. Kennedy Library: 
Pre-Presidential Papers, Senate Files, 1956), Box No. 810. 
22
rbid. 
18 
" 
. . 
I have concluded to depart from the precedents of the 
past. I have decided that the selection of the vice-
presidential nominee should be made through the free process 
of the convention. 1123 Immediately, convention delegates 
began to lobby for their favorite candidate, and the 
selection process turned into a struggle between Kennedy and 
Estes Kefauver. In the end, the candidate from Tennessee 
defeated his formidable Catholic opponent. On the brighter 
side, Kefauver did not win because of Kennedy's faith, but, 
as Sorensen explained, because of numerous strategic 
blunders made by Kennedy's staff on the convention floor. 24 
Kennedy supporters as well as political analysts 
perceived a great victory in Kennedy's defeat. Overnight, 
they maintained, this viable vice-presidential candidate had 
become a well-known and respected national leader of the 
Democratic party. McCall magazine observed that "when the 
convention was over it had crowned only one hero -- John F. 
Kennedy. 1125 Arthur Schlesinger Jr. concurred. 
York: 
I wanted to say that, however, the V.P. contest came 
out, you clearly emerged as the man who gained most 
during the convention. You hit the bull's eye on 
every one of your appearances; and your general 
demeanor and effectiveness made you in a single week a 
23 Burns, Kennedy, pp. 186-188. 
2 4 Ibid. , p. 18 8. ; Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy, (New 
Bantam Books, 1965), pp. 101-103. 
25p Cl. . ress 1pp1ng, 
Library: Pre-Presidential 
No. 810. 
McCall, 1956 (John F. 
Papers, Senate Files, 
Kennedy 
1956), Box 
19 
national political figure. You are bound to be in 
everyone's mind from now on f~ any future 
consideration of national candidates. 
James MacGregor Burns boldly predicted that "In this moment 
of triumphant defeat, his campaign for the presidency was 
27 born." 
Kennedy, encouraged by these voices of optimism, 
began to campaign unofficially for the presidential 
candidacy of the Democratic party. He was convinced he had 
overcome and buried Smith's tragic legacy. He had 
confronted publicly the religious issue, transformed it into 
a political asset, and most important, conveyed a public 
image of an American and not a Catholic candidate. Catholic 
liberal scholar and journalist, John Cogley, thought that 
this was the major difference between Smith's failure and 
Kennedy's success. 
John F. Kennedy is no Al Smith. He is much closer to 
the enduring Protestant image of the President than 
the self-made man who grew up on the East side of New 
York • . • Kennedy is the American Catholic arrive . • 
If the tradition which has kept Catholics out of the 
White House is to go, the image Kennedy projects will 
provide a fairly painless transition. The stereotype 
of the Irish-Catholic politician, the pugnacious, 
priest ridden representative of an embittered, 
embattled minority, simply does not fit the poi~gd, 
urbane, cosmopolitan young socialite from Harvard. 
26Arthur J. Schlesinger, Jr. to John F. Kennedy, 
Letter, August 21, 1956 (John F. Kennedy Library: 
Pre-Presidential Papers, Senate Files, 1956), Box No. 810. 
27 Burns, Kennedy, p. 187. 
28John Cogley, "A Catholic for President?," 
Commonweal, April 10, 1959, p. 53. 
CHAPTER II 
BETRAYER OF HIS OWN KIND: 
KENNEDY AND THE CATHOLIC ISSUE IN 1959 
Next to birth control and Pope John's announcement 
of the Vatican Council, the top religious news story of 1959 
among the country's some forty million Catholics was the 
likelihood of a Catholic presidential candidate. 1 During 
this year, Kennedy expressed his views on the religious 
issue in an exclusive Look interview. He hoped that his 
interview would allay Protestant fears and, once and for all, 
bury the religious issue before the official presidential 
campaign began the following January. His interview did 
mitigate some of the more moderate anti-Catholics, but 
surprisingly, it incurred the wrath of the American Catholic 
hierarchy and diocesan press. To them, he became a betrayer 
of his own kind. At the end of the year, Kennedy once again 
found himself in an uncomfortable religious controversy 
1Boston Pilot, January 2, 1960, p. 8: other important 
religious news stories for the year were: Bishops condemn 
the use of birth control, Mother Seton was declared 
venerable, Krushchev visits the United States for 12 days, 
President Eisenhower told news conference that the he saw no 
reason why a Catholic should not be elected president. 
20 
21 
Use of the hierarchy's pastoral letter on birth control. bee a 
1 9 60 dawned, Kennedy realized that he had to appease When 
both protestant and Catholic sensitivities if he were to 
become the next president of the United States. 
With the presidential campaign approximately twelve 
months away, Kennedy had a long conversation with Dr. Henry 
Knox, former presiding bishop of the Episcopal Church in the 
united States, about church-state issues and anti-Catholicism. 
After the meeting, Kennedy was convinced that Protestants, 
even "eminent ones," still had doubts about his religious 
views and his relationship with church officials. 2 Wanting 
to convince Protestants and other non-Catholics that he 
believed in separation of church and state and that as 
president he would make his decisions independent of Church 
dogma and papal influence, Kennedy submitted to an interview 
with Fletcher Knebel, a nationally respected journalist. 
I gave the interview on my own initiative because I 
felt that the questions which were raised were matters 
which ref le ct honest doubts among many citizens and 
because I felt that frank answers might help to remove 
this problem from a political context. In giving 
these answers, I was simply stating candidly my firm 
belief that a Catholic can serve as the President of 
the United States and fulfill his oath of 3office with 
complete fidelity and without reservation. 
The contents of Kennedy's interview were published 
2Fletcher Knebel, "Democratic Forecast: A Catholic 
in 1960," Look, March 3, 1959, pp. 16-17. 
3 John F. Kennedy, Memorandum, 
Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential 
Correspondence), Box No. 998. 
March 1959 (John F. 
Papers, General 
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March 3rd issue of Look magazine. Kennedy succinctly in the 
h 1·s views on the controversial church-state issues. stated 
Catholic, he perceived no difficulty in maintaining AS a 
absolute fidelity to his presidential oath: his Catholicism 
would not impede his overriding responsibility to his 
constitutional duties. "Whatever one's religion in private 
life may be, for the office holder, nothing takes precedence 
over his oath to uphold the Constitution and all its parts 
including the First Amendment and the strict separation 
4 
of Church and State." He also vehemently opposed sending 
an American ambassador to the Vatican in Rome because 
"Whatever the advantages might be in Rome -- and I am not 
convinced of these -- they would be more than off set by the 
divisive effect at home. " 5 He finally rejected direct 
federal aid to parochial schools. "The First Amendment to 
the Constitution is an infinitely wise one. There can be no 
question of Federal funds being used for support of 
parochial or private schools. It's unconstitutional under 
the First Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court. 
I'm opposed to the Federal government's extending support to 
4 Fletcher, "Democratic Forecast," Look, pp. 16-17. 
5 Ibid. Richard Cardinal Cushing, Oral History 
Interview, (John F. Kennedy Library: Oral History 
~ollection), Transcript p.3 Cushing gave his opinion on this 
issue. "That was an absurd objection against the election 
of President Kennedy. I do not know one member of the 
hierarchy in the United States who in my lifetime favored 
such a step. Undoubtedly there were some, but I never knew 
them." 
any Church or its schools." 6 sustain 
Kennedy's interview did manage to assuage some 
23 
protestant fears but, to his chagrin and surprise, it "drew 
a less enthusiastic reaction from Catholics than anti-
Catholic bigots." 7 The aspect of the interview that most 
disturbed Catholics was Kennedy's "nothing takes precedence 
over the oathn statement, a statement his Catholic critics 
called a "pretty pathetic" espousal of godless secularism to 
appease bigots. 8 The American Catholic hierarchy found it 
necessary to publicly state its disagreement with Kennedy in 
its national Catholic Almanac. Separation of religion from 
one's public life was impossible, according to American 
bishops; the Catholic conscience must interact and adjudge 
the constitutional oath. The bishops reminded Kennedy that 
"The demands of integrity require him to be answerable to 
God for actions whether public or private." 9 Thurston Davis, 
6
rbid. Richard Cardinal Cushing, Oral History 
Interview, (John F. Kennedy Library: Oral History Collec-
tion) , Transcript p. 3 Cushing gave his opinion on this 
issue. 
"That was an absurd objection against the election of 
President Kennedy. I do not know one member of the hierarchy 
in the United States who in my lifetime favored such a step. 
Undoubtedly there were some, but I never knew them." 
7 The Tablet, February 28, 1959, p. 6. 
8Donald McDonald, The Catholic Messenger, "Some 250 
Percent Americanism," February 26, 1959, p. 12. 
9
catholic Almanac, (1960), pp. 109-110. Entitled 
"Catholic Candidate for the Presidency: Catholic Conscience 
vs Constitution," the article ended by giving advice ~n how 
Catholics should vote. "Competence and integrity are the 
basic criteria of the fitness of any candidate, not because 
he is or is not a Catholic." 
J editor of America, the national Jesuit weekly s. . , 
magazine, was taken aback by it. "Mr. Kennedy doesn't 
really believe that. No religious man, be he Catholic, 
protestant, or Jew, holds such an opinion. A man's 
conscience has a bearing on his public as well as his 
l 'f .. 10 private 1 e. 
Ave Maria's editor, John Reedy, C. S. C., accused 
Kennedy of being a proponent of godless secularism. 
24 
"Something indeed does take over the obligation to uphold 
the constitution namely conscience. No man may 
rightfully act against his conscience. To relegate your 
conscience to your private life is not only unrealistic but 
dangerous because it leads to secularism in public life. 011 
The San Francisco Monitor concurred. "The mouthing of such 
a phrase is a surrender to secularism by those who would 
divorce public morality from religion and God from public 
l 'f 1112 1 e. The most vitriolic and ruthless attack emerged 
from the pen of Robert Hoyt, editor of the St. Joseph-
Kansas City Register. "If this is an American doctrine, I'm 
leaving for Tahiti." He called Kennedy a fascist who was 
lOThurston, Davis, "On Questioning Catholic 
Candidates," America, March 7, 1959, p. 651. 
11 John Reedy, "Catholics and the Presidency," Ave 
Maria, March 7, 1959, p. 18. 
12Father Mark Hurley, "Question Mark?," San 
Francisco Monitor, March 6, 1959, p. 4. Hurley continued 
his diatribe against Kennedy, accusing him of appeasing such 
bigots as Blanshard and concluding that he should have "bad-
mouthed" this bigotry. 
25 
t keep his own conscience. His oath statement was unable o 
•the same doctrine as the one used by Nazi torturers and 
assassins in the Nuremberg trials. They conunitted crimes in 
absolute obedience to their superiors and laws of their 
d "13 lan • 
The most damaging charge against Kennedy in the 
catholic press was that he betrayed his own kind by 
submitting to such a bigoted interview in order to appease 
14 Protestants. To the San Francisco Monitor, the interview 
symbolized the compromise and humiliation of every Catholic 
15 in the United States. Gerard Sherry of the Catholic 
Review was enraged by Kennedy's interview. "Unfortunately, 
a Catholic president is something quite a number of bigots 
still can't stomach. These bigots question the loyalty of a 
Catholic presidential candidate solely on religious grounds 
he appears to have gone overboard in an effort to 
13The Catholic Week (Birmingham, Alabama) March 20, 
1959, p. 6. According to Hoyt, Kennedy was not a Catholic 
if he had to be reminded by Catholics and by even "good 
Protestants" that his ultimate loyalty was not to the state 
but to God. 
14National Catholic Welfare Conference: Religious 
News Service (Microfilm: University of Notre Dame). Report 
entitled "Questioning of Catholic Candidate Regarding Their 
Americanism is condemned by Newspaper Editorials," March 2, 
1959, pp. 59: 1394-1399. Provided a brief sununary of the 
negative responses of the Catholic press toward Kennedy's 
participation in the interview. 
15J. Hurley, "Question Mark?," San Francisco 
Monitor, March 6, 1959, p. 4. 
26 
placate the bigots. 1116 The Catholic Messenger, viewing the 
entire episode with "considerable dismay," concluded, "It is 
unpleasant to see a Catholic Senator in the awkward position 
of bending over backwards as he tries to prove his loyalty 
to the Constitution. The whole affair is rather insulting 
and should not be dignified by serious attention. 1117 The 
Steubenville Register of Ohio expressed similar frustration 
and exasperation in its future hope: "Some day, we should 
like to see a Catholic, when questioned about the possible 
conflict between his Church and the Constitution to stand up 
and say: 'It's none of your business how I feel on these 
matters. Accept me for what I am, not for what I believe. 
If you can't do this, then satisfy your prejudice and vote 
. t '18 agains me. 
Catholic journals disparaged Kennedy's submission to 
such a religious test. Two specialized journals for the 
16NCWC: Religious News Service, March 2, 1959, pp. 
59-1395. 
17Donald McDonald, "Some 250% Americanism," Catholic 
Messenger, February 26, 1959, p. 12. McDonald advised that 
Catholics should not allow Blanshards to ask such questions 
and quoted Will Herberg for an explanation of Kennedy's 
actions. "American Catholics have been so eager to become 
Americans that they have overdone this job. They have 
become 250% Americans. You get the most violent reaction to 
the slightest slur on the American Way of Life from Catholic 
Americans." 
18NCWC: Religious News Service, March 2, 1959, pp. 
59-1396. Father James E. Quinn, "Art of the Possible," the 
Lafayette Edition of Our Sunday Visitor, March 3, 1959, p. 
2A. 
27 
American Catholic clergy, The Priest and Homiletic and 
Pastoral Review, usually reticent on political matters, were 
disappointed with Kennedy and disenchanted with Catholic 
1 . . . 19 po it1c1ans. "For there are Catholics who look to 
political expediency or who are ill-informed on the natural 
law in making their decisions and there are undoubtedly 
catholics who bend over backwards and act in reverse just to 
emphasize their freedom of control by the Vatican. 1120 
America, after depicting the interview as 11 insulting," 
"discriminatory," "humiliating," and "a remnant of the bad 
old days of Knownothingism, " 21 summarized the feelings of 
its entire editorial staff. 11 Our own reaction to the 
controverted Look interview is one of impatience at the 
earnest Massachusetts Senator's efforts to appease bigots 
rather than of disagreement with the positive points he 
made. A Catholic political candidate, if he must make a 
profession of his faith, should not seem to give quarter to 
religious bigotry, even at the risk of having his words 
distorted." 22 
19The Priest, Vol. 15, January 1959, pp. 6-13; The 
Homiletic and Pastoral Review, Vol. 59, April 1959, pp--:--
625-629. 
20Editorial, "Catholics in Politics," The Priest, 
Vol. 15, January 1959, pp. 6-13. 
21
oavis, "Questioning Catholic Candidate," America, 
March 7, 1959, p. 651; Also consult "Third Degree for 
Catholics," editorial in America, March 14, 1959, p. 675. 
22 Ibid., p. 651. 
28 
Not all Catholics, however, were Kennedy antagonists. 
Kennedy did have some tentative and adamant supporters among 
his religious peers in the hierarchy and the press. Father 
Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., dean for religious communities 
at the Catholic University of America as well as a renowned 
American theologian, refused to make any specific comments 
on Kennedy's Look interview but advised the public and 
supporters of Kennedy that he would give him the "benefit of 
the doubt." He assured Americans that there was no conflict 
between Catholicism and the constitution, but if one did 
emerge, "God's law must come first." 23 Richard Cardinal 
Cushing, long-time family friend and confessor, interpreted 
Kennedy's Look interview and Catholic press reaction as an 
example of how statements may cause "unintentional 
confusion." He thought that Kennedy had given 
straightforward answers, yet the quotes used by the press 
were trite, while the commentaries were extensive. He was 
especially displeased that these questions had to be asked 
at all. "I think it is a great pity They are 
certainly ridiculous when presented to a person in public as 
long as Senator Kennedy." 24 
23NCWC: Religious News Service, "Asserts Exemplary 
Catholic would make best type of Public Official," March 9, 
1959, pp. 59-1594. 
24Boston Pilot, March 14, 1959, p. 1; Father Philip 
Kelley to John F. Kennedy, March 10, 1959 (John F. Kennedy 
Library: Pre-Presidential Papers, General Correspondence), 
Box No. 998. Father Kelley wrote to Kennedy to praise 
Cushing "who certainly gave you his blessing." John 
29 
The editor of the Michigan Catholic adjudged 
Kennedy's oath statement as necessary to convince 
non-Catholics of a Catholic president's loyalty. "The 
senator is merely saying that he foresees no conflict in 
conscience between his duty as a Catholic and his duty, if 
he were president, to uphold the cons ti tut ion." 25 The 
leading liberal journal Commonweal, run by Catholic 
laypersons, concluded that the time was ripe for Catholics 
to correct false and misleading images of the Church and to 
replace religious bias with religious tolerance. This was 
not the time to cry religious test. Kennedy's interview 
symbolized the challenge all Catholics must encounter to 
b . 1 d . Am . l' f 26 ecome invo ve in erican 1 e. Finally, Father Raymond 
Gribbin in his article, "The Catholic President: A 
President who would violate his oath of office would make 
himself an enemy of God," said Kennedy espoused sound 
Catholic doctrine. "All Catholics by force of obligation 
must consider all oaths in such a manner, for to violate 
one's oath is to turn one's back on God. It is a mortal 
sin." If violation of an oath were as "egregious as 
murder," Gribbin contended, Catholics would examine their 
F. Kennedy to Father Kelley, Letter, March 18, 1959 (John F. 
Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential Papers, General 
Correspondence), Box No. 998. Kennedy's thank you note. 
25Editorial, "Senator Kennedy's Stand," Michigan 
Catholic, February 26, 1959, p. 4. 
26 Commonweal, 11 A Catholic for President, 11 March 6, 
1959, p. 587. 
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conscience before taking any oath and find that the 
presidential oath was compatible with Catholic principles. 
"The oath taken by the president of the United States is an 
oath that may be taken in good conscience by any Catholic 
... he will put nothing before it. His allegiance to the 
pope then will be carried out in perfect harmony with the 
demands of the oath." 27 
In spite of these few voices of support, the 
American Catholic church in its newspapers was very outraged 
by Kennedy's interview. Nearly a decade later, John Cogley 
wrote: 
I don't think you can exaggerate the reaction to that 
Look article in the Catholic press, particularly 
because it was a very negative and very naive 
reaction, and I thought, a very politically unsophis-
ticated reaction. It indicated to me at the time that 
27 Reverend Raymond William Gribbin, "The Catholic 
Candidate: A Catholic Who Would Violate His Oath of Office 
Would Make Himself an Enemy of God," Our Sunday Visitor 
(National Edition), February 28, 1959, p. 2. Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr. defended Kennedy against a few of his 
Protestant critics. Consult Arthur Schlesinger Jr. to Dr. 
Robert Sampson of the First Methodist Church, Letter (John 
F. Kennedy Library: Special Correspondence-Arthur 
Schlesinger), Box No. 32. He argued that Kennedy by his 
oath statement was faithfully adhering to a presidential 
tradition. "I know of no president who had even said that 
his religion took precedence over his oath to uphold the 
constitution." He then concluded that since "religion is a 
private matter in a free society," Dr. Sampson and other 
critics were attempting to "Blackball Kennedy." Schlesinger 
also wrote letters in defense of Kennedy to the editor of 
Christianity and Crisis. Schlesinger to John F. Kennedy, 
Letter March 26, 1959. Schlesinger to editor of 
Christianity and Crisis, Letter, April 7, 1959 (John F. 
Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential Papers, General 
Correspondence), Box No. 998. 
31 
the::( hadn 'ZB thought through this whole question very 
serious,ly. 
Naive or not, Kennedy realized that he had failed to take 
into account Catholic response to his Look interview. He 
did not anticipate Catholic hostility. His close advisor, 
Theodore Sorensen, contended, that Kennedy, unlike Al Smith, 
was preoccupied with challenging the Catholic liability 
charge, and casting doubt on the suspicions of "Americans of 
good will." In the end, allaying Protestant fears obscured 
and took precedence over Catholic sensitivity. 
To end those suspicions and to end the tradition 
against a Catholic president, he knew he had to answer 
not only reasonable questions but many unreasonable 
questions as well. He knew he could not afford to be 
defensive, angry, impatient, or silent, no matter how 
many times he had heard the2 g5ame insulting, foolish, 
or discriminatory questions. 
Realizing the error in his strategy, Kennedy came to 
his own defense in a memorandum sent out of his Washington, 
D.C. office to Catholic critics. He stressed that his 
interview was not intended to be an exhaustive treatise on 
Catholic thought concerning the obligations of the office-
holder in a democratic society. He argued that such an 
ambitious undertaking would have been presumptuous on his part 
28
oral History Interview, John Cogley, February 20, 
1968 (John F. Kennedy Library: Oral History Collection), 
Transcript, p. 46. Cogley also explained how this involved 
his first communication with Kennedy in his life. After 
reading his series in Commonweal, Kennedy sent him a note of 
thanks and later incorporated his advice in his Houston 
Speech. 
29 Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1965), pp. 108-113. 
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"since I am trained neither in philosophy, theology, or 
church history." 30 The purpose of his interview was to show 
that a Catholic can be a loyal President. Conunenting on his 
oath statement, he emphasized that history demonstrated the 
compatibility of the presidential oath and conscience 
because no previous president had resigned or violated the 
oath. Such a compatibility was ostensible. "I should have 
thought it self-evident that all men regard conscience as an 
essential element in all human decisions ••• Indeed, the 
oath of office would be a meaningless gesture were it not 
for the principles which conscience imposes. 1131 Lastly, 
Kennedy maintained that he was not a bigot appeaser" . 
quite frankly, I do not feel that I have made any 
compromises; and I certainly am not, as you suggest, 
attempting to placate any particular group, anti-Catholic or 
otherwise. I am merely trying to state in my own way what I 
consider to be orthodox principles regarding the 
relationship between a Christian politician and his 
beliefs. 1132 
30John F. Kennedy to Citizen, Memorandum, 1959 (John 
F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential Papers, General 
Correspondence), Box No. 998. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid.; John F. Kennedy to Father Robert Whelan, 
Letter, July 15, 1959 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-
Presidential Papers, General Correspondence), Box No. 998. 
NCWC: Religious News Service, "Kennedy Conunents on 
Editorials," March 3, 1959, pp. 59-1595. 
In the aftermath of the Look interview, Time 
magazine conducted a poll to determine the extent of co-
religionist support for Catholic presidential candidate. 
Fifty-two percent, more than half of the Catholic 
participants, admitted they would be willing to switch 
political parties to vote for one of their own kind as 
33 
president. Ninety-five percent of Catholics interviewed,, 
said that they would prefer a candidate who shared their 
. 11 h . l' . 33 politics as we as t eir re 1g1on. The Alamo Register's 
local poll, which comprised one thousand students enrolled 
in San Antonio's Catholic institutions of higher learning, 
34 found that a majority preferred Kennedy. Organizing a 
fifty-state listening poll, Newsweek administered a survey 
of the country's Catholic community -- clergy, politicians, 
and rank and file. Newsweek deduced from its findings a 
composite picture of what it thought to be the views of a 
typical or average Catholic voter. The average Catholic 
voter discerned no conflict of loyalties between Catholicism 
and Americanism; would vote only for the best qualified 
candidate; sought to expunge religion from the campaign but 
realized it was an impossible task; wanted, despite 
apprehensions about the prematurity of a Catholic candidate 
3311 Politics: Can a Catholic Win?, Time, May 18, 
1959, p. 23. The findings also revealed that 58% of all 
U.S. Catholics were Democrats. 
34Alamo Register, December 10, 1959, pp. 1, 11. Out 
of 987 ballots, Kennedy received 345 or 35%, while Nixon 
received 227 or 23%. 
34 
and about the possibility of the resurfacing of the bigotry 
of 1928, a Catholic to run for the presidency; and even more 
than that, wanted him to win -- to break the last major 
symbol and bastion of Protestant America. 35 
These polls provided some comfort to Kennedy but 
they did not obfuscate his political judgment. Such a 
hostile reaction convinced Kennedy that he could not take 
catholic support for granted, and that he would have to be 
more circumspect in his statements concerning Catholicism 
and politics. Even more important, these polls and the 
whole Look episode persuaded him that the Church's hierarchy 
"was out to get him," and "out to embarrass him." According 
to John Cogley, Kennedy thought that some Republican bishops 
"disliked the liberal tenor of his thinking," while others 
revealed "a kind of resentment sometimes that here he was, a 
Harvard man, the boy who didn't go to Catholic schools, 
being the nation's number one representative of Catholicism 
• and also a fear that his style was altogether too 
secularized for their tastes. 1136 He also suspected that the 
Catholic clergy did not want a Catholic president because "A 
Catholic could no longer be a persecuted minority, an 
tt 't d th t k f h . th 1 't 1137 a i u e a ma es or co esiveness among e a1 y. 
3511 00 Catholics really want a Catholic President?," 
Newsweek, December 21, 1959, p. 27. 
36 John Cogley, Oral History Interview, February 29, 
1968 (John F. Kennedy Library: Oral History Collection), 
Transcript, pp. 38-40. 
37
rbid.; "Report from the Capital," Jubilee, May, 
35 
Kennedy's suspicions of the Catholic hierarchy were 
given more credence in November 1959 when American bishops 
published their pastoral letter, "Explosion or Backfire?" 
that opposed birth control. 38 The bishops contended that 
there was a concerted and systematic effort to convince 
Americans that the government should provide public funds 
for promoting artificial birth control. They opposed any 
public assistance for artificial birth control, abortion, 
and sterilization. They claimed that the "population 
explosion" was "hyperbolic propaganda." It was a "smoke 
screen behind which a moral evil may be foisted on the 
public." According to them, birth control was not the only 
solution. Scientific studies in agricultural production 
could meet the need of a rapidly expanding world population, 
and unlike birth control, increased food production was 
"morally" acceptable under the natural law of God. The 
bishops' pronouncement admonished: 
Never should we allow the unilateral guess-estimates 
of special pleaders to stampede or terrorize the 
United States into national or international policy 
inimical to human dignity. For the adoption of the 
morally objectionable means advocated to forestall the 
so-called 'J>g>pulation explosion' may backfire on the 
human race. 
1959, pp. 2-5. "Do Catholics really want a Catholic 
President?," Newsweek, December 1959, p. 28. 
38Hugh J. Nolan, ed., Pastoral Letters of the U.S. 
Catholic Bishops 1941-1961 (USCC: Washington, D.C., 1984), 
Vol. 2, pp. 221-225. 
39
rbid., p. 224; Editorial "Easy Way Out," Ave 
Maria, December 12, 1959, p. 17. Editor considered birth 
36 
The American Catholic church considered birth 
control a very serious matter. Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., 
posed the question whether a Catholic druggist could sell 
contraceptives. Connell concluded that if a druggist did, 
he was "guilty of a grave sin." 40 He was a public sinner 
and should be refused the sacraments. To Connell, the use 
of any artificial means of contraception violated the 
sacrament of marriage and God's natural law. There were 
only three acceptable methods of regulating conception: 
defer marriage, protracted continence, and periodic rhythm. 
These three methods protected "the true order of the ends of 
marriage and preserved the natural integrity of the marriage 
t 1141 ac . Theological Studies summarized the clerical 
argument against contraception. 
In summary, then, each single act of coi ti on is a 
natural sign of the mutual, procreative love of two 
partners. Coition is the symbol of natural marriage 
and of the supernatural, which later is, in turn, the 
symbol of Christ's union with his Church. 
control a specious solution. "Birth control might seem at 
first glance to be the easiest way out of a difficult 
problem . . • To solve the problem of population pressures 
by a policy inimical to human dignity would be folly 
indeed." John L. Thomas, s. J., "The Catholic Position on 
Birth Control," Catholic Mind, January-February 1960, pp. 
239-243; John P. Leary, s. J., "Is Birth Control the State's 
Business?," February 22, 1960; Vital Speeches (1960), pp. 
377-379. 
4
°Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., 
Contraceptives," American Ecclesiastical 
June 1959, pp. 120-123. 
"The Sale of 
Review, Vol. 140, 
41
william J. Gibbons, s. J. "World Population and 
World Food Supply," Catholic Almanac (1960), pp. 96-106. 
37 
contraception is evil because it falsifies this sign. 
contraception is wrong because it is a fictitious 
symbol of love, a substitution, of what, in truth 
symbolizes monstrous selfishness for what symbolizes 
utter self-giving • • • Contraception w~2 evil; it was 
a flat rejection of God's interjection. 
Catholic bishops perceived the need to publicly 
express their opinion on birth control because of recent 
developments. In July 1959, the President's Committee to 
study the United States Assistance Program, headed by 
William Draper, suggested that the United States help other 
countries, upon request, "in the formulation of their plans 
designed to deal with the problem of rapid population 
growth. 1143 The committee recommended that the government 
should support such programs in the United Nations. This 
Draper Report was generally interpreted as recommending the 
distribution of birth control information. It also became 
noted for the popularization of the term "population 
explosion," which implied and rationalized the need and 
support of birth control programs. 44 
The great historian and philosopher, Arnold Toynbee, 
42Paul M. Quay, s. J., "Contraception and Conjugal 
Love," Theological Studies, Vol. 22, December 1961, p. 40. 
43 James Reston, "Kennedy Opposes Advocacy by U.S. of 
Birth Control," New York Times, November 28, 1959, p. 1. 
Editorial, "Birth Control Debate," The Sign, January 1960, 
p. 10. 
44Archbishop Karl J. Alter, "Twisting of Birth 
Control Issue Charged," Catholic Transcript, February 11, 
1960, p. 10; Archbishop Alter delivered the speech "To Keep 
the Record Straight" to a layman's retreat organization of 
Cincinnati. 
38 
spoke in favor of a birth control program in Rome on 
November 2. The following week CBS presented an hour long 
program which was widely regarded by the clergy as 
"propaganda for artificial birth control." 45 Finally, the 
same week that the bishops met to draw up their pastoral 
letter, the National Conference of the Planned Parenthood 
Association held its convention in New York City. The 
conference delegates passed a resolution which implied 
eventual acceptance of the program by the Catholic Church: 
"that no doubt the Catholic Church would in the course of 
time modify its own ethical position on artificial birth 
control. 1146 
All these events, especially the last suggestion of 
a deferred acquiescence, prompted American bishops to 
proclaim the Church's positions on birth control. Bishop 
Karl J. Alter, chairman of the Administrative Board of the 
NCWC, attempted to explain that the church did not want to 
generate controversy but had to make the statement when 
events seemed to indicate that an effort was underway "to 
foster the adoption of artificial birth control as part of a 
45Archbishop Karl J. Alter, "Twisting of Birth 
Control Issue Charged," Catholic Transcript, February 11, 
1960, p. 10. 
46 Ibid., Also see New York Times, December 3, 1959, 
p. 1. 
47Alter, "Twisting of Birth Control 
Transcript, February 11, 1960, p. 10. 
.,"Catholic 
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national policy in granting foreign aid." 47 Despite Alter's 
good intentions, the issuance of the pastoral letter 
undermined whatever good Kennedy's Look interview had 
accomplished and raised the religious issue once again. It 
revived non-Catholic fears and suspicions about a Catholic 
president's ability to take a stance independent of such 
moral pronouncements. Kennedy, Sorensen noted, was outraged 
with the Church's hierarchy. "The Senator was sharply 
irritated that so sensitive and divisive an issue had been 
needlessly dragged into the headlines on the eve of his 
official campaign. The bishop's declaration furthered his 
belief that the hierarchy did not want him to be a 
candidate." 48 William E. Bohn, a Catholic and editor of the 
New Leader, a journal sponsored by the American Labor 
Conference on International Affairs, agreed with Kennedy's 
assessment in his article "No Chance for Kennedy." 49 
According to Bohn, the nomination and election of Kennedy 
was "nothing more than a bright dream of his optimistic 
youth." After reading numerous commentaries and talking to 
many observers, Bohn concluded that the former attractive 
candidate may as well call off his presidential campaign. 
48 Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 126-127. 
49
william E. Bohn, "No Chance for Senator Kennedy," 
New Leader, January 18, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-
Presidential Papers, Senate Files), Box No. 535; George 
Meany, Oral History Interview, July 16, 1964 (John F. 
Kennedy Library: Oral History Collection), Transcript, pp. 
12-17. Meany generally observed that labor remained 
uncommitted until the Democratic Convention that summer. 
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That statement of the Bishops was the most unfortunate 
piece of public relations activity I ever observed ••• 
But the position itself is not what provided the 
greatest shock. What disturbs many people is the tone 
of the pronouncement. These men speak like dictators. 
And because they talk that way a fine, intelligent, 
patriotic citizen named John Kennedy has not the 
remotest chance to be nominated as the Democr~0ic 
candidate for the Presidency of the United States. 
In an effort to demonstrate his autonomy to non-
catholics, Kennedy submitted to a telephone interview with 
James Reston of the New York Times. Kennedy articulated his 
independent position on birth control at home or abroad by 
the United States government. Promotion of birth control, 
especially in underdeveloped countries, he could not 
support. 
We have to be very careful on how we give advice on 
this subject ..• Accordingly I think it would be the 
greatest psychological mistake for us to appear to 
advocate limitation of the black, brown, or yellow 
peoples whose population is increasing no faster than 
in the United States • . For the United States to 
intervene on this basis would involve a kind of mean 
patriotism, W~fch I think they would find most 
objectionable. 
Reston then asked Kennedy if his position on birth control 
was in any way influenced by the sixteen bishops who drew up 
the pastoral letter. Kennedy rejoined with an emphatic 
"No." He argued that his position was independently 
formulated, held long before the pastoral letter, and 
50 Bohn, "No Chance for Senator Kennedy," New Leader, 
January 18, p. 6. 
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rnterview between Senator John F. Kennedy and 
James Reston of the New York Times, November 1 7, 1959, 
Copies, (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential Papers, 
1960 Campaign Files, Religious Issue), Box No. 1001. 
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unscathed by hierarchical influence. He reassured Reston 
that any decision that he would make concerning birth 
control as a public official would be "in accordance with 
his oath to do whatever was in the best interests of the 
united States. 1152 In his commentary on the interview, 
Reston drew one major lesson from the entire episode. 
The current controversy over birth control has at 
least made one thing clear. That is the hierarchy of 
the Roman Catholic Church is not acting in a way to 
promote the candidacy of Senator John F •5 j<ennedy of Massachusetts or any other Roman Catholic. 
Kennedy was relieved to see the year come to an end 
without any further incidents. The events of 1959 taught 
him that the Catholic dimension of the religious issue could 
prove hazardous to his winning of the presidency. He could 
not politically afford the charge, "Betrayer of his own 
kind. II Henceforth, he realized that, in his quest to 
mitigate anti-Catholic forces, he would have to monitor the 
reaction of the American Catholic Church. The birth control 
controversy shattered Kennedy's vision of a campaign 
impervious to and absent of bigotry. Alf red Scanlan, a 
strong Kennedy supporter, eloquently verbalized the 
anxieties of the Catholic presidential candidate on the eve 
of the campaign. 
52
rbid.; Bishop James A. Pike Episcopal Bishop of 
San Francisco, also stated that the Catholic Bishops had 
"condemned • . • millions of people of less fortunate parts 
of the world to starvations, bondage, misery, and despair." 
53James Reston, "Kennedy Opposes Birth 
Control," New York Times, November 28, 1959, pp. 1, 12. 
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So far as the present state of America is concerned, 
including the election which lies ahead in 1960, any 
publiC dispute concerning artificial birth control is, 
as both President Eisenhower and ex-President Truman 
have labeled it, a 'false' issue. But, I am afraid it 
may be more than just false; it may be a contrived 
issue, and therefore a fraudulent one. There are 
disturbing circumstances which suggest that the issue 
may have been raised for the purpose of masquerading 
an opposition to the presidential aspirations of 
senator John Kennedy, which otherwise would stand 
exposed as an qr,position arising solely out of 
undiluted bigotry. 
54Alfred L. Scanlan to Editor of Washington Post, 
Letter, December 11, 1959 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-
Presidential Papers, 1960 Campaign Files, Religious Issues), 
Box No. 1001. Also consult Editorial "Why Pick on 
Kennedy?," Ave Marie, December 12, 1959, pp. 16-17. 
Chapter III 
DEFENDER OF THE FAITH: 
KENNEDY AND THE CHURCH DURING THE 1960 
PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES 
In early 1960 two books, Bishop James Pike's A Roman 
Catholic in the White House and Paul Blanshard's God and Man 
in Washington, were published. 1 Both authors argued that a 
Catholic should not be president of the United States 
because he would be influenced and manipulated by the 
Vatican. When Kennedy announced his candidacy for the 
presidential nomination of the Democratic party, he and the 
Church, fearing a remake of the sectarian conflagration in 
1928, submerged their antagonisms and tacitly cooperated to 
defend the faith. To circumvent another 1928, the Church's 
leadership and press advocated a policy of political 
neutrality toward the candidates, began their own campaign 
1George Gilmary Higgins, "Blanshard Back at Old 
Stand," The Yardstick, February 8, 1960 (George Hilmary 
Higgins Papers: Catholic University of America Archives), 
Box No. 49~ "Paul Blanshard: New Title, Same Old Story," 
The Catholic Messenger, February 18, 1960, p. 10. "Paul 
Blanshard: New Book, Same Old Plot," Boston Pilot, February 
6, 1960, p. 5., Gustave Weigel, S.J., "Bishop Pike and a 
Catholic President," Ave Maria, May 28, 1960, pp. 20-21. 
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of rational responses to anti-Catholic charges, and enjoined 
all catholics to remain calm in the face of these bigoted 
attacks. Kennedy became a defender of the faith with his 
campaign speech to the Associated Society of Newspaper 
Edi tors, maintaining Catholicism and Americanism were 
compatible. With such a public defense and with both 
proclaiming Kennedy "Not a Catholic Candidate," Kennedy 
became the presidential candidate for the Democratic party 
and the Church prematurely declared the demise of the 
religious issue. 
When the presidential primaries began, some leading 
Catholic politicians of the Democratic party looked with 
disfavor upon the running of any Catholic because it was 
simply a lost cause -- a Catholic candidate could not win 
the election. 2 In a conversation with Joseph Kennedy, David 
L. Lawrence, governor of Pennsylvania, explained why he 
could not support his son. "I said to him, 'Mr. Kennedy, 
I'd love to be for your boy. I'd love to see him president 
of the United States, but I don't think he can win. I don't 
think any Catholic can win. 113 Senator George McGovern of 
South Dakota opposed Kennedy's candidacy because he feared 
200 Catholics Really Want a Catholic President?," 
Newsweek, December 21, 1959, p. 27. 
3
oavid L. Lawrence, Oral History 
22, 1966 (John F. Kennedy Library: 
Collection), Transcript, p. 27. 
Interview, January 
Oral History 
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the detrimental ramifications that a Catholic candidate 
would have upon state and local elections. "I feared the 
impact of the religious issue on our part of the country. 
It is a strongly Protestant area. It was an area that very 
decisively rejected Al Smith's bid in 1928. I knew 
something about the religious character of the area and I 
d h 1 . . . .. 4 feare t e re 1g1ous issue. In January of 1960, David 
Lawrence, Chicago mayor Richard Dailey, New York governor 
Robert Wagner, and California governor Edmund Brown met for 
breakfast at a local hotel in in Washington, D.C. During 
the course of the discussion, Brown came out in full support 
of Kennedy: "I thought that in spite of the fact that he 
was a Catholic and that there had never been a Catholic 
president, and there was Catholic prejudice, unquestionably, 
that we should forget about that because this man had the 
best chance of being elected the president of the United 
States. 115 The best the other Catholic politicians could do 
was remain "open-minded" about Brown's assessment of the 
situation; for most believed that "the Catholic religion 
would be almost a bar sinister. 116 
4
senator George McGovern, Oral History Interview, 
April 24, 1964 (John F. Kennedy Library: Oral History 
Collection), Transcript, p. 9. 
5Edmund G. Brown, Oral History Interview, July 26, 
1964 (John F. Kennedy Library: Oral History Collection), 
Transcript, pp. 4-7. Brown wanted to set down on record 
that at this breakfast "I was the real protangonist of John 
F. Kennedy." 
6Ibid.; Also consult David Lawrence, Oral History 
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Leadership of the American Catholic Church agreed 
with this pessimistic political outlook of the Kennedy 
candidacy. Father Charles Rice in a Newsweek poll observed, 
"The Catholic people got badly burned in 1928 and I can't 
see any advantage in stirring up the bitterness again. 
Personally, I wish that Kennedy would not run." 7 Father 
Robert Drinan, s. J., Dean of Boston College Law School, 
admitted that "Catholics are deeply divided on the subject 
of a Catholic running for President. Most are fearful we 
may get a terrific black eye out of this situation, that if 
Kennedy is defeated, his defeat may be attributed to his 
religion. 118 Thinking that Americans were not ready for a 
Catholic president, Cardinal Cushing, a long time supporter 
of Kennedy's since 1956, halfheartedly predicted Kennedy's 
campaign victory. 
But I feared it was still too early for a Roman 
Catholic to buck the strong, if mostly, silent, tides 
of religious prejudice. Nevertheless, I was convinced 
if anyone could break through that wall of prejudice, 
our best hope was with John F. Kennedy. More than any 
other Catholic of the twentieth century he was capable 
Interview, January 22, 1966 (John F. Kennedy Library: Oral 
History Collection), Transcript, pp. 3-4, 7. Lawrence was 
also soft in his support of Kennedy because of his loyalty 
to Adlai Stevenson. Eugene McCarthy supported Stevenson as 
well. 
7
"Do Catholics really want a Catholic President?," 
Newsweek, December 21, 1959, p. 28. 
8 Ibid. 
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of facing this herculean challenge. 9 
John Sheerin, a paulist father and editor of the Catholic 
world, took a dimmer view of Kennedy's prospects. "I would 
say that the American people are unwilling to vote for a 
catholic president. The majority of voters are not 
emotionally and psychologically mature enough to conquer 
bias and cast a ballot for a Catholic." 10 
More dreaded among the Church leaders than 
anti-Catholicism's adverse impact upon Kennedy's nomination 
was its detrimental effect upon religious relations in the 
United States. With a Catholic in the running, they feared 
the spread of anti-Catholicism and the concomitant rise of 
Catholic belligerency, the two primary ingredients for a 
sectarian conflagration. To avoid such a confrontation 
during the primaries, the Church's hierarchy established 
a policy of political neutrality among the clergy. The 
three leading national journals for clerical instruction 
delineated the precise meaning and full implication of this 
9Richard Cardinal Cushing, Oral History Interview, 
(John F. Kennedy Library: Oral History Collection) , 
Transcript, pp. 3-5; Richard Cardinal Cushing, Speech, 1960 
(John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential Papers, Senate 
Files: Church and State Folder), Box No. 535. 
lO John B. Sheerin, CSP, editor, "How Fair Are 
Kennedy's Critics?," Catholic World, March 1960, Vol. 190, 
pp. 333-335; "The 1960 Presidential Campaign: A Jubilee 
Poll," Jubilee, March 1960, pp. 9-15; "Priest Discusses 
Catholic Vote for President," The Tablet, April 9, 1960, 
p. 1. 
11 
policy. 
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The Priest ordered clerics to adopt a non-partisan 
stance in the primary campaign. It advised its readership 
that priests essentially had two roles in society. They 
were citizens of the United States, owing a duty to the 
state to be intelligently informed on political issues and 
to vote wisely. But, foremost, they served as a spiritual 
and moral guide for Catholic citizens. They should educate 
and consult them on certain moral-political issues and 
encourage capable Catholics to become involved in politics, 
basing their activism on Catholic social principles. The 
Priest observed that lack of clerical guidance led to the 
travesty of 1928 and has allowed a small minority of 
atheists to dictate to Catholics the acceptance of 
secularized education. This must not be allowed to 
continue, urged the journal. Priests must not neglect their 
major responsibility: "His job is to alert the people to 
issues and candidates concerning justice and Catholic social 
. . 1 .. 12 pr1nc1p es. 
Father Aidan Carr, editor of the Homiletic and 
Pastoral Review, admonished priests about the longstanding 
tradition that "Priests have no business being in Politics." 
1111 Do Catholics Really Want a Catholic President?," 
Newsweek, December 21, 1959, p. 28. 
12E. F. Garesche, S. J., "The Priest in Politics: A 
Non-Partisan Interest," The Priest, Vol. 15, December 1959, 
pp. 1002-1007. 
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But this dirt not mean "total indifference" to certain pieces 
of legislation and politics in general. Such a stance was 
irresponsible and could be detrimental to the Catholic 
community. Priests should speak out on moral and religious 
issues. Priests should not openly support any candidate. 
"Nothing will stir up bigotry more readily than the boast: 
Father so and so says I'm the man for the job." In the end, 
Carr demanded that priests be actively concerned about 
issues but not committed to a candidate or party. 
Whatever may be the political leaning of the priest, 
his smartest course is not to show his hand. This 
isn't being wishy-washy. It's common sense in the 
view of the universal responsibilities of the priest-
hood. He can vote as he wishes and, whr~ the election 
is over, congratulate the winner ••• " 
Francis J. O'Connell, editor of American 
Ecclesiastical Review, reiterated the same themes. He 
reminded priests that they were forbidden to take part in 
political affairs directly. Yet when public events or 
matters concern the "greater good of religion or country," a 
priest may be the purveyor of certain Catholic principles 
"without in any way campaigning for any candidate." He 
counseled priests to have a posture of charity when 
confronted with bigoted attacks. Not confrontation but 
prayer would enlighten the ignorant enemy. 14 
13Aidan Carr, "Priest in Poli tics," Homiletic & 
Pastoral Review, May 1960, p. 688. 
14Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., "A Catholic for 
President," January-June 1960, American Ecclesiastical 
Review, Vol. 142, pp. 271-273. 
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If the spirit of anti-Catholic bigotry pervades the 
land in the near future, they must retain the spirit 
of charity toward those who are hostile to the Church, 
ascribing their antagonism to ignorance rather than 
malice. And Catholics should be urged to pray that 
such persons may be enlightened so that they will come 
to understand cofsectly the Catholic Church and 
Catholic doctrine. 
O'Connell further advised priests to consult the rank and 
file about the proper criteria that should be followed when 
voting. Under all circumstances, a Catholic must vote for 
the best qualified candidate or else commit a sin. 
If a Catholic cast his ballot for a candidate because 
he was a Catholic and passed over a non-Catholic, who, 
in his estimation, would make a better president, he 
would be guilty of a sin. In oth16 words there should 
be no Catholic party in our land. 
Monsignor Frederick Barnes, editor of the Catholic 
Messenger, prescribed the same policy of political 
neutrality and Catholic responsibility for diocesan 
newspapers in the presidential campaign. He discerned two 
roles for the Catholic press. An editor should not openly 
support or oppose a candidate, but this neutrality on 
political matters should give way to a public activism when 
the candidate's religion was attacked. "At this point, it 
became a religious matter for the paper's serious 
attention." In fact, Catholic papers had an obligation to 
15Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., "A Catholic for 
President," January-June 1960, American Ecclesiastical 
Review, Vol. 142, pp. 271-273. 
16Ibid.: In short, a Catholic was bound in 
conscience to vote for the candidate best suited for office. 
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report in their pages every bigoted attack against Kennedy, 
and to defend publicly the position that Catholicism was 
. 1 . th t Arn . . l ? B f d th t compat1b e w1 rue er1can1srn. arnes orewarne a 
such a policy would result in the name of Kennedy appearing 
in the paper many times, and at first glance, would appear 
that it was conducting a publicity campaign for him. Such 
an interpretation simply was not true, and such a policy was 
not an endorsement of Kennedy but a defense of the Catholic 
faith. Barnes concluded that diocesan newspapers should 
follow such an editorial policy as long as the Catholic 
Church in America was on trial and not Kennedy's political 
qualifications. Once Americans decided to vote for the man 
and not against his faith it should cease. 18 The Northwest 
Progress in its editorials advised Catholics to react 
responsibly to bigoted attacks. "My point is that Catholics 
should practice patience even until it hurts in the corning 
political campaign." According to the paper's editor, 
Catholics must address charges of reasonable critics, but 
ignore the unreasonable attacks upon their faith. "In the 
long run, if Catholics act patiently under the temptation of 
anger, it can prove to reasonable Protestants that the 
Catholic Church is not running for the presidency and that 
1 7 . F d . k II s d II Monsignor re er1c Barnes, enator Kenne y, 
Catholic Messenger, February 4, 1960, p. 10. 
18 Ibid. 
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the pope has no designs on the White House." 19 
One of the initial charges in the primaries was that 
there existed a Catholic voting bloc which was directly 
controlled by the Vatican. The Church went on the 
defensive, saying such a "Catholic vote" was a myth. The 
Catholic Digest argued that "Catholic voters are just as 
free, unfettered, intelligent, and divided in their voting 
preferences as any other group." Catholics, to say the 
least, were many things -- Democrats, Republicans, Irish, 
Polish, 20 anti and pro labor. There was no official 
Catholic party line or monolithic Catholic political 
interest group seeking to take over the country. Such 
attacks provoked the ire and concern of Father George 
Higgins, a leading Catholic spokesman for social and labor 
reform. In his syndicated weekly commentary, entitled "No 
Party Line for Catholics," Higgins reported the different 
opinions that emerged at the recent Catholic Economic 
Association Conference in Washington, D.C. Catholics 
disagreed on right to work legislation and union shops. 
These palpable differences, Higgins concluded, "can serve to 
remind some of our jittery non-Catholic friends that 
19 John Sheerin, "Campaign will test Catholics' 
Patience," Northwest Progress, January 22, 1960, p. 4. 
20Elmo Roper, "The Myth of a Catholic Vote," 
Catholic Digest, Vol. 24, February 1960, pp. 31-32. 
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American Catholics are not identical peas in a political 
pod. 1121 Father Ralph Gorman in The Sign vehemently denied 
that "There existed a monolithic Catholic line on the issues 
which are handed down from the pope to bishops and priests 
22 
who pass it on to the lay people of the church." 
In an attempt to dissipate Catholic anger over anti-
Catholicism, the Catholic press uncovered the roots and the 
historical reasons for this blinded prejudice. Such 
knowledge, the editors hoped, would lead to understanding. 
America explained to its readers that a Catholic president 
represented a dreaded turning point to anti-Catholics. It 
symbolized the death of Protestant America and the birth of 
pluralistic America. America argued that two hundred, and 
as recent as thirty years ago, the United States was a 
Protestant country. Yet in three decades this has all 
changed. "Today in 1960 we are certainly not a Catholic 
country, nor are we on the way to becoming one. But we have 
virtually ceased to be Protestant ..• Thus, it is dawning 
on us today that America has entered a Post-Protestant 
Era. 1123 The journal believed that the 1960 campaign for the 
21George Higgins, "No Party Line for Catholics," The 
Yardstick, January 4, 1960. 
22Father Ralph Gorman, "Disagreements among 
Catholics," The Sign, October 1959, p. 12. 
23Thurston Davis, "Our Post-Protestant Pluralism," 
America, March 5, 1960, pp. 673-675. 
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presidency represented the first national manifestation of 
this cultural pluralism. Protestant bigotry and bitterness 
would be exhibited in the campaign because Kennedy, being 
Irish-Catholic, represented an attempt to conquer the last 
symbol of Protestant America -- the presidency. 
Throughout these months, however, the fundamental fact 
should be kept in mind that 1960 is not 1928. Today 
America is Post-Protestant in orientation. For better 
or worse, America in 1960 is pluralist. Today, 
whether anybody happens to like it or not a Cabot or 
Kenned¥ 4 is pretty much a chip off the same old block. 
Victor c. Perkiss, professor of political science at 
St. Mary's College, Moraga, California in the pages of The 
Catholic Digest brought to the attention of Catholics what 
he considered to be a new anti-Catholic group, the urbane, 
sophisticated intellectuals who feared the influence of any 
religion in American life. These "agnostic secularists" 
perceived all religions as "quaint survivals of an 
unenlightened past" and wanted Catholicism to remain a 
foreign and despised thing. 25 They interpreted the recent 
rise of Catholics and religious orthodoxy in the 1950's as a 
threat to their blueprint of a secular society, "a vision of 
a homogenous America untroubled by religious absolutes and 
religious divisions." Thus, secularists, along with 
Protestants alike, did not want a Catholic president. 
24
rbid., pp. 674-676. 
25
victor c. Ferkiss, "Why not a Catholic 
President?," Catholic World, Vol. 190, February 1960, pp. 
273-280. 
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The inviolability of the White House is thus the last 
symbolic bastion of the belief that Catholics are a 
tolerated group of outsiders rather than full-fledged 
members of the American community. The vision of an 
America in which Catholics do not matter -- a vision 
shared by both the religious and anti-religious 
opponents of a Catholic candidacy -- would be visibly 
shattered by the inauguration of a Catholic president. 
It is the psychological need to preserve the image of 
America rather than any rational fear of what a 
Catholic might do with the actual powers of the 
presidency, which accounts for the dynamism ~G current 
opposition to a Catholic in the White House. 
Like the Catholic community, Kennedy was forced to 
confront directly the forces of anti-Catholicism during his 
Democratic primary campaign or else be defeated by them. 
The religious issue posed its greatest challenge to 
Kennedy's nomination during the Wisconsin and West Virginia 
primaries. In both of these primaries the religious issue 
was widely discussed, deliberated, and debated. On May 5, 
Kennedy defeated Humphrey in Wisconsin, a state whose 
population was 31% Catholic. Winning with 56% of the 
popular vote, his victory was neither decisive or 
overwhelming as had been predicted. He did capture most of 
the state's Catholic vote, sweeping the heavily Catholic and 
old Joe McCarthy districts. He also received a large 
percentage of the Catholic Republican crossover vote. 27 
Despite the numerous questions asked about his faith in the 
26
victor C. Ferkiss, "Why not a Catholic, 
President?," Catholic World, Vol. 190, February 1960, p. 
275. 
27Theodore White, The Making of the President 1960, 
(New York: Pocket Books, 1961), pp. 111-120. 
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state campaign, it was these results -- Catholics voting for 
Kennedy and non-Catholics voting for Humphrey -- that 
catapulted religion into prominence in the primaries. The 
results confirmed all prior suspicions of non-Catholics, 
especially a Catholic voting bloc that was attempting to put 
Kennedy into the White House. 
The Catholic press wasted no time in responding to 
the seemingly intransigent "Catholic vote" charge. 
Monsignor Franklyn J. Kennedy, assistant editor of the 
catholic Herald Citizen of Milwaukee, was especially 
irritated by this accusation because it implied that priests 
told Catholics how to vote in the pulpit and in the 
confessional. The Sunday before the primary election, 
Kennedy maintained, 2,000 priests in 1,214 pulpits conducted 
themselves admirably and impartially. "It is safe to say 
that not one of the priests told his parishioners which 
candidate to vote for." 28 In fact, the only time a priest 
would tell Catholics to vote for or against someone was 
"when there is a known Communist-atheist running for 
office. 1129 The Boston Pilot called the Catholic vote charge 
"absurd!" The rationale behind such a charge was to create 
a counter Protestant vote, thus dividing the community along 
28Monsignor Franklin J. Kennedy, "Should We Tell 
Readers What Candidate to Vote for?," Catholic Herald 
Citizen, March 19, 1960, p. 2 and "The Catholic Vote," May 
7, 1960, p. 2. 
29 Ibid. 
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. l' 30 religious ines. 
The Catholic journal, Ave Maria in its special 
report on the Wisconsin primary admitted that Catholics 
voted for Kennedy, and explained why religion played a major 
role in Kennedy's victory. 
In the opinion of this writer, it is precisely due to 
the unsavory activities of a few bigots that a great 
number of Wisconsin Catholics registered a determined 
protest i~ 1 the form of a vote for the Catholic 
candidate. 
Although such a development could mean the polarization of 
the American religious community, argued the journal, the 
catholic support for Kennedy in Wisconsin demonstrated tc 
all other Americans that forty million Catholics "li'k: other 
religious or racial minorities, are capable of expressing a 
. . d' ,.32 spontaneous vote against preJU ice. In the same issue, 
Professor Eric Waldmon, chairman of the political science 
department at Marquette University, declared the Wisconsin 
results refuted the existence of a Catholic vote. Catholics 
voted for Kennedy not because he was Catholic but because 
"Americans were anti-Catholic. Both local and national news 
media, concluded Waldmon, have distorted the primary 
results. "Such a distortion was a disservice to our 
30Ed. . 1 itoria , "Simmer Down," Boston Pilot, April 9, 
1960, p. 4. 
31Editorial, "Wisconsin's Catholic Vote," Ave Maria 
April 30, 1960, p. 16. 
32 Ibid. 
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nation. The editor of Commonweal realized Kennedy 
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received the majority of Catholic votes and, as a result, 
feared a political battle along religious lines, declaring 
that "the religious issue is now firmly a part of the 
• th II campaign more an ever. He then attempted to explain the 
source of voter solidarity. 
" . we believe that it reflects only the natural 
desire of a very large minority to achieve symbolic 
recognition that they are, finally, more than second-
class citizens. It does not represent a Catholic 
plot. The Church as such has no stake in the election 
of a Catholic as President; it does not seek nor could 
it receive special favors from any Catholic who might 
be president. Indeed, we could go further; we do not 
think American Catholics would support a Catholic 
candidate who sought f av~~s from the Catholic Church 
which were denied others. 
As a result of Wisconsin's returns, religion became 
the paramount issue in Kennedy's primary campaign in West 
Virginia. James Wine, future director of religious relations 
in Kennedy's presidential campaign, observed: "This was 
really the first time that the issue had come out in full 
bloom, both locally where the battle was being fought at the 
time as well as attracting national attention and involving 
the Protestant clergy to the extent that it did. 1135 With 
33
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Primary," Ave Maria, April 23, 1960, pp. 16-17. 
34Editorial, "The Religious Issues, 11 Commonweal, 
April 22, 1960, pp. 79-80. 
35J r.;• ames rvine, 
1967 (John F. Kennedy 
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catholics only comprising 5% of its population, West 
Virginia would be the public testing ground for the charges 
and counter charges of Catholics and anti-Catholics. It 
would also demonstrate to politicians and voters whether 
Kennedy was a viable presidential candidate whose appeal 
crossed sectarian lines and included the non-Catholic 
36 
vote. 
The Boston Herald ran the headline, "Kennedy Set to 
11 R 1 . . I T t ' W t v· ' ' n 37 K d Face Fu e 1g1ous ssue es in es 1rg1n1a. enne y 
encountered a strong Protestant opposition that claimed a 
Catholic in the White House would establish "a dictatorship 
by telephone from the Vatican." He needed to capture this 
illusive non-Catholic vote, which seemed to escape him with 
the widespread publicity of the religious issue in the 
state. A West Virginia poll showed Kennedy with a 40% lead 
over Humphrey in 1959, but a more recent 1960 poll gave 
Humphrey a 20% edge over Kennedy. This drastic shift in 
voting preference was attributed to religion: "But no one 
in West Virginia knew you were a Catholic in December 1959. 
38 Now they know." They knew because of coverage the issue 
36Theodore White, The Making of the President, pp. 
120-137. 
3711 Kennedy Set to Face Full Religious Issue Test in 
West Virginia," Boston Herald, April 20, 1960, p. 1. 
38
white, The Making of the President, p. 1211 Also 
consult Editorial, "Fabricated Issue," Catholic Transcript, 
April 14, 1960, p. 4. 
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received in the nation's press. 
Nationalization of the religious issue exhumed an 
obscure event out of Kennedy's past. In December 19 4 7, 
congressman Kennedy accepted, then rejected, an invitation 
to speak at a fund raising dinner for the Chapel of Four 
Chaplains in Phi!adelphia. He was invited by Dr. Daniel A. 
Poling, chairman and editor of the Christian Herald 
Magazine. The chapel was dedicated to the memory of four 
world War II military chaplains, two Protestants (one 
Poling's son), one Catholic priest, and one Jewish Rabbi. 
on February 3, 1943, the four chaplains were aboard an 
American ship which was torpedoed while off the coast of 
Greenland, killing seven hundred men. They gave up their 
life preservers to soldiers, and then, joining together in 
prayer, sank to their deaths. 39 
Dr. Poling headed this fund drive for the interfaith 
Chapel of Four Chaplains, which was to be located in the 
lower level of Philadelphia's Grae~ Baptist Temple and which 
was to contain a separate altar for each faith. Kennedy 
initially accepted his invitation to attend the memorial 
dinner at the Bellevue-Stratford Hotel. But a few days 
later he declined because of the religious undertones of his 
invitation. He could only attend as a "public officer." 
39Editorial "Senator Kennedy and the Chapel," 
Commonweal, January 29, 1960, pp. 479-480. 
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I was happy to accept. A few days before the event, I 
learned • • • that I was to be the spokesman for the 
Catholic organization. I further learned the memorial 
was to be located in the sanctuary of a church of a 
different faith. This is against the precepts of a 
catholic Church. Because of this fact, the 
Archdiocese of Philadelphia was unable to support the 
drive. Therefore, I felt I had no credential,fb to 
attend in the capacity in which I had been asked. 
Dr. Poling was very upset with Kennedy's actions. 
He maintained that he had invited Kennedy as a "Congressman 
from Massachusetts." He accused Kennedy of submitting to 
the pressure of the local Catholic hierarchy. At the time, 
cardinal Dougherty refused to cooperate with the Four 
Chaplain fund drive because the chapel was to be located in 
a Protestant church, a violation of Canon Law. Poling 
inferred the following explanation for Kennedy's withdrawal. 
" ••• you did not decline an invitation, you accepted an 
invitation, and then at the request of his Eminence, 
Cardinal Dougherty, you abruptly cancelled the 
engagement." 41 The controversy was not resolved then, and 
thirteen years later, Poling revived it in the pages of his 
magazine, implying that Kennedy was not as independent of 
h . Ch h h 1 · · 42 is urc as e was c aiming. 
40 John F. Kennedy, Press Release, January 14, 1960 
(John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential Papers; 
Religious Issues File of James Wine), Box No. 1015. 
41Dr. Daniel A. Poling to John F. Kennedy, Letter, 
June 30, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential 
Papers; Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1015. 
42Poling-Kennedy Correspondence, Letter, January-
July 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential 
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Kennedy became restless and irritated over the 
extensive coverage in the press of the Poling incident and 
the so-called "Fabricated Issue." He had to resolve, 
neutralize, or mitigate the effects of such news reporting, 
if he were to win in West Virginia. Would a presentation of 
his religious views to a national forum be necessary? His 
own personal staff was divided on what to do. His 
washington staff suggested that he avoid such a direct 
attack upon the religious issue. "It was simply too 
explosive! 1143 His local West Virginian advisors recommended 
a direct confrontation, a position supported by Kennedy's 
Harvard intellectuals such as legal scholar, Archibald Cox. 
He wrote Kennedy at the time encouraging him "to make a very 
serious, full dress speech upon the relationship between 
Church and State." Cox argued that such a speech would 
accomplish three important things. It would demonstrate 
Kennedy's capacity to once and for all remove the religious 
issue from the political realm. It would convert a 
"sizeable group" of non-Catholics with thoughtful and 
serious reservations about his capacity to be a Catholic 
president without any interference from his Church. 
Finally, it was the appropriate time to address this problem 
prior to the Democratic Convention when it might be 
Papers~ Religious Issue Files of James Wine) , Box 1O15. 
Contains seven pieces of correspondence. 
43
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perceived as party doctrine and not as his individual 
44 
philosophy. 
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Kennedy decided to confront the issue in his address 
to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 21 in 
washington, D. C. He changed his scheduled talk from 
"America's stake in the Underdeveloped World," to "Religion 
and Politics. 1145 In the beginning of his address he boldly 
implicated the nation's press in creating the need to change 
his topic. "I have decided, in view of current press 
reports, that it would be appropriate to speak to you today 
about what has been widely called the religious issue in 
.American politics." 4 6 He emphatically denied that he was 
trying to be the first Catholic president or was seeking the 
Catholic vote. "I want no votes solely on the account of my 
44 Ibid.7 Archibald Cox to John F. Kennedy, Letter, 
April 8, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential 
Papers, Senate Files), Box No. 534. He ended by informing 
Kennedy that Lucian Pye at MIT and Mark Howe of Harvard 
would develop the speech into writing, and as for Pye, he 
"is the most ardent of your making a speech now." 
4511 Kennedy Set to Face Full Religious Issue Test in 
West Virginia," Boston Herald, April 20, 1960, p. 1. 
Theodore Sorensen, "The Catholic Issue in Politics," Speech, 
February 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential 
Papers, Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1033. 
Sorensen, a Unitarian, served as major advisor to Kennedy on 
religious issue until James Wine replaced him after the 
Democratic National Convention. Sorensen's speech was 
probably the primary foundation upon which Kennedy's ASNE 
speech was based. 
46New York Times, April 22, 1960, pp. 16-17; John 
Fenton, The Catholic Vote (New Orleans: Hauser Press, 
1960), pp. 132-140. 
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religion • . • I do not want any vote cast for me for such 
illogical reasons." Defining the religious issue as a 
"misunderstanding" of his own religious convictions and as a 
"suspicion" of a so-called Catholic vote, Kennedy forewarned 
the editors that they had a grave responsibility beyond the 
reporting of the facts and the writing of "lofty editorials 
deploring intolerance." They should ensure that religion 
would not become the dominant issue of the campaign. 
And the press, while not creating the issue, will 
largely determine whether or not it does become 
dominant whether it is kept in perspective 
whether it is considered objectively whether 
needless 4fears and suspicions are stilled instead of 
aroused. 
Kennedy revealed how the press up until his speech 
magnified and oversimplified the religious controversy, 
while ignoring the vital and significant issues. Editors 
throughout the Wisconsin primary highlighted the religious 
issue above farm legislation, foreign policy, defense, civil 
rights, labor unions, and price supports. One newspaper 
article, Kennedy noted, used the work "Catholic" twenty 
times in fifteen paragraphs. He contended, that until 
national coverage in the press impressed upon the voters of 
West Virginia that religion was the decisive and critical 
issue in the upcoming primary, most were oblivious or 
indifferent to it. 
47 New York Times, April 22, 1960, pp. 16-17. 
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I do not think religion is the decisive issue in any 
state. I do not think it should be. I do not think 
it should be made to. And recognizing my own 
responsibilities, in that regffd, I am hopeful that 
you will recognize yours also. 
Kennedy rhetorically formulated and answered three 
questions: Is the religious issue a legitimate one in the 
campaign? Should voters be analyzed purely in terms of 
catholic and anti-Catholic predilections? Was there any 
justification for solely applying the religious test on the 
office of the presidency? There was only one instance, 
according to Kennedy, in which the religious issue was valid 
and that was the concern over ecclesiastical pressures and 
obligations upon the president to act against the national 
interest. Kennedy rejoined: "I have answered the question 
many times. My answer was -- and is -- No!" As far as he 
was concerned, to generalize in terms of Catholic and anti-
Catholic votes distorted American political reality. If 
such criteria were acceptable, he could just as readily use 
the weather as a tool of analysis. "I ran strongest in 
those areas where the average temperature in January was 20 
degrees or higher, and poorest in those areas where it was 
14 d 1 1149 egrees or ower ..• To simplify the motivations of 
Jews, Protestants, and Catholics to such an extent was 
submitting them to a religious test: 
48New York Times, April 22, 1960, pp. 16-17. 
49Ibid. 
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To submit the candidates to a religious test is unfair 
enough -- to apply it to the voters the~lves is 
divisive, degrading, and wholly unwarranted. 
Kennedy thought that to apply a religious test to 
presidential candidates was unwarranted, especially since he 
was not a Catholic candidate. "I am not a Catholic 
candidate for president. I do not speak for the Catholic 
Church on issues of public policy -- and no one in that 
church speaks for me." In the long run, Kennedy insisted 
upon his independent stand from the Church. "Do not expect 
me to explain or defend every act or statement of every Pope 
or priest in this country or some others in this century or 
the last •.. " 51 
Kennedy concluded his oration by considering his 
course of action in face of the religious issue. He could 
simply withdraw from the contest to avoid religious 
controversy and accept the vice-presidential nomination to 
placate Catholics in the country. But Kennedy could not 
follow such a course: "I find that suggestion highly 
distasteful. It assumes the worst about a country which 
prides itself on being more tolerant and better educated 
than it was in 1928. America cannot admit to the world that 
one third of its population was forever barred from the 
52 White House." He would run for the presidency instead, 
50New York Times, April 22, 1960, pp. 16-17. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
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proceeding through the primaries, nominations, and election, 
and if bigotry showed its invidious face, so be it. He 
ended with a vigorous stand behind his position: 
But regardless of the political outcome, the issue is 
here to be faced. It is my job to face it frankly and 
fully. And it is our job S:3' face it fairly, in 
perspective and in proportion. 
"Thank God!" for his speech and for such a great 
defender of the faith, proclaimed the editor of Ave Maria. 
His response typified the jubilant response to his oration 
by the Catholic press. 54 West Virginians also reacted 
positively to Kennedy's call, "Not a Catholic Candidate." 
They presented him with a comfortable 2 to 1 victory margin 
over Hubert Humphrey in the primary election. The country 
realized that the primary's outcome was not due to religion 
but to other non-religious factors such as his charisma, his 
appeal to the poor, his efficient campaign organization, and 
his obtaining of support from FDR's son. 55 His victory 
convinced fellow Democrats that he could capture the non-
Catholic vote. David Lawrence's convictions were shaken. 
Although still behind Stevenson, Lawrence admitted that 
Kennedy's vig:tory in West Virginia "shook Il1Y thinking a bit.;J' 
about whether or not he could win." 56 State Democratic 
53New York Times, April 22, 1960, pp. 16-17. 
54Ave Maria, May 7, 1960, p. 16; NCWC, May 1960 
55Editorial, "A Fading Political Issue," Commonweal, 
May 27, 1960, pp. 219-220. 
56
oavid Lawrence, Oral History Interview, January 
22, 1966 (John F. Kennedy Library: Oral History 
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leader, W. H. Holt of West Virginia, declared that the 
results clearly demonstrated the attractiveness of a 
catholic president. 
Sometimes I think it would do this country a 
'power' 'o good' to have a Catholic for president. It 
would do away with once and for all the religious 
bugaboo that bothers a lot of peog7e and could promote 
tolerance among his people ... " 
The morning after his victory in West Virginia 
Kennedy announced that "the religious issue was buried." 58 
The Catholic press voiced a similar optimism. Commonweal 
concluded that the religious issue "was certainly dealt a 
damaging blow but it is still too early to offer the funeral 
oration. 1159 America concurred. "On all sides, finally, the 
West Virginia vote won a warm welcome as grounds for hoping 
that the religious issue might be on the wane in the 
political arena. 1160 The magazine's Washington correspondent, 
Mary McGrory, ended her commentary on the following 
Collection), Transcript, p. 4; Senator George McGovern, Oral 
History Interview, April 24, 1964 (John F. Kennedy Library: 
Oral History Collection), Transcript, p. 11. McGovern noted 
that he was behind Humphrey until West Virginia. After 
Kennedy's victory, McGovern asked Kennedy for an appointment 
on his staff. 
57w. H. Holt to Senator Cramer 
April 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: 
Papers, Senate Files), Box No. 535. 
of Boston, Letter, 
Pre-Presidential 
58Editorial, "A Fading Political Issue," Commonweal, 
May 27, 1960, pp. 219-220. 
59 Ibid. 
60Editorial, "West Virginia Votes," America, May 21, 
1960, p. 271. 
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auspicious note. 
The conquest of prejudice, however, means that Senator 
Kennedy need no longer name his religion as an 
obstacle to nomination. More than that, as he said at 
an early morning press conference at his jubilant 
headquarters in Charleston: 'I think that after the 
campaign in this state, it will not be necessary to 
mention it again.' Al\fresent would certainly say a 
'fervent' Amen to that. 
Lastly, the Providence Visitor argued in its editorial that 
a Catholic was the best possible presidential candidate for 
the country. "No one could be better qualified for the 
leadership of our country than a Catholic. A Catholic is in 
touch with the fullness of grace and saving truth. 1162 
These Catholic commentaries and Kennedy's own 
purview of the religion controversy seemed to be accurate up 
through the Democratic National Convention. At the end of 
May, the Vatican newspaper, Osservatore Romano, published an 
article that argued the Church had a special role to play in 
temporal affairs, and in this case, advised all Catholics to 
vote for the anti-Communists in the upcoming election. Such 
church intervention in politics before West Virginia would 
have generated a war of diatribes and accusations in the 
United States. But once news of the story came to America, 
61Mary McGrory, "Washington Front," Commonweal, May 
21, 1960, p. 275. Editorial, "The Catholic Vote," The 
Tablet, May 14, 1960, p. 12. The Paper's editor was pleased 
with results in West Virginia's primary. "It indicates that 
the ugly factor of religious prejudice has been discarded in 
that state." 
62Editorial, "Is Catholic Best Possible Candidate?," 
Providence Visitor, June 3, 1960, p. 3. 
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only a few non-Catholics made it an issue in Kennedy's 
campaign for the presidency. Catholics, of course, denied 
any complicity with the paper's position and said such a 
pronouncement was only applicable to Italian politics. One 
catholic journal wrote at the time: "It would be uncandid 
to pretend that the editorial was not an embarrassment to 
catholics in many countries. 1163 
The Democratic National Convention took place during 
this period of religious concord. Only a few certain 
quarters harbored any religious doubts about Kennedy and 
were ineffectual in preventing the Convention's nomination 
of Kennedy as the Democratic party's presidential 
candidate. 64 On July 15, 1960, Kennedy delivered his 
acceptance speech to the convention's delegates, directing 
his opening remarks to his faith. "I am fully aware of the 
fact that the Democratic party, by nominating someone of my 
faith, has taken on what many regard as a new and hazardous 
risk -- new, at least, since 1928. 1165 Kennedy assured his 
captive audience that their trust and confidence in him on 
this issue was not unwarranted. He would uphold the 
63Editorial, "Osservatore Romano," Boston Pilot, 
June 4, 1960, p. 4. Editorial, "A Bewildering Article," 
America, June 25, 1960, pp. 390-391. 
64
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Oral History Interview, 1977 (John F. 
Oral History Collection), Transcript, p.3. 
6511 John F. Kennedy's Acceptance Speech in Los 
Angeles," Vital Speeches, (1960), pp. 610-612. 
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constitution and the nation's interest above any religious 
pressures 
hierarchy, 
record. 
"relevant. 
to know: 
my own 
or obligations emanating from the Church's 
as evidenced by his past fourteen-year public 
His religious affiliation was simply not 
"66 
"I am telling you now that you are entitled 
That my decisions on every public policy will be 
as an American, a Democrat, and a free Man! 1167 
After Kennedy's nomination and acceptance speech 
Francis Cardinal Spellman of New York sent him a note of 
congratulations "on your wonderful victory" and told him how 
he stayed up until 4:15 a.m. to hear the final nomination 
68 
results. The Catholic Messenger rejoiced in Kennedy's 
victory: "It is the clearest sign that the written 
religious test for the Presidency is losing its hold. 1169 
The Northwest Progress in its editorial interpreted 
Kennedy's success as symbolizing the political downfall of 
bigotry: "that the ghost of prejudice and bigotry has so 
often stalked the American convention's halls has at last 
66John F. Kennedy's Acceptance Speech in Los 
Angeles," Vital Speeches, (1960), pp. 610-612. 
67 Ibid. 
68Francis Cardinal Spellman to John F. Kennedy, 
Letter, July 14, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-
Presidential Papers, Special Correspondence-Spellman), Box 
No. 33. 
69Editorial, "Nomination," Catholic Messenger, July 
21, 196, p. 12. 
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been dispelled. 1170 The Advocate advised Catholics to take 
great pride in Kennedy's nomination and to rejoice in the 
fact that the United States had greatly matured since 1928. 
Kennedy was "a tribute to the virtues of his Catholic 
character and to the gifts of his Catholic mind and 
personality. 1171 It was miserable out tonight, maintained 
the San Francisco Monitor, for the few remaining "dens of 
bigotry in the United States. 1172 The Catholic Action of the 
South in New Orleans unequivocally proclaimed that Kennedy's 
nomination had undermined the validity of any future 
1 . . t t 73 re 1g1ous es • 
The primary campaign began with fear of another 1928 
and ended with the declaration of the demise of the 
religious issue. Kennedy had become the Catholic 
presidential candidate of the Democratic party for several 
reasons. Perhaps the most important was the' politically 
neutral• stance of the Catholic hierarchy and press coupled 
with their importunings of fellow Catholics to remain calm 
and understanding toward bigoted attacks. This made more 
credible the remarks of Kennedy in his ASNE speech. Never-
70Edi tori al, "A Test of Statesmanship, 11 Northwest 
Progress, July 15, 1960, p. 4. 
71Editorial, "Nomination," Catholic Messenger, July 
21, 196, p. 12. 
72Editorial, "It's Miserable Out Tonight," San 
Francisco Monitor, July 15, 1960, p. 12. 
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theless, underlying this cooperation between the Church and 
Kennedy in their attempt to circumvent the religious rancor 
of Al Smith's day resided a politically conservative and 
liberal Catholic opposition. 
CHAPTER IV 
'NOT A CATHOLIC CANDIDATE': CATHOLIC OPPOSITION 
ON THE POLITICAL RIGHT AND LEFT 
Not all Catholics celebrated Kennedy's nomination as 
a symbol of the demise of the religious issue. Perusing the 
pages of Dorothy Day's newspaper, the Catholic Worker, 
readers would have received inadequate coverage of Kennedy's 
entire primary campaign and victory. The featured articles 
of the Catholic Worker concerned civil rights, pacificism, 
humanitarianism, and civil disobedience. Not Kennedy but 
Tolstoy, Thoreau, and Ghandi were the men of the hour. Not 
bigotry but poverty and nuclear destruction were of 
paramount concern. 1 Day's indifference was surpassed by 
anguish among other Catholic editors, clerics, and politicians. 
1The Catholic Worker (Microfilm: University of Notre 
Dame). Day had her regular serial "On Pilgrimage," 
describing her travels throughout the United States. Also 
see George Gilmary Higgins, The Yardstick: Catholic Tests 
of Social Order, 1959 (George Gilmary Higgins Papers: 
Catholic University of America Archives). Contained 
complete set from 1945-1981, Box No's. 49-50. Father 
Higgins also ignored the Kennedy campaign. As the director 
of the Social Action Department for the National Catholic 
Welfare Conference, he prioritized working class problems in 
his column, The Yardstick, subtitled "Catholic Tests of a 
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They opposed Kennedy, perceiving him not as a Catholic 
candidate but as an unsavory liberal or conservative 
politician. 
John Courtney Murray, S. J., the great American 
theologian, was a moderate conservative Republican who 
75 
opposed Kennedy. A firm supporter of Dulles' foreign policy 
and of Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956, Murray maintained that 
his opposition to Kennedy had nothing to do with the fact 
that the candidate was Catholic. Although the Kennedy staff 
sought out Murray's advice on theological matters -- the 
most noted instance being Sorensen's call to him concerning 
the Houston speech -- Murray was "not eager" to see John 
Kennedy elected president. He considered Kennedy an 
intellectual "lightweight" and was critical of his liberal 
philosophy. "He took a dim view of Stevenson and a dimmer 
view of Kennedy. 112 Cogley, a close friend of Murray's, 
recalled that, after receiving a telegram from Robert F. 
Kennedy asking him to join the campaign staff, Murray 
advised him not to accept and not to have "anything to do 
with those people. 113 
Social Order." Higgins championed the causes of the poor 
and of social justice, and was particularly worried about 
the survival of such causes among Catholics who moved up on 
the socio-economic ladder and then into the suburbs. 
2John Cogley, Oral History Interview, February 20, 
1968 (John F. Kennedy Library: Oral History Collection), 
Transcript, pp. 30-32. 
3Ibid. 
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Throughout the primaries William F. Buckley's 
conservative National Review magazine took a unique 
perspective on the religious issue and opposed Kennedy's 
candidacy. Although he perceived the bigoted anti-Catholic 
attacks as "an unhealthy impulse to let loose on the body 
politic," Buckley thought that religion should be an issue, 
that voters should know whether a candidate was Catholic, 
protestant, Jewish, or a non-believer. Without such 
knowledge of the candidate's religious background, a voter 
"will be making a superficial judgment. It would be 
ridiculous to forget the religious faith if one of them ran 
for an office that decides issues of property, civil 
disobedience, and war. 114 With the above assumption in mind, 
Buckley formulated his magazine's position concerning the 
primary in West Virginia: 
We are against Senator Kennedy for President 
because he is a Catholic~ and we are against 
Humphrey, though not for his Protestantism. 
the same time, in forming o'-¥ judgment, we 
overlook their religious ties. 
but not 
Herbert 
But at 
do not 
The National Review disliked Kennedy's attempt to be 
"everything to everyone," a position and image that was 
based upon insincerity. Kennedy's insincerity allowed him 
to be the "beneficiary of the voters' own moral 
misapprehensions." His balancing act of ambivalence 
May 7, 
4Editorial, "Is Religion an Issue," National Review, 
1960, p. 285. 
5 Ibid. 
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resulted in votes "of both the pro-McCarthy Irish and the 
anti-McCarthy members of the Harvard University Faculty." 6 
Especially disturbing to Buckley and others on his staff was 
Kennedy's liberalism. They attacked his support of state 
welfare, his belief in big government, and his advocacy of 
negotiations with the Communists. 7 
The Wanderer, a reactionary conservative lay 
catholic newspaper out of St. Paul, Minnesota, decried 
Kennedy's liberalism. Founded in 1867, the newspaper was 
based upon a tradition of anti-liberalism, secularism, 
atheism, and communism. During the primary, it summed up 
its purpose: 
It is in the first place historic liberalism which 
continues to pave the way for worldwide atheistic 
communism. It is still liberalism's characteristic 
brand of moral relativism and indifferentism which 
constitutes the ugly boil . . and the big question 
today still is who wi~ lance the boil -- Catholicism 
or the International?" 
According to The Wanderer, Kennedy espoused the following 
despicable liberal principles. "He consistently expressed 
predilections for centralized government and welfare statism 
with its built-in tendencies toward mechanistic 
regimentation and object dehumanization. 119 Most deplorable, 
6John Chamberlain, "The Chameleon Image of John F. 
Kennedy," National Review, April 23, 1960, pp. 261-263. 
7Ibid. 
8The Wanderer, January 7, 1960, p. 4. 
9Editorial, "The Religious Issue," The Wanderer, 
September 22, 1960, p. 4. 
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Kennedy received the backing of the leftist Americans for 
Democratic Action, ADA, a group The Wanderer characterized 
as a "malodorous hodgepodge of rabid ideologies, fuzzy-
mined, egg-heads, Harvard beatniks, materialistic do-gooders 
of every red and pink shade." 1° Finally, the newspaper 
found fault with Kennedy's approach to the religious issue 
because it allowed him to obscure the fact that he was not a 
product of parochial schools and that in London he was the 
understudy of a socialist professor. 
In any case, the religious issue injected into this 
campaign to date has been and continues to be a 
misleading and deceptive tactic, to say the least. 
Without much regard for the long range social and 
religious consequences, it was primarily concerned and 
designed, so it would seem, as a calculated expedient, 
a mere 'vote catcher' device, and as such it has 
miserably failed to give the electorate the true 
measure and worth of the Democrat's leading contender 
either as a bonafide Christian statesman or seasoned 
Catholic. On these basic iffues among others, the 
voters are still in the dark. 
The Tablet, a conservative Catholic newspaper under 
the authority of New York's Francis Cardinal Spellman, still 
admired Senator Joseph McCarthy. "Senator McCarthy, almost 
alone and against tremendous odds, alerted this nation to 
lOEdi torial, "Catholic in Poli tics," The Wanderer, 
May 26, 1960, p. 4. Mrs. Harvey to John F. Kennedy, Letter, 
June 8, 1959 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential 
Papers, General Correspondence), Box No. 999. Mrs. Harvey 
charged Kennedy with the same association with the ADA. 
"However, I accuse you of not being a good Catholic because 
of your connection with the Americans for Democratic 
Action." 
11Editorial, "Catholics in Politics," The Wanderer, 
May 26, 1960, p. 4. 
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the communist menace within, as no man before or since has 
12 done." Harboring such memories, the paper's editor 
attacked Richard Rovere' s recently published study that 
presented an unfavorable view of McCarthy. Rovere was a 
communist and anti-Catholic, while his book was "repulsive" 
and at best "irresponsible trash. 1113 Kennedy entered the 
fray when he publicly expressed his admiration for Rovere's 
scholarship. R. Emmet Kane in the "Reader's Column" of The 
Tablet published an open letter to Kennedy. Kane admitted 
that he had been a Catholic-Democrat for years and that he 
was looking forward to Catholic in the White House. But 
Kennedy's approval of Rovere's book and his delineation of 
its merits had changed Kane's mind. 
The shock occasioned today by your endorsement of 
Rovere's uncharitable and untruthful biography of 
McCarthy, has forced me to change my estimate of you 
I can find no excuse for you nor can I trust 
your judgment for approving of Rovere's book and its 
proven false statements about a fellow Catholic 
patriot who is prevented by death from defe~~ing 
himself. I am sorry I can no longer endorse you. 
12
oon Zirkel, "Richard Revere's Book on Senator Joe 
McCarthy," The Tablet, July 11, 1959, p. 21. 
13
rbid. 
14 R. Emmet Kane, "Readers Forum," The Tablet, August 
8, 1959, p. 6. Kennedy's reply was published in the paper. 
He apologized for the misintepretation of his remarks which 
were only meant to concern the merits of the book and the 
skills of its author. His remarks were not meant to be a 
judgment on the "complex McCarthy character." Also consult 
"Weird Logic, Timid Souls vs. Student Loyalty Oaths," The 
Homiletic and Pastoral Review, Vol. 59, April 1959, pp:-
625-629. 
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The best known of Kennedy's Catholic conservative 
opponents was Juniper D. Carol, a Franciscan theologian and 
editor of Marianist Studies. Carol epitomized the 
anti-liberalism and anti-communism of the Catholic right. 
His article, "Kennedy for President: A Catholic Priest says 
No!" appeared in the ultra-conservative magazine, Human 
Events, after Kennedy's nomination. 15 In it, Carol 
presented himself as a concerned citizen who would not be so 
presumptuous as to tell his readers whom to vote for. 
Instead, he would advise his reading audience "as to the 
type of candidate they ought not vote for." According to 
Carol, to cast a ballot for any liberal candidate would be a 
disservice to the country. Liberal beliefs in welfare 
statism, world government, and unionized labor represented 
dangerous encroachments on individual and national 
liberties. Carol perceived liberal policy toward communism 
-- tolerating subversives in the country, aiding communistic 
governments, and promoting negotiations and cultural 
exchanges with the Soviets -- as buttressing the growth and 
domination of this diabolical ideology throughout the world. 
Carol promised to do all in his power to stop such a 
15
or. Juniper B. Carol, "Kennedy for President: A 
Priest says No!" Human Events, July 28, 1960, pp. 313-314; 
Also reprinted in the The Wanderer, May 26, 1960, p. 5 and 
in John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential Papers: 
Religious Issue Files of James Wine, Box No. 1020. 
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development: "Frankly, the frightening prospect of yet 
another liberal Administration makes me shudder. 1116 
Carol opposed Kennedy because he embodied this 
liberal ideology. Carol maintained that Kennedy's record in 
Congress over the past two years palpably demonstrated his 
liberal tendencies. Ninety-three out of ninety-seven votes 
found Kennedy on the same side with Hubert Humphrey, "the 
most obnoxious egg-head in Congress." Kennedy's 100% rating 
from the ADA and his befriending of the president of the 
United Auto Workers, Walter Reuther, who was "a ruthless 
labor dictator and one of the most mischievious socialist 
leaders in the country, should be enough to chill the 
enthusiasms of the most fanatic Kennedy backers." Carol 
concluded that Kennedy was the wrong man to provide the 
strength, courage, and leadership to stave off the "Russian 
Bear. 1117 
Numerous reprints of Carol's article were 
distributed throughout the country. In some Catholic 
circles, Carol was accused of disseminating hate literature 
and abetting the cause of anti-Catholic bigots. Editor, 
Donald McDonald, referred to the whole conservative Catholic 
right -- Carol, the Tablet, The Wanderer, and the National 
16
or. Juniper B. Carol, "Kennedy for President: A 
Priest says No!" Human Events, July 28, 1960, pp. 313-314: 
Also reprinted in the The Wanderer, May 26, 1960, p. 5 and 
in John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential Papers: 
Religious Issue Files of James Wine, Box No. 1020. 
17Ibid. 
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Review -- as "anti-Kennedy reactionaries" and "outright 
blackguards." They all suffered from a pathological and 
moral . k 18 sic ness. A fellow priest accused Carol of 
violating his proper role as a priest. Numerous Catholics 
complained that Protestants and other non-Catholics opposed 
to Kennedy took advantage of Carol's article, in particular, 
when they wanted to downgrade him in the eyes of his co-
l . . . t 19 re 1g1on1s s. 
Carol came to his own defense. He first noted that 
the editor of Human Events deleted a couple of paragraphs 
from his original manuscript. In these missing paragraphs, 
he denounced the Republicans for following the same "liberal 
line" on many issues as the Democrats, especially their 
stance toward communism. 
The editor said he had no room for those two 
paragraphs. The point I am making is that: I was not 
trying to promote one party at the expense of the 
other. I am not interested in politics as politics, 
but I am very much concerned about the moral problems 
involved, such as socialism and the appeasement of 
communism. I agree with you that non-Catholics will 
use my article to further their own bigotry. I regret 
that as much as you do, but I feel that such people 
would twist even the wo2gs of the pope or of Christ to 
suit their own purpose. 
18
walter L. Matt, "On This and That," The Wanderer, 
September 15, 1960, p. 4. 
19Father Boniface Fielding to John F. Kennedy, 
Letter, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential 
Papers, Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1020. 
2 0ibid. 
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Carol's defense fell upon deaf ears. One concerned 
catholic citizen wrote Kennedy after he had read Carol's 
article: "I'm so mad, I could spit."
21 Another Catholic 
could not believe that such a diatribe could flow from the 
pen of a Catholic priest: "We are very reluctant to believe 
it was actually written by a priest, since being Catholics 
ourselves, we never heard of anything quite like it, and 
never thought such a thing reasonable." 22 One Catholic 
bluntly informed Kennedy that the author of the article was 
not a Catholic priest. 23 In his reply to these concerned 
catholics, Kennedy reassured them that Carol's article did 
not represent the official position of the Catholic Church. 
He explained that Carol's diatribe was "merely an expression 
of the extreme right wing economic and social opinions of 
Father Carol himself." 24 
21 Gertrude E. Mullen to John F. Kennedy, Letter, 
August 22, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential 
Papers, Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1020. 
22Mr. & Mrs. James O'Connor to Democratic National 
Committee, Letter, October 11, 1960 (John F. Kennedy 
Library: Pre-Presidential Papers, Religious Issue Files of 
James Wine), Box No. 1008. 
23Miss Grace Ede Villiers to John F. Kennedy, 
Letter, September 28, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-
Presidential Papers, Religious Issue Files of James Wine), 
Box No. 1004. 
24 J. Arthur Lazell to Mr. & Mrs. James O'Connor, 
Letter, October 31, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-
Presidential Papers, Religious Issue Files of James Wine), 
Box No. 1008. 
84 
Conservative Catholics were also antagonistic toward 
the Americanization of the Catholic community, a process 
which Kennedy symbolized and which eroded Catholic 
principle in favor of secularist beliefs. Monsignor Irving 
de Blanc, director of the National Catholic Family Bureau, 
was disturbed by the effect American society had upon 
catholic practices and beliefs. Findings from a recent 
study of his bureau clearly demonstrated that Catholics 
utilized contraceptives as readily as non-Catholics. 
Dismayed by these findings and convinced that American 
influence was the cause, de Blanc called for Catholics to 
withdraw from mainstream America, to avoid undue exposure to 
non-Catholic culture, and to return to the ghetto to 
preserve the foundations of their faith. Such a retreat 
was the panacea to the erosion of Catholic morality and 
convictions. "Catholics should not have close associates 
who are in a different religious situation. You soon 
compromise with a cultural pattern. 1125 The editor of Ave 
Maria, after studying the report of de Blanc's bureau, 
agreed that Catholic practice of birth control and divorce 
signified a dangerous secular trend and the emergence of a 
morals gap. "What these figures really demonstrate is our 
alarming morals gap between beliefs and practices of 
Catholics. The simple fact is they do not seem to practice 
25Ed. ' l itoria , 
16, 1960, p. 16. 
"Back to the Ghetto?," Commonweal, July 
what they 
26 preach." This 
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hypocrisy existed because 
catholics lived in a non-Christian society. "It is geared 
to secular goals and values; it is monumentally indifferent 
to religious values. 1127 The Tablet despised this American-
ization trend that Kennedy symbolized and that reduced the 
number of new converts to the Church. "We believe more 
converts are attracted to the Church of firm principle then 
a Church of weakened compromise. So the way to correct and 
amend recent trends and strengthen the Church is to believe 
28 in a return to orthodoxy." 
' In the end, Human Events published an article by one 
of its assistant Catholics editors, Nicholas T. Nonenmacher. 
He summarized conservative antipathy toward Kennedy. He 
contended that if there was going to be a Catholic vote, it 
would be against and not for Kennedy. Catholic 
conservatives, according to him, will demonstrate that 
tribal affinity will not help Kennedy in his quest for the 
presidency. "In sum, just being a Catholic will not make it 
easier for Jack Kennedy to get Catholic votes. 1129 
26Editorial, "The Morals Gap," Ave Maria, July 16, 
1960, p. 16. 
27Ibid. 
28Editorial, The Tablet, March 12, 1960, p. 11. 
29Nicolas T. Nonenmacher, "Will Catholics Defeat 
Kennedy?," Human Events, August 11, 1960, pp. 345-346; 
Reprint in John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue Files 
of James Wine, Box No. 1020. 
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Most Catholic liberals eventually supported Kennedy 
in his presidential campaign. But, before and even a short 
time after his nomination, liberal support was tenuous at 
best. The editors of Commonweal, America, and Ave Maria, 
Dorothy Day, George Higgins, Eugene McCarthy, and David 
Lawrence were Catholic liberals who along with Jews and 
intellectuals questioned Kennedy's liberalism and who looked 
to Adlai Stevenson for leadership and to Eleanor Roosevelt 
for inspiration. Kennedy needed the support of these 
American liberals. Arthur Schlesinger advised Kennedy on 
his liberal dilemma. He explained that liberals remained 
demobilized by and uncommitted to Kennedy because they 
supported Stevenson, were suspicious of Lyndon Johnson, and 
disliked Kennedy's organizational and machine politics. 
Without issue-oriented liberals to spark the campaign, 
Kennedy was left with the only remaining distinguishing tag 
"the Catholic candidate, and fanatics have been allowed 
to make religion the dominant issue in the campaign. 1130 
Schlesinger drew up a plan of action to attract liberals to 
his campaign. He suggested that Kennedy would have to 
reiterate that he was more liberal than Nixon, that he would 
have to utilize more rhetorical flourishes in his orations, 
and that he would have to meet with this issue-oriented 
30Arthur Schlesinger to John F. Kennedy, Letter, 
August 26, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential 
Papers, Special Correspondence-Schlesinger), Box No. 32. 
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segment of the electorate. Once these things had been 
accomplished, Schlesinger thought that issue-minded liberal 
Democrats would enter Kennedy's campaign, giving it "steam," 
dissipating "the profound air of lethargy," and eradicating 
the religious issue once and for all. 
The only way to do this is to fill the vacuum -- to 
charge the campaign with intellectual and emotional 
content -- to make people think of you in so many 
other ways that the question of your faith recedes 
into the background -- all this means to enlist the 
enthusiasm of the kinetic Democra31 who alone can 
convert the campaign into t crusade. 
In a subsequent letter to Kennedy, Schlesinger 
discussed his participation in a meeting of the Board of 
Directors of the ADA (Americans for Democratic Action} • 
Schlesinger observed these issue-minded people perceived 
Nixon as "trouble," and half-heartedly supported Kennedy 
because they were uncertain about Kennedy's political 
beliefs. One board member confided in Schlesinger: "It 
isn't what Kennedy believes that worries me. It's whether 
he believes in anything." 32 Schlesinger reminded Kennedy 
that it was this group that could revitalize his campaign 
and bury the religious issue. But Schlesinger discovered 
another impediment at the meeting, one that was perhaps 
insurmountable among a few liberals. "Some liberals I am 
31Arthur Schlesinger to John F. Kennedy, Letter, 
August 26, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential 
Papers, Special Correspondence-Schlesinger}, Box No. 32. 
32 Ibid. 
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ashamed to say, are secret anti-Catholics. But not many, 
and certainly not many at this meeting. 033 
Another explanation for liberal antagonism toward 
Kennedy was the stormy relationship between his family and 
Eleanor Roosevelt, the supposed embodiment of true liberal 
doctrines. A firm believer in civil liberties, Mrs. 
Roosevelt for years had accused Kennedy of "too much profile 
and not enough courage" on such issues as McCarthyism and 
civil right. 34 Lawrence Fuchs, a liberal, Jewish professor 
of political science was a close friend and colleague of 
Mrs. Roosevelt; they both taught courses at Brandeis 
35 University for several years. As early as 1959, Kennedy 
sought out Fuchs for an explanation of Mrs. Roosevelt's 
aversion toward his bid for the presidency. Kennedy 
defensively and categorically attributed his liberal 
opposition to "prejudice." It was the only plausible 
explanation of liberal support for Stevenson even though he 
could not win. "They're just prejudiced against Catholics." 
And as far as Mrs. Roosevelt was concerned, Kennedy 
33Arthur Schlesinger to John F. Kennedy, Letter, 
August 26, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential 
Papers, Special Correspondence-Schlesinger), Box No. 32. 
34Peter Collier and David Horowitz, The Kennedys, 
(New York: Warner Books, 1984), pp. 299-300. James 
MacGregor Burns, John F. Kennedy: A Political Profile (New 
York: Avon Books, 1959), pp. 93-95, 133-152. 
35Lawrence Fuchs, Oral History 
28, 1966 (John F. Kennedy Library: 
Collection), Transcript, pp. 7-16. 
Interview, November 
Oral History 
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believed: "Well, it's just a matter of prejudice; it's an 
argument she had with my father thirty years ago. 1136 
Fuchs agreed with Kennedy to a certain extent. Not 
all but some liberals were anti-Catholic. "They had a 
tremendously strong disposition to disbelieve the 
possibility of a Catholic being a free, independent and 
liberal President of the United States." Fuchs defended 
Mrs. Roosevelt, however, exonerating her of any inkling of 
anti-Catholicism." ••• she had the kind of mind that did 
not stereotype people. She never said anything like 'Well, 
Catholics are like that!'" Although she disagreed with 
Spellman and other members of the American Catholic 
hierarchy on matters of church and state, Fuchs contended, 
she harbored no "prejorative feelings about Catholics as 
such." In fact, she perceived Kennedy only as a person. 
"She did not view Kennedy as a Catholic at all. I mean, she 
saw him as a person. We never talked about Kennedy as a 
Catholic. 1137 What still perturbed Mrs. Roosevelt about 
Kennedy was his inaction during the days of McCarthy, when 
American civil liberties were in their greatest danger. 
While Kennedy sat back in his hospital bed, the "greatest 
menace of the nation" rampaged throughout the country. In 
36Lawrence Fuchs, Oral History 
28, 1966 (John F. Kennedy Library: 
Collectic\n,, Transcript, pp. 7-16. 
37Ibid. 
Interview, November 
Oral History 
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spite of his later explanations and censure of McCarthy, she 
still doubted Kennedy's courage. Mrs. Roosevelt was deeply 
committed to Adlai Stevenson, whom, according to Fuchs, she 
38 
considered one of the greatest statesmen of the country. 
Kennedy's winning the presidential nomination of the 
Democratic party in July 1960 transformed Mrs. Roosevelt 
into a reluctant supporter of Kennedy. This transformation 
can be traced in the Kennedy-Roosevelt correspondence 
between January 1959-August 1960. The correspondence was 
initiated by one of Mrs. Roosevelt's articles critical of 
Kennedy, claiming that he would be made president by his 
father's unlimited spending. For several months, Kennedy 
denied her charge. His persistence finally persuaded Mrs. 
Roosevelt to admit that the sources for her accusations were 
unreliable rumors and to prof fer a retraction that Kennedy 
said was not necessary. 39 
After the Democratic convention, Mrs. Roosevelt 
agreed to meet Kennedy at Hyde Park in Chicago on August 7. 
At the end of this meeting of reconciliation, she announced 
38Lawrence Fuchs, Oral History 
28, 1966 (John F. Kennedy Library: 
Collection), Transcript, pp. 7-16. 
Interview, November 
Oral History 
39Kennedy-Roosevelt Correspondence, January 1959-
August 1960, Letters (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-
Presidential Papers, Special Correspondence -- Eleanor 
Roosevelt), Box No. 32. As late as May 1960, Mrs. Roosevelt 
still had doubts about Kennedy or any Catholic president to 
resist the pressures of the church and uphold the separation 
of Church and state. "I'm not sure Kennedy could do this." 
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to the press that she would campaign for Kennedy. In a 
letter to a close acquaintance, she divulged her change of 
heart about the candidate. 
I also had the distinct feeling that here was a man 
who could learn. I liked him better than I ever had 
before because he seemed as little cock-,r&re, and I 
think that his mind was open to new ideas. 
she did confide to her friend that she still had some 
reservations so she was willing to accept only the nominal 
position of the Honorary Chairperson of Kennedy's Citizen 
Committee. Such a position allowed her the luxury of 
maintaining a wait and see attitude, becoming more active 
and involved in the campaign on the basis of what she coined 
"Kennedy's personal progress." She closed with a note of 
optimism: "I will be surer of this as time goes on, but I 
think I am not mistaken in feeling that he would make a good 
41 president if elected." 
With Stevenson's defeat and with Mrs. Roosevelt's 
conversion, American liberals, Catholic and non-Catholic 
alike, began to support Kennedy, filling Schlesinger's 
emotional and intellectual void in the campaign. But some 
rank and file liberals remained unconvinced because of the 
religious issue. Kennedy's Catholicism was too great of a 
40 Eleanor Roosevelt to Mrs. Mary Lasker, Letter, 
August 16, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential 
Papers, Special Correspondence -- Eleanor Roosevelt), Box 
No. 3 2. 
41 Ibid. 
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handicap to overcome in order to win in November. Frank A. 
simon, a Protestant-liberal and political activist in 
California, foreboded as much only one month after Kennedy's 
nomination. 
I was very enthusiastic about the party's chances 
after the convention, but that enthusiasm has faded. 
I believe they will beat you with religious prejudice. 
About two weeks ago I started a campaign of getting my 
friends registered to vote. To my amazement I found 
several of my Democratic friends voting for Nixon 
because you are Catholic. It appears we have not come 
very far since 1928 I don't see how you can 
possibly convert the people by November 8th. There is 
a big percentage of Protestants who will vote against 
you. I don't see much hop~ 2 in your carrying but a few 
more states than Al Smith. 
Simon advised Kennedy that no matter how great his efforts 
were to neutralize the religious issue, they would all be in 
vain. There simply was not enough time, and Americans were 
not ready for a president of his faith. Simon did present 
what he thought to be the only remaining viable alternative 
for Kennedy to follow to ensure a victory for the 
Democratic party in November. 
There is an alternative resign in favor of Senator 
Johnson. I believe Johnson would be a sure winner, in 
fact I believe an¥3 top Democrat other than a Catholic 
would beat Nixon. 
In spite of these voices of opposition on the 
Catholic right and left, the American Catholic church 
42Frank A. Simon to John F. Kennedy, Letter, August 
24, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential Papers, 
Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1010. 
43 Ibid. 
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celebrated Kennedy's nomination. It, however, was to be a 
premature celebration of bigotry's demise. Frank Simon's 
foreboding was more accurate. For these days of concord and 
victory would soon be forgotten in the trenches of religious 
strife. A Texan poll at the time revealed the change in the 
offing. Whereas in 1959 Kennedy led Nixon by a comfortable 
margin of two to one, this poll placed Nixon five percentage 
points ahead of Kennedy. The reason for this turnabout in 
the voter's preferences was religion. "Today mainly because 
of the build up of the religious issue Kennedy would 
publicly face defeat in this predominately Protestant but 
traditionally Democratic state. 44 Dale Francis in his 
syndicated column seemed to convey a realistic view of the 
situation. Proclaiming a "Time for Love," he predicted that 
the next three months of campaigning would be a time when 
"Catholics will be bombarded by religious attacks unequaled 
since 1928. Catholics must be prepared to combat this hate 
45 
with its greatest enemy -- love." 
44John Belden, "The Texas Poll," June 1960 (John F. 
Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential Papers, Senate Files), Box 
No. 535; Also consult, James Wine, "Anti-Catholic Material," 
(John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential Papers, 
Religious Issue Files of James Wine) Box No. 1017, Folders 
1-18. 
45Dale Francis, "A Time for Love," Our Sunday 
Visitor (National Edition), July 31, 1960, p. 6714. Also 
see, Editorial, "Kennedy Nomination," Catholic Week, July 
22, 1960, p. 6. It feared that Kennedy's nomination would 
be used as "bait" to mount an anti-Catholic crusade in the 
South. 
CHAPTER V 
KENNEDY AND CATHOLIC AMERICA ON TRIAL: 
THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1960 
John F. Kennedy and Catholic America faced their 
true religious trial during the 1960 presidential campaign. 
Beginning in August, anti-Catholic bigots were resurrected 
when they realized that in ninety days a Catholic could be 
in the White House. This group feared the "onward march of 
totalitarian Roman Catholicism" and the ominous portent for 
America's future: "It is a safe bet that America will be a 
Roman Catholic country in eight years." 1 During this trial, 
Kennedy and the Church cooperated and defended themselves 
against these charges that portrayed them as un-American. 
The rationale behind their defense was to avoid a repeat of 
1928 with all of its religious rancor, hatred, and strife. 
While Kennedy, the politician, was more reasonable in his 
response to such outlandish charges, numerous Catholics were 
1Rabbi Arthur Gilbert, "Four Approaches to a 
Catholic Presidential Candidate," The Catholic Messenger, 
September 28, 1960, p. 8. 
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incensed and bitter about these attacks and considered such 
a trial unnecessary and unjust. The official position of 
the catholic Church and its press was a continued neutrality 
to the political fortunes of Kennedy and restraint to 
scurrilous voices of Catholic antipathy. Kennedy became the 
first Catholic president because both he and his Church 
mitigated religious hysteria and persuaded non-Catholics 
with honest doubts. 
A California Baptist minister observed: "The moment 
the Democrats nominated a Roman Catholic, they transformed 
10, 000 Baptist preachers into active politicians. 112 The 
anti-Catholic groups on the periphery of the political 
spectrum became more active and more conspicuous during the 
month of August, so much so, that Bruce Felknor, director of 
the Fair Campaign Practices Committee, presaged that the 
levels of bigotry in 1960 could possibly surpass those in 
1928. 3 James Reston in the New York Times acknowledged that 
bigotry was becoming more acute, and Kennedy's campaign 
headquarters was inundated with anti-Catholic mailings. 4 
211 The Issue That Just Won't Die," Newsweek, 
September 28, 1960, pp. 61-63. 
3New York Times, August 25, 1960, p. 1. 
4 Ibid. : Mrs. Eugene Meyer to John F. Kennedy, 
Letter, August 24, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-
Presidential Papers, Religious Issue Files of James Wine), 
Box No • 10 0 8 • 
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John Kennedy, you are not fit for the Presidency of 
this great Christian nation. Roman Catholicism is not 
Christianity and you know it. How intelligent people 
can be enslaved to such ignorance, superstition, and 
paganism is more than I can undersand • • • 5Read the bible Mr. Kennedy and you'll learn the truth. 
one of Kennedy's supporters in Zanesville, Ohio 
informed Kennedy that a bogus and scurrilous oath of the 
Knights of Columbus was being "widely distributed in the 
area." She was upset because, according to the so-called 
oath, Catholics throughout the world were helping the pope 
exterminate all those of the Protestant faith. Each 
catholic swore "That I will urge a relentless war secretly 
or openly against all heretical Protestant, as I am directed 
to extirpate them from the face of the earth • To 
accomplish this end, the oath sanctioned all Catholics to 
maim, torture, murder, and "rip up the stomachs and wombs of 
the women and crush the heads of their infants against the 
5Lillian Burnette to John F. Kennedy, Letter, 
September 6, 1960, (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential 
Papers, Religious Issue Files of James Wine) Box No. 1002. 
Also consult John McNamara to John F. Kennedy, Letter, 
August 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential 
Papers, Religious Issues Files of James Wine), Box No. 1008. 
McNamara sent Kennedy numerous clippings from leading 
newspapers of Alabama that not only told "lies," but "preyed 
on ignorance and bigotry." He was upset about anti-
Catholicism while at the same time approving of segregation. 
"My Brother, Msgr. McNamara of Savannah, Georgia, is an 
integrationist. I do not agree with either you or him on 
that question. I believe in equal rights -- voting and 
education -- but certainly not mixing or intermarriage. 
6Mrs. Alice M. Dunn to John F. Kennedy, Letter, 
August 22, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue 
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1003 
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wall in order to annihilate their execrable race." 7 The 
f_riest in its editorial "Foul Play" recalled that in Al 
smith's campaign of 1928 bigots in Pittsburg hired a woman 
who was pregnant to walk the street garbed in a nun's habit. 
Just as denigrating to Catholics in 1960 was the widespread 
dissemination of two leaflets throughout the United States, 
America is a Catholic Country and The Pope for President. 8 
America's editorial, "Ghost That Rides Again," foreboded the 
worst: II • there are growing signs that a certain 
lunatic fringe among the sects is determined to evoke the 
long dead bigotry of the 1920's during the battle for the 
presidency. 119 
The vice-presidential candidate of the Democratic 
party, Lyndon B. Johnson, decried the outburst of religious 
intolerance after John Kennedy's nomination. "The way to 
size up a man is to look him in the eyes, and I have looked 
in Jack Kennedy's eyes. No human being in the world is 
7Mrs. Alice M. Dunn to John F. Kennedy, Letter, 
August 22, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue 
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1003. Other documents that 
discuss the bogus oath and its history: Walter D. Harris to 
Robert Kennedy, Letter, August 19, 1960 (John F. Kennedy 
Library: Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1015; 
J. Arthur Lazell to Mr. Arthur S. Landacre, Letter, August 
31, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue Files), 
Box No. 1015. 
8Editorial, "Foul Play," The Priest, September 1960, 
PP • 7 4 5 - 7 4 6 • 
9Edi tori al, "Bigotry Rides Again," America, 
September 3, 1960, p. 586. 
98 
t dictate his decisions. He is going to do what is going o 
Arnerl. ca. "10 best for In an attempt to weaken this chorus of 
bigotry and to lessen its impact, Nixon announced on August 
22 that, in his campaign for the presidency, religion was 
d b . 11 not and woul not e an issue. At the end of August, 
Kennedy received a lengthy letter from John Kenneth 
Galbraith. In it, he discussed religion's impact on 
politics in the farm belt areas of the country. After 
talking with at least one hundred journalists, farm leaders, 
and Democratic farmers, he concluded that "Religion in the 
rural corn belt, Great Plains, and down into rural Texas has 
become an issue greater than either income or peace. 1112 He 
recommended that Kennedy address the agricultural problems 
in the national media -- posthaste. "It will help to crowd 
out the religious issue but it must be done quickly before 
these attitudes harden as they surely will." Most 
important, Galbraith stressed that Kennedy should focus upon 
the study and resolution of the American farmers' hardships 
by Congress. Therefore, his major message should read: 
I know some farm people have reservations concerning 
my religious faith; I tell you why these reservations 
are groundless, I warn you of the danger of being 
10
congressional Quarterly Almanac, 86th Congress, 
2nd Session, Vol. 16 (Washington, D.C., 1960), pp. 804-805. 
11 Ibid. 
12 John Kenneth Galbraith to John F. Kennedy, Letter, 
August 25, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue 
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1004. 
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diverted by this issue into attitudes which will make 
permanent 1 ~11 of the problems we have not had a chance to solve. 
These voices of concern and advice were heard by 
John Kennedy and his campaign staff -- Robert Kennedy, Ralph 
Dungan, Theodore Sorensen, and John Hooker, Jr. They began 
to organize and direct efforts either to eradicate or 
neutralize the religious issue in the campaign. Their first 
concerted action was to produce a campaign memorandum that 
contained numerous statements made by Kennedy addressing his 
Catholic faith. 14 It covered the entire religious 
controversy that had developed since Kennedy's Look 
interview in 1959 -- separation of Church and state, federal 
aid to education, birth control, and the Poling incident. 
The memorandum also cited favorable positions held by 
Catholic and non-Catholic leaders and had a section on Al 
Smith in which it undermined the myth that religion was the 
major cause of his defeat. The carefully constructed 
document ended with these words of Kennedy: 
I don't think that my religion is anyone's business but 
my business. Is any one going to tell me that I lost 
this primary day when I was born and baptized forty-
13John Kenneth Galbraith to John F. Kennedy, Letter, 
August 25, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue 
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1004. 
1411senator Kennedy and the Catholic Question," 
Memorandum, August 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious 
Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1015. 
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two years ago?! 15 
Besides composing and distributing this memorandum, 
Kennedy and his advisors, firmly believing that he would win 
"unless defeated by the religious issue, 11 decided to 
establish a special committee devoted to neutralizing the 
religious tensions in the . 16 campaign. The Community 
Relations Committee would be responsible for all intrusions 
of religion in politics, answering all correspondence 
concerning Kennedy's faith, compiling a fact book on the 
religious question for all staff members; directing mailings 
to key Protestant areas as well as Democratic leaders across 
the nation, establishing a dialogue with Protestant editors 
and ministers, and obtaining the active support of 
Protestant leadership on local, state, and national 
levels. 17 James Wine, a lay leader of the National Council 
1511 Senator Kennedy and the Catholic Question, 11 
Memorandum, August 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious 
Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1015. Also see Robert 
Kennedy to Representative Ken Hechler, Letter, August 31, 
1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue File of James 
Wine), Box No. 1015. Eventually the Democratic National 
Committee compiled its own Memorandum on Kennedy and the 
Religious Issue: J. Arthur Lazell to Mr. John Baker, Letter, 
September 12, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue 
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1015; The Memorandum, 
September 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue 
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1015 and "Memorandum on the 
Religious Issue," Boston Herald, September 9, 1960, p. 1. 
1611Memorandum on the Religious Issue: 
Relations Program of Action, 11 August 15, 19 6 O 
Kennedy Library: Religious Issue Files of James 
No. 1015. 
17Ibid. 
Community 
(John F. 
Wine), Box 
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of churches, was the committee's director. John Cogley, a 
liberal Catholic layman, and Arthur Lazell Jr., a Protestant 
minister, served as Wine's two assistants. 18 Wine became 
director for two reasons. He believed that a candidate's 
faith should be no bar from public office and that 
Protestants needed to reveal their true convictions about 
religious freedom. 19 He explained that the title of his 
committee -- "Community Relations" -- was inclusive of all 
citizens. 
We reasoned that we were going to have a religious 
issue in the mind of the voter, whether or not he had 
anything to do with the Church and consequently, in 
terms of all groups. 20so that was the way we finally decided upon the tag. 
Wine succinctly expressed his primary task as 
director: "It was to say that the religious issue and all 
its ramifications were my responsibility." 21 The major 
18James Wine to Steve Smith, Interoffice Memorandum, 
September 14, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue 
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1015; Charles A. Gauld to 
James Wine, Letter, August 26, 1960 (John F. Kennedy 
Library: Religious Issue Files of James Wine) , Box No. 
1015; James Wine, Oral History Interview, January 26, 1967 
(John F. Kennedy Library: Oral History Collection), 
Transcript, pp. 10-14, 22-23, 25-29; John Cogley, Oral 
History Interview, February 20, 1968 (John F. Kennedy 
Library: Oral History Collection), Transcript, p. 32. 
l 9J T.1 ' ames y~J.ne, Oral History Interview, Transcript, 
pp. 22-23. 
20
rbid., pp. 28-29. 
21 Ibid. 
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thrust of his program was directed at Protestants and not 
catholics. He did not seek to convert anyone but "to ferret 
our high areas of prejudice and neutralize anti-Catholicism." 
Robert Kennedy and Theodore Sorensen advised Wine that to 
effect neutralization his staff's response to bigotry must 
not display animosity which might alienate reasonable 
anti-Catholics. It should be a well-balanced and logical 
argument that would not only neutralize bigotry in the 
campaign but persuade reasonable Protestants to vote for 
Kennedy in spite of his Catholic faith. 22 
Wine's "Projected Analysis of Simulation on the 
Religious Issue," portrayed this neutralization strategy as 
the biggest vote getter for Kennedy. 23 His simulation 
concluded that Kennedy already had experienced the worst 
Protestant defections because of his Catholicism. He could 
22 
"Memorandum on the Religious Issue: Community 
Relations Program of Action," August 15, 1960 (John F. 
Kennedy Library: Religious Issues Files of James Wine), Box 
No. 1015. John Jay Hooker, Jr., Oral History Interview, 
February 2, 1966 (John F. Kennedy Library: Oral History 
Collection), Transcript, p. 40. Mr. Hooker managed the 
religious issue before Wine's arrival in Washington, D.C. 
He was especially close to Robert Kennedy who appointed him 
to the temporary position on the campaign staff in the early 
days. He made the following observation concerning Robert 
Kennedy and the religious issue. "Bob felt very deeply 
about this. This was a matter about which he had enormous 
conviction. His brother's religion was not relevant to his 
brother's ability to run the nation." 
23 James Wine, "Analysis of Simulation on the 
Religious Issue," September 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: 
Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1015. 
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only gain votes. "On balance he could not lose further from 
forthright and persistent attention to the religious issue 
but gain." Wine thought that Kennedy must not sweep the 
"religious issue under the rug." . I_!1s"t:.~c:!.c:l he sh.~':1:.~.~- promote 
among certain groups reasonable non-Catholics, Catholics, 
.. ,--.,,~,,_.,.'. .. -~ •" ' 
and other minorities that a vote against him was an act 
of religious intolerance. They would resent such overt 
prejudice. Such an approach would minimize further 
defections and maximize Kennedy's votes based upon 
disapproval of religious prejudice. 24 Wine distributed 
these simulation results to his state coordinators, 
recommending the implementation of this strategy with one 
restrictive stipulation. 
It should be clearly understood that the working 
policy with regard to this issue from the onset of the 
campaign is and has been to meet the issue only when 
raised by others. On no occasion have we or will we 
provoke the issue -- rather to combat an attack, but 
more particularly to aizsver questions factually, on 
all phases of the issue. 
As events unfolded, Wine need not have worried about 
his staff raising the religious issue first. As early as 
September, he reported that his office was handling 150 
24 James Wine, "Analysis of Simulation on the 
Religious Issue," September 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: 
Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1015. 
25James Wine to Co-ordinators, Interoffice 
Memorandum, September 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: 
Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1015. 
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letters per day and forty-one out of state calls. 2 6 
Protestant leaders and ministers accommodated Wine on this 
matter as well. On September 6, 1960 at the Mayflower Hotel 
in Washington, D.C. one hundred and fifty Protestant 
personages, representing 37 different sects, met as 
"Citizens for Religious Freedom" to dedicate themselves to 
the proposition that "Jack Kennedy's Roman Catholicism would 
by no means be forgotten as an election issue." Dr. Norman 
Vincent Peale, one of the country's prominent Protestant 
leaders, presided over the conference. The author of The 
Power of Positive Thinking and the leader of Manhattan's 
Marble Collegiate Church whose following rivaled that of 
Billy Graham's declared at the meeting: "Our American 
culture is at stake. I don't say it won't survive, but it 
won't be what it was. 1127 Those present issued a two 
thousand word statement that "served to make religion the 
most emotional issue of the 1960 election." The resolution 
accepted by the group charged that no Catholic president 
could remain impervious to Vatican influence and pressure. 
"It is inconceivable that a Roman Catholic President would 
26J w· ames ine, Oral History Interview, Transcript, 
pp. 25-29. 
2711 The Campaign: The Power of Negative Thinking," 
~, September 19, 1960, pp. 21-22; "That Religious Issue: 
Hot and Getting Hotter," Newsweek, September 19, 1960, pp. 
37-38. Dr. Daniel Poling, editor of the Christian Herald 
was the other important Protestant leader at the conference. 
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not be under extreme pressure by the hierarchy of his church 
to accede to its policies •• II Because of this inseparable 
connection, the resolution concluded that a Catholic was not 
qualified to be president of the United States. 28 
Religious leaders of all persuasions and supporters 
of Kennedy were shocked and, in some cases, incensed by 
Peal's manifesto. Peale was supposedly one of the most 
respectable and reasonable Protestants. His actions in 
Washington shattered this image of tolerance. Peale even 
experienced opposition among his own flock. Congressman 
Yale Huffman of Wheatridge, Colorado, one of Peale's 
faithful followers, found his recent pronouncement very 
"painful" because it was using religion for political gain. 
"The statement of 150 preachers was calculated to influence 
votes; it was a political statement issuing from religious 
figures. 1129 Huffman demanded that Peale publicly admit his 
grave error in waving the flag of religious intolerance. 30 
28The Campaign: The Power of Negative Thinking," 
Time, September 19, 1960, pp. 21-22; "That Religious Issue: 
Hot and Getting Hotter," Newsweek, September 19, 1960, pp. 
37-38. Dr. Daniel Poling, editor of the Christian Herald 
was the other important Protestant leader at the conference. 
Some Protestants saw a position on Catholicism as the same 
as a soft position on Communism. Dr. Harold J. Ockenga of 
Boston's Park Street Church compared Kennedy to Khrushchev, 
saying that each "is a captive of a system." 
29Yale Huffman to Dr. Norman Vincent Peale, Letter, 
September 9, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue 
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1012. 
30 Ibid. 
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Leading liberal Protestants condemned Peale's actions. Dr. 
Reinhold Neiburhr stated, "Dr. Peale and his associates 
• show blind prejudice." 31 John C. Bennet, Dean of the 
Faculty at the Union Theological Seminary, contended that 
the Washington meeting symbolized "a Protestant Underworld 
that stirs undisguised hatred of Catholics. 1132 Rabbi 
Maurice N. Eisendrath, president of the Union of American 
Hebrew Congregations, expressed profound "distress" by 
Peale's attempt to transform the presidential campaign into 
a "Religious Holy War" and "to provide a cloak of 
respectability to the forces of bigotry in this country. 1133 
On September 11 Richard Nixon, while on "Meet the Press," 
was asked about Peale's recent statement. He rejoined that 
it betrayed the democratic process because it sought to 
determine the election on religious grounds. He absolved 
his campaign of any guilt of raising the religious issue. 
"As far as I am concerned, I have issued orders to all of 
3111 Bennet and Niebuhr Repudiate Religious Attack on 
Kennedy's Candidacy," Press Release of Liberal Party of New 
York State, September 9, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: 
Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1018. 
32Ibid., In Time, September 19, 1960, p. 22. James 
A. Pike, Protestant~iscopal Bishop of California, 
denounced Peale: "Any argument which would rule out a Roman 
Catholic just because he is a Roman Catholic is both bigotry 
and a violation of the constitutional guarantee of no 
religious test for public office." 
3311 statement by Rabbi Maurice N. Eisendrath," 
President of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, 
September 13, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue 
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1019. 
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the people in my campaign not to discuss religion and not to 
. 't I . 11 d l' t d. l' ' " 34 raise i • wi ec ine o iscuss re igion. 
With such an overwhelming negative response, Peale 
found it necessary to explain his actions. He renounced all 
association with the Washington statement and sent the 
"Citizens for Religious Freedom" the following telegram: 
"Please do not include me in any further meeting or 
activities in your group. It will not be possible for me to 
participate anyway. 1135 Peale insisted that "I was not duped 
• I was just stupid. I went innocently like a babe in 
the woods." He denied press reports that the meeting in 
Washington, D.C. was the "Peale Group," and maintained that 
he was invited to attend "A Study Conference for the purpose 
of examining the whole philosophical question of the 
relationship of freedom to religion. 1136 He contended that 
he had nothing to do with the organizing efforts, presided 
only over the morning session, and did not prepare the 
released statement. He did admit that he had failed to 
foresee the statement's impact on the political campaign. 
34Richard M. Nixon, "Meet the Press," September 11, 
1960, The Speeches of Vice President Nixon: Presidential 
Campaign of 1960, (United States Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C.), pp. 12-14. 
35
or. Norman Vincent Peale to Charles B. Feeney, 
Letter, September 1960, (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious 
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1009. 
3611 Pastors and Politics," Newsweek, September 26, 
1960, p. 42. 
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"I sincerely did not mean it to be so, but perhaps I will be 
a wiser person in the future at least, let us hope so. 1137 
Completely "distraught" by the entire fiasco, especially 
"the injection of myself into political publicity which is 
actually contrary to my own nature • II Peale tendered 
his resignation to his Church elders who rejected it. 
Although dismayed and contrite, Peale maintained that he did 
nothing wrong. "I do not feel that I was wrong in attending 
the meeting, but it may have been unwise under the 
circumstances. 1138 
While on the campaign trail in California, Kennedy 
responded on the day that Peale statement was released. 
I do not accept the view that my Church would place 
pressures on me. The great struggle today is between 
thos3 9who believe in no God and those who believe in God. 
Wine and his committee on Community Relations initially 
considered the "Peale Affair" a very serious threat and 
devised a plan of counterattack. 40 Wine decided that the 
counterattack should be based upon constitutional, 
nonpartisan, nonsectarian, and moral grounds. Leaflets 
37
nr. Norman Vincent Peale to Fellow Church Members, 
Letter, September 15, 1960, (John F. Kennedy Library: 
Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1002. 
pp. 
38 Ibid. 
39T. ~, 
40James 
35-40. 
September 19, 1960, p. 22. 
Wine, Oral History Interview, Transcript, 
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should be printed and distributed that contained quotes of 
important lay and clerical Protestant leaders who denounced 
the Peale manifesto. He also proposed a special effort 
among minorities, especially Blacks. To acquire the support 
of Blacks, he recommended assistance from Black ministers: 
Negro parishioners traditionally look to their pastors 
for guidance in all areas of living. This influence 
should not be underestimated as these ministTis are 
the key to political attitudes of their flocks. 
Wine's plan of counterattack was rendered ineffectual 
because, as already seen, the Peale episode backfired and 
was scorned as an intolerant attack upon America's precept 
of religious freedom. Wine determined that " ••. through 
bad judgment and naivete on their own parts they pretty well 
punctured the balloon without us having to do anything. As 
a consequence, we took no counteraction. Once Peale 
disassociated himself from the statement, it faltered and 
fell apart. 1142 
As September progressed, Newsweek voting polls 
revealed, "One key to the election, about all agree, is the 
religious issue. 1143 Throughout the election, reporters 
41James Wine, Oral History Interview, Transcript, 
pp. 35-40. Ruth w. Kingman to Ken O'Donnell, Memorandum, 
September 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issues 
Files of James Wine) , Box No. 1015. 
42James Wine, Oral History Interview, Transcript, 
pp. 35-37. 
430
will Voters Vote Their Faith?" Newsweek, 
September 26, 1960, pp. 42-45. Article provides findings of 
its fifty state listening poll of Peale's impact on voters. 
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discovered, "The issue of Kennedy's Catholicism is being 
talked about in practically all states, and in some almost 
to the exclusion of every other political topic." 44 It 
appeared, in spite of Peale's resounding backfire, the 
incident did catapult the religions issue into permanent 
national prominence throughout the remainder of the 
campaign. According to Wine, Peale, if nothing else, 
revived the more reasonable charges against a Catholic 
president, which proved to be the most difficult to answer. 
Protestants still were disturbed by Kennedy's Look interview 
and its compartmentalization of his religion and public 
life. Wine realized Protestants could simply not believe or 
accept this dichotomy of faith and politics. "Protestants 
believe I am a Christian and it affected my daily life, so 
it doesn't make sense that the monolithic and authoritarian 
posture of the Catholic Church will not affect him. " 45 
Another persistent accusation emboldened at the time among 
non-Catholics concerned Catholic political power. 
It was the idea that there would be control by the 
American political Catholic group, that the cabinet 
would be full of Catholics, that the Supreme Court 
would be full of Catholics, that the Catholic Church 
44
"Will Voters Vote Their 
September 26, 1960, pp. 42-45. Yet 
for speculation on its conclusion. 
Catholics are for Kennedy, and not 
against Kennedy." 
Faith?" Newsweek, 
report did leave room 
"Clearly, not all 
all Protestants are 
45James Wine, Oral History Interview, Transcript, 
pp. 51-53. 
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in this country would become a political entity -- not 
necessarily a political entity that was controlled by 
the Vatican, but a political ewty that would have a 
political head in this country. 
Taking into account the growth of Catholics in 
strength and numbers and Catholic dominance in key, 
electoral areas, Wine and others perceived Protestant 
trepidation of the emergence of a large Catholic interest 
group in American politics as legitimate and difficult to 
47 
reason away. In order to dispel these revised or 
emboldened reservations, Kennedy realized that he had to 
confront the religious issue in a speech that would receive 
national attention. 48 While in the eye of Peale's religious 
storm, Kennedy accepted an invitation to address the Greater 
Houston Ministerial Alliance Conference on September 12. 49 
46 John Jay Hooker, Jr. , Oral History Interview, 
Transcript, p. 40. 
4 7 Ibid., After reading a batch of Kennedy's 
religious mail, John Cogley concluded that in addressing 
these rational objections to his faith, Kennedy should 
approach it as a constitutional issue and avoid all 
theological questions. John Cogley, Five Page Memorandum, 
September 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue 
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1018. 
48The Democratic National Committee, headed by 
Senator Henry Jackson, also worried about Republican use of 
the religious issue to their advantage. Senator Jackson was 
concerned about Nixon's indifference and inaction to his 
party's manipulation of anti-Catholicism. "Nixon must take 
positive action and demand that it be stopped right now." 
Senator Henry Jackson, Statement of the Democratic National 
Cornroi ttee, September 16, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: 
Theodore Sorensen Papers), Box No. 15. 
4 9 James Wine, Oral History Interview, Transcript, 
pp. 60-66. 
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Prior to Peale's manifesto, Dr. Herbert Meza, a 
leader of the Houston ministers, had invited Kennedy to 
participate in the conference. Kennedy, Wine, and others 
could not agree on whether or not to accept the invitation. 
some considered it "an unwise confrontation in the "Bible 
belt" to an audience of conservative fundamentalists. 50 
Even Wine, who favored acceptance, had very serious 
apprehensions about the conference. 
It was set up for somebody who really wanted to make a 
mockery of it. If somebody had tried to torpedo it by 
bringing up a number of Ministers who would simply be 
crying to ask all kinds of questions that would be 
irrelevant, but any treatment of which could militate 
against you no matter how you look at it lik~ 1 1 When did you stop beating your wife?' kind of thing. 
Despite these apprehensions, all resigned themselves 
to Kennedy's participation if he were to win or lose the 
upcoming election on a basis other than his religious 
affiliation. Wine realized the importance of the speech in 
his campaign to persuade reasonable critics. "There was no 
doubt in my mind it would make or break us. I felt that 
strongly about it and said so. 1152 Kennedy's Houston speech 
50James Wine, Oral History Interview, Transcript, 
pp. 60-66. 
51 Ibid., This anxiety over the meeting was 
exemplified by Wine's careful attention to the details of 
the format Kennedy and others would follow at the meeting. 
James Wine to John Seigathaler, Letter, September 4, 1960 
(John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue Files of James 
Wine), Box No. 1015. 
52James Wine, Oral History Interview, Transcript, 
pp. 60-66. 
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was researched by Cogley and Wine, composed by Sorensen;-and 
edited with the help of John Courtney Murray. While on the 
plane to Houston, Cogley drilled Kennedy with possible 
questions the ministers might ask. Cogley recalled that 
during the flight both seemed anxious about winning his 
Protestant audience at the expense of alienating Catholics. 
"He did not want Catholics to think he sold out the Church, 
so he had to walk a tightrope." 53 
In Houston, Kennedy prefaced his speech by noting 
that "world communism and poverty" were more important 
concerns than the so-called religious issue. "These are the 
real issues which should decide this campaign. And they 
are not religious issues -- for war and hunger and ignorance 
and despair know no religious barrier." But because he was 
a Catholic and because the real issues were being eschewed, 
he thought it was necessary for him to once again state "not 
what kind of Church I believe in, for that should be 
important only to me -- bu.t 'lf!hat kind of America I believe 
in." 54 He proclaimed his belief in an America in which 
53John Cogley, Oral History Interview, Transcript, 
pp. 11, 45-46. Cogley called September the "famous" month 
of the religious issue. During the brainstorming session, 
Kennedy wrote out his answers on paper because his throat 
was hoarse. 
54
complete text of John F. Kennedy's speech to the 
Greater Houston Ministerial Association, September 12, 1960. 
William David Smith, "Alfred E. Smith and John F. Kennedy: 
The Religious Issue during the Presidential Campaigns of 
1928 and 1960," (Dissertation, Souther Illinois University, 
June 1964}, p. 314. 
separation of state and church was absolute, religious 
intolerance was eradicated, and the American ideal of 
brotherhood prevailed. 
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This is the kind of America I believe in -- and this 
is the kind I fought for in the South Pacific and the 
kind my brother died for in Europe. No one suggested 
that we might have divided loyalty, that we did not 
believe in liberty, or that we belonged to a disloyal 
group that thre~5ened the freedom for which our 
forefathers died. 
Kennedy then declared, "I am not the Catholic candidate for 
president. I am the Democratic Party's candidate for 
President who happens to be Catholic. I do not speak for 
the Church on public matters -- and the Church does not 
speak for me." He reassured his audience that he would make 
all of his presidential decisions based solely on the 
nation's interests. No ecclesiastical pressure, power, or 
threat of punishment could compel him to do otherwise. But, 
if his official duties and obligations violated his 
conscience or vice versa, which he believed remotely 
possible at best, ". then I would resign my office." 56 
The question and answer period was dominated by the 
familiar accusations that had hounded Kennedy since his Look 
interview in 1959: federal aid to education, the 
55 Complete text of John F. Kennedy's speech to the 
Greater Houston Ministerial Association, September 12, 1960. 
William David Smith, "Alfred E. Smith and John F. Kennedy: 
The Religious Issue during the Presidential Campaigns of 
1928 and 1960," (Dissertation, Souther Illinois University, 
June 1964), p. 316. 
56 Ibid., p. 317. 
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appointment of an ambassador to Rome, the Poling incident, 
and his commitment to separation of church and state. 57 One 
comment raised the ire of Kennedy. It was the suggestion 
that he compile a statement of his views on church and state 
and submit it to the Pope for his authorization. Kennedy 
responded that he would refuse to ask for Vatican 
approbation, as he would refuse to submit to Vatican 
authority as president. When the questioner persisted after 
his answer, Kennedy curtly responded: 
I don't have to have the approval in that sense. I 
have not submitted my statement before I read it to 
the Vatican. I did not submit it to Cardinal Cushing 
. it seems to me that I am the one that is running 
for office of the P1Ss5idency and not Cardinal Cushing 
and not anyone else. 
He ended his verbal foray by assuring those present that he 
did not think that the questions asked were unfair or 
unreasonable or were motivated by prejudice or bigotry. He 
colored his closing remarks with a slight twist of humor. 
I want you to know that I am grateful to you for 
inviting me tonight. I am sure I have made no 
converts to my church./laughter/But I do hope that at 
least my view, which I believe to be the view of my 
fellow Catholics . • • may be of some value # at 
least assisting you to make a careful judgement. 
57
complete text of John F. Kennedy's speech to the 
Greater Houston Ministerial Association, September 12, 1960. 
William David Smith, "Alfred E. Smith and John F. Kennedy: 
The Religious Issue during the Presidential Campaigns of 
1928 and 1960," (Dissertation, Souther Illinois University, 
June 1964), p. 317-328. 
5 8 Ibid. I p. 3 2 2. 
59 Ibid., p. 328. 
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Kennedy's Houston speeclJ. proved to be the major 
turning point in the campaign. Cogley, looking back in 
hindsight, realized its significance. "But I felt if he got 
the nomination he wouldn't be defeated on this score only 
(religion). I think I was wrong now because I believe if it 
had not been for the Houston thing he couldn't have been 
60 
elected." Kennedy's forensic masterpiece did not bury the 
religious issue but it did manage to remove the honest 
doubts of most reasonable non-Catholics. Hooker observed, 
"Those people who were sincere became convinced by the 
statement in Houston. I think he got 95% of the people who 
were reasonable on the subject whose doubts were genuine. I 
think he overwhelmingly sold himself on that question." 61 
Sorensen parroted Hooker's assessment. 
It made unnecessary any further full-scale answer from 
the candidate, and Kennedy, while continuing to answer 
questions, never raised the subject again. It offered 
in one document all the answers to all the questions 
any reasonable man could ask. It helped divide the 
citizens legitimately concerned about Kennedy's vi5~s 
from the fanatics who had condemned him from birth. 
The Houston speech not withstanding, the 
unreasonable attacks continued. Wine received one letter 
60John Cogley, Oral History Interview, Transcript, 
pp. 48-49. 
61 John Jay Hooker, Jr., Oral History Interview, 
Transcript, pp. 48-49. 
62 The Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Bantam 
Books, 1965), p. 218. For examples of reasonable 
Protestants persuaded by Kennedy's speech in Houston see: 
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from a Protestant who perceived one way Kennedy could win in 
November. "If you will leave the Catholic Church, you will 
get the votes that will make you our president. 1163 Through-
out the remainder of the campaign, American households 
received countless anti-Catholic mailings, chain letters, 
leaflets, and pamphlets. Abolish the Nunneries and Save the 
Girl, Kennedy Supports Pope Order of Segregation by Creed, 
and To Kill Protestants were a few examples of the 
anti-Catholic tracts in circulation at the time. 64 
Robert w. Evans to John F. Kennedy, Letter, September 16, 
1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issues Files of 
James Wine), Box No. 1003 and Mrs. Robert Alexander to John 
F. Kennedy, Letter, September 19, 1960 (John F. Kennedy 
Library: Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1002. 
Henceforth, Kennedy's campaign packet on the religious issue 
contained a copy of his Houston speech. A film of his 
performance in Houston was also widely distributed 
throughout the country during the campaign. "Memorandum on 
Religion Packet," Research Di vision of the Democratic 
National Committee, September 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: 
Democratic National Committee Press Releases 1958-1960), Box 
No. 1034. Assisting Kennedy's attack on the religious issue 
was the first of four televised debates against Nixon on 
September 26th in Chicago. "Some 70 million adults, nearly 
two-thirds of the nation 1 s adult population watched or 
listened to the first debate." Americans observed Kennedy 
at his forensic best, and the result was "Protestants no 
longer thought of Kennedy only as a Catholic." Sorensen, 
Kennedy, pp. 222-229. 
63Mrs. Hallies Blake to John F. Kennedy, Letter, 
September 21, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue 
Files), Box No. 1002. For another example of bigoted 
reaction to Kennedy's speech see c. Ralph Youngblood to John 
F. Kennedy, Letter, October 7, 1960 (John F. Kennedy 
Library: Religious Issue Files), Box No. 1012. Youngblood 
concluded 11 I must confess the more you talk the more 
confused you make your stand of your position of your 
religion in politics." 
64Patricia Barret, Religious Liberty and the 
American Presidency, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1963), 
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Felknor's Fair Campaign Practices Committee in 1962 analyzed 
l,383 reports of unfair anti-Catholic campaign literature. 
Felkner estimated that 20 to 25 million pieces of such 
literature were distributed, and he discerned four different 
types of anti-Catholicism in the materials: "5% vile, 25% 
dishonest, 35% unfair, and 35% responsible." 65 
Despite this plethora of anti-Catholic materials, 
the religious issue only twice threatened in October to 
reach the heights during the days of the Peale controversy. 
Three prelates of Puerto Rico, Archbishop James Davis, 
Bishop John McManus, and Bishop Luis Martinez, enjoined all 
church members not to vote for Governor Marin's Popular 
Democratic Party which supported government sponsored birth 
control programs. Catholics who disobeyed this injunction 
ld b . t d 66 wou e excommunica e • It did not take long for 
American non-Catholics to portend a similar incident of the 
pp. 28-29. This work summarized the report of Bruce L. 
Felknor's Fair Campaign Practices Committee. Its appendix 
contains a complete list of anti-Catholic material by the 
committee, pp. 60-125. 
65Ibid., Also see Bruce Felkner to Theodore 
Sorensen, Letter, September 2 2, 19 61 (John F. Kennedy 
Library: Religious Issue Files), Box No. 1015. He enclosed 
in this correspondence to Sorensen a fourteen page list of 
anti-Catholic literature which contained approximately 350 
different titles. Numerous examples of this bigoted press 
are also contained in The Uncatalogued John F. Kennedy 
Collection, Department of Special Collections, University of 
Notre Dame. 
66
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church controlling the state when Kennedy became president. 
According to Cogley, 11 it started up the whole controversy 
again," simply because the bishops' actions in Puerto Rico 
acted as a confirmation of earlier Protestant fears. 67 
Wine initially thought the issue "a tough one." He 
issued orders to treat the incident as they did the 
Osservatore Romano article. Wine contended that Puerto 
Rico's predicament was not applicable to the religious issue 
in the current presidential campaign," that it was strictly 
a local situation and that it involved the Church 
. 'l 1168 pr1mar1 y. It was a flagrant distortion of reality to 
compare it to Kennedy or the American Catholic Church. 
Marin's Democratic party and Puerto Rico's Catholic Church 
were completely separate of both mainland institutions. 
Wine thought it was necessary to reiterate Kennedy's long-
standing position on such matters. "Senator Kennedy has 
stated on many occasions that he considers it wholly 
improper and alien to our Democratic system for Churchmen of 
any faith to tell the members of their church for whom to 
vote or for whom not to vote. 1169 In the end, only a few 
55-57. 
67
cogley, Oral History Interview, p. 14. 
68w. ine, Oral History Interview, Transcript, pp. 
69 Ibid., Kennedy's Campaign Form Letter in Response 
to Inquiries about Puerto Rico, November 1960 (John F. 
Kennedy Library: Religious Issues Files), Box No. 1015. 
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.Americans seemed concerned about the Puerto Rico incident. 
To everybody's surprise, it didn't blow up nearly as 
big as everybody thought it was going to. I remember 
around the center the day the Bishops' statement came 
out that everybody thought this was the end of the 
line. And I must say that I felt somewhat that way, 
too . . The best thing to do was nothing because 
Kennedy was in the spot of having been embarrassed by 
these bishops and he didn't want to escalate70he whole thing. And it seemed to work out all right. 
A week before Reformation Sunday, 40 fundamentalist 
sects of the National Association of Evangelicals, horrified 
by the prospect of a Catholic president, attempted to 
transform October 30 into a day of national protest. 71 
Charles Kuralt reported from Illinois during this week of 
preparation and discovered the religious issue alive and 
well in the Midwest. "We did not come to Illinois to report 
on the religious issue. We came here to report on the trend 
of the campaign and found religion a major factor in it. 1172 
At the end of his sojourn through the state, he concluded 
that Protestants would primarily vote against Kennedy and 
Catholics would vote for him. 73 In contrast to Illinois' 
polarization, Reformation Sunday turned out to be more 
70John Cogley, Oral History Interview, Transcript, 
p. 15. 
7111 sticky Issue," Newsweek, October 31, 1960, p. 21. 
72
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F. Kennedy: Presidential Campaign of 1960 (United States 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1961), pp. 
309-316. 
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rhetoric than actual fact. Wine could recall only two minor 
incidents in New Jersey and Washington, o.c. "I think it 
would have been very hurtful had it been widespread. Given 
the time and the setting it would have caused a lot of 
people to have second thoughts, I think. 1174 The protest 
failed; only the lunatic fringe rallied around this banner 
of religious bigotry. As in the case of Puerto Rico, Wine 
and his staff were pleased and relieved. 
While Protestants failed to fill the streets on 
Reformation Sunday, :Kennedy appeared on "Face the Nation." 
Of course the major topic of discussion was religion. He 
was asked if he would give another public exposition on his 
religious convictions before the election. He rejected such 
a proposal. "No, I don't think that there is any reason •• 
• after all my statements and after my record has been 
carefully scanned for fourteen years :Kennedy did 
not conceal his irritation with uproar over his Catholicism. 
If 90% of the population were Catholics, I would still 
be opposed to it (Union of Church and State). Why is 
it -- we 35 million Catholics -- what is it in their 
record that makes anyone think that they are not as 
devote9 6 to this ideas of separation of Church and State? 
74James Wine, Oral History Interview, Transcript, 
pp. 40-41. 
75John F. :Kennedy, "Face the Nation," CBS 
Television, October 30, 1960. Speeches of Senator John F. 
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During the last week before the election, "The hate 
literature continued to pour forth." 77 Kennedy 1 s campaign 
headquarters received numerous pieces of bigoted 
correspondence. 0. W. Reece of Oklahoma, an Evangelical 
minister, wrote him a vicious letter, telling Kennedy that 
.Americans were nauseous over his attempt to buy the election 
"with the tainted millions of booze money which you got from 
your now thoroughly discredited father. 1178 Reece would not 
be deceived by his comments. The plain and simple fact was 
that the Pope and his fellow Catholics wanted to control 
.America. 79 Bob McGee's special television report, "The 
Campaign and the Candidates," reported that the delegates at 
the Texas Southern Baptist Convention resolved: "We believe 
this (religion) is one of the legitimate factors in the 
formation of a decision to cast a ballot. 1180 On the day 
before the election, Kennedy appeared on New Hampshire 
7711 The Biggest Issue," Newsweek, November 7, 1960, 
p. 20. Bishop Pike admitted that the ugliness of the 
bigotry has made him "more defensive of Mr. Kennedy's 
position." 
780.w. Reece to John F. Kennedy, Letter, November 1, 
1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue Files of 
James Wine), Box No. 1009. 
79 Ibid. 
80Robert McGee, "The Campaign and the Candidates," 
NBC Television, Joint Appearance of Vice-President Nixon and 
Senator John F. Kennedy: The Presidential Campaign of 1960, 
(United States Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C.: 
1961) I PP• 362-370 o 
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television· He entertained several questions from his 
audience and callers. Inevitably his religion was the major 
thrust of one query. "If elected, will your actions as 
president be influenced by your Church?" Kennedy revealed 
his relief that his trial was at and end. "Well, I suppose 
this is perhaps the last time that question will come up • • 
• I am glad to have the opportunity to answer that one for 
the last time." 81 
After Kennedy's nomination, Catholics were 
completely taken aback by the resurfacing of scurrilous 
prejudice. Andrew Greeley, steeped in dialogue, pluralism, 
and understanding, admitted his shock when he wrote, "that 
the upsurge in irrationalism seemed completely 
82 
unexpected." In a short time this shock among Catholics 
quickly transformed into anger and bitterness. Edward 
Taylor's animosity emanated from his letter to Kennedy. "We 
are having the screws put to us by bigoted men who would be 
known as religious leaders were their reprehensible 
techniques to fail them." He thought Kennedy's acceptance 
speech at the Democratic Convention was excellent and 
recommended that he provide the country's bigots with "the 
81Television Program, "John F. Kennedy Interview," 
Manchester, New Hampshire, November 7, 1960, Speeches of 
John F. Kennedy: Presidential Campaign of 1960, p. 944. 
82 Andrew Greeley, "The Yardstick," The Alamo 
Register, September 18, 1960, pp. 4, 9. 
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same kind of hell again. 1183 He commanded Kennedy to "Give 
them Hell, and speak loudly. You're being too nice about 
everything. Too logical. The people don• t want cool 
squared logic on an emotional issue. 1184 
John Ziegler and his entire family of seven had 
taken a vacation in the South. They were very upset with 
finding a strong presence of anti-Catholicism there. " 
we were shocked beyond words at the vicious anti-Catholic 
bigotry campaign that is sweeping the country. As converts 
and proud of our new religion, we demand Senator that you 
make a nationwide talk. The sooner you give this talk, the 
quicker we can get at these bigots. 1185 The Catholic Week of 
Birmingham, Alabama in its editorial, "U.S. Catholics 
Libeled," expressed similar sentiments of bellicosity. It 
recommended that all Catholics unite and close ranks behind 
their bishops in defense of their Church. Once united, 
Catholics must be unrelenting in their attack against 
prejudice. 
We must make these people realize that lying does not 
pay, that the world has moved on since their hate 
campaign of 1928, and that they cannot treat Catholics 
with the same impunity in the world of today. We must 
83 Edward F. Taylor to John F. Kennedy, Letter, 
August 25, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue 
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1000. 
84 Ibid. 
85John Ziegler to John F. Kennedy, Letter, September 
2, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue Files of 
James Wine), Box No. 1012. 
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drag them into the light and expose them to the world 
as the real conspirators against this nation. We must 
call the bluff of these conspiratorg;6 we must unmask and uncloak them in their anonymity. 
A Catholic attack, based upon righteousness and 
resentment, became prevalent. John R. Rush in his letter to 
the editor of The Tablet insisted that Catholics coalesce 
into one voting bloc in opposition to prejudice. Catholics 
opposed to such a concerted attack were, at best, 
"unrealistic" and, at worst, "betrayers of their own kind." 
Instead of trying to eliminate bias on the part of our 
separated brethren, we should try and eliminate bias 
of Catholics against a Catholic for president. The 
Catholics who are against Kennedy are the same ones 
who often say, 'look what they did to Al Smith.' What 
do they mean by that? If Senator Kennedy is defeated 
we can't say for years to come 'look what they did to 
Jack KerwTdy. ' It will be look what we did to ,Jack 
Kennedy. 
Another letter expressed disgust with Kennedy's obsequious 
stand in the face of such attacks. "I see no reason why the 
Catholic community should feel any particular pride in his 
nomination. Senator Kennedy has tried to disassociate 
himself from that community to the point of near apology for 
his religious affiliation in his acceptance speech." 88 
Conservative journalist, L. Brent Bozell implied that 
86Editorial, "U.S. Catholics Libeled," Catholic 
~' September 16, 1960, p. 
87 Letter to the Edi tor, John Rush, The Tablet, 
August 6 , 19 6 0, p. 7. 
88
"The Reader's Forum," The National Review, August 
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Kennedy was overall to blame for the religious issue. 
Finally, the Democratic candidate could produce 
salutary consequences for all concerned by spending 
less time disassociating himself from his Church, and 
more of it explaiwng those teachings and practices 
that give concern. 
Peale's manifesto intensified feelings of resentment 
and anger among Catholics. In his letter to Kennedy, c. W. 
O'Mara's displeasure was self-evident. "I as a Catholic am 
a little tired and disgusted when you as my representative 
first as president and second as a fellow Catholic and third 
as a fellow American are pointed to as a traitor. n 90 
Bitterness flowed from O'Mara' s pen in his concluding 
remarks. 
I went through the 1928 campaign. Filthy and dirty it 
was, this time we Catholics deserve better. We are 
not traitors, second-class citizens to be distrusted. 
We are not slyly waiting to turn our country over to 
the Pope. We are single-minded and intelligent. We 
love our country and you are big enough to lead it. 
You as representative of the American Catholics are 
pointed to as the Arch-traitor. You are condemned to 
the role of subservient serf of the country to the 
Pope w~ is waiting to take over America • How 
Stupid! 
Peale even stirred the pen of William Buckley in the 
pages of his National Review. In his editorial "A Little 
89
"The Catholic Issue," L. Brent Bozell, The 
National Review, September 24, 1960, p. 171. 
90c.w. O'Mara to John F. Kennedy, Letter, September 
7, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue Files of 
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Positive Thought for Norman Peale, " Buckley explained that 
his magazine found Kennedy an undesirable presidential 
candidate because of his accommodation of Communism and his 
advocacy of a welfare state. But in spite of his opposition 
to Kennedy, Buckley could not agree with Peale's 
apprehension of Kennedy's religion. "Mr. Kennedy is a 
disappointment and a serious threat, but not, as Dr. Norman 
Peale so recklessly suggests, because he is Catholic." 92 
Buckley assured Peale that Vatican control over Kennedy was 
an impossibility. The Church's authority was infallible on 
matters of morality and doctrine but "where moral and civil 
law conflict, the Church will distinguish the authority of 
Ceasar. 11 Peale's pope hunting as interpreted by Buckley 
implied that all Americans desired a president who was 
beyond the influence of religious morality, who was "the 
self-sufficient Autonomous man, and who would make all of 
his own rules." Buckley feared such a president. "God save 
us from such an event. Most of us are guided prescriptively 
by tradition, by habits of mind, and conscience, and 
morals. 1193 
Catholic Republican, George Dickenson, was upset 
with the political consequences of Peale's actions. In a 
92
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letter to Peale, he sarcastically suggested that the 
Democratic party should send him a note of thanks for his 
generous assistance. He saw the need for such action 
because Peale's manifesto turned many Catholic Republicans 
into Democrats. "Your brand of bigotry will influence many 
Republicans of Catholic faith to vote for Senator 
94 Kennedy." Dickenson canvassed Catholic Republicans in his 
district and found that a majority of them had decided to 
vote against Nixon. Dickenson reminded Peale that Catholics 
never felt a special rapport with Kennedy, a man who was 
never really close to the Catholic Church. But his 
statement has changed all this. 
I am sure that the majority of Americans of all faiths 
will now place you along side of the southern jack-leg 
preacher, who is educated, ignorant, intolerant, and 
stupid. You now have joined what has 9gme to be known 
in this country as the Lunatic Fringe. 
Anti-Catholicism generated by Kennedy's nomination 
and Peale's statement in some instances provoked a more 
optimistic response among Catholics. A Few Catholics viewed 
this resurgence of bigotry as a time ripe with opportunity. 
As far as the editor of the San Francisco Monitor was 
concerned, Catholics who found Kennedy's candidacy 
uncomfortable, who decried "Jack, Go Home! , " and who 
94George W. Dickenson to Norman Vincent Peale, 
Letter, September 12, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: 
Religious Issue Files), Box No. 1012. 
95 Ibid. 
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disliked being on the "Hot Spot" because of their faith, 
wanted to return to the days of the ghetto "when no one even 
cared about their religion or way of life." 96 These "Dog in 
the Manager Catholics were spineless and feared giving 
public witness to their faith. But now we are on trial. He 
has brought the searchlight into our corner. He has shown 
that a faith is not only to be lived but defended." 97 The 
editor thought that Kennedy's nomination had provided 
Catholics with an audience, both concerned and inquisitive 
about their religious beliefs. If Catholics were successful 
in explaining their faith, the editor, using a football 
analogy, concluded that Catholics will never again be 
"second-class guards, good enough to hang around the locker 
room but never classy enough to make the starting line 
up. 1198 The Catholic Transcript suggested that "Some good 
may come of this gross evil. 11 The bigotry is out in the 
open to be adjudged for its scurrility, injustice, 
hyperbole, and hate. Commonweal noted that the Peale fiasco 
was not only the "highpoint of religious bigotry in this 
campaign but the turning point." The turning point 
represented the identification and criticism of unreasonable 
9611 Jack, Go Home!," San Francisco Monitor, September 
23, 1960, p. 24. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
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sources of prejudice by both Catholics and non-Catholics. 99 
Archbishop Connally of Portland, Oregon, although shocked 
and outraged by the anti-Catholicism of fair-minded 
protestants comprising Peale's group, was optimistic that 
such pronouncements would extinguish the fires of 
prejudice. 10° Connally believed that irrational anti-
Catholicism would lead to the paradoxical result of Catholic 
converts who despised such religious intolerance. "This 
verification will drive thousands of non-Catholic friends 
and neighbors into the Church and we must be prepared to 
meet them11101 
Such propitious forecasts of anti-Catholicism were 
believed only by a Catholic minority. Most Catholics were 
indignant and harbored intense feelings of animosity toward 
their non-Catholic accusers. Church leaders and Catholic 
editors realized that the religious issue was not buried by 
Kennedy's nomination. Fearing religious strife and the 
ghost of Al Smith, they upheld their primary campaign 
strategy of political neutrality and Catholic 
responsibility. They called on fellow Catholics for calm 
and restraint. America's editorial staff announced it was 
9911catholicism and the Campaign," Commonweal, 
September 23, 1960, pp. 507-508. 
lOO"Archbishop Connally Deplores Current Attack on 
Church," Northwest Progress, September 30, 1960, pp. 1-2. 
lOlibid. 
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"No time for anger." They advised Catholics to remain calm, 
even though they were convinced that the country "was 
apparently right back where we were thirty years ago." 102 
What especially disturbed these editors was not the bigots 
of the lunatic fringe but the "rational bigoted 
pseudo-urbanites such as Norman Peale and Dr. Poling." They 
were dismayed that men of such stature could ally themselves 
with "the theologically bankrupt Protestant underworld of 
bigotry." Such false accusations deserved no answer. To do 
so would give them validity and distract from the real 
issues of the campaign. 
The saddest thing about Dr. Peale's excursion into 
national politics on this level is that he is bound to 
divert needed energies and precious time into totally 
unprofitable channels of ignorant, enervating, and 
bigoted controversy. The problems to which he calls 
attention are pseudo-problems. Yet their unfortunate 
capacity for distracting and misleading even the 
intelligent citizen is so great that they tend to 
driv7 the re~l Pf8~lems off the limited horizons of 
public attention. 
Monsignor George Kelley in the pages of America 
beseeched Catholics that it was "A Time for Keeping on 
Shirts." He predicted that the religious conflagration 
would perhaps become worse than 1928, and advised fellow 
Catholics not to react to these despicable charges against 
American Catholicism. "Do not answer such idiocy nor react 
102Editorial, "No Time for Anger," America, 
September 24, 1960, pp. 689-690. The entire issue was 
devoted to anti-Catholicism in the presidential campaign. 
lOJibid. 
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with typical resentment or anger, or your own bigotry. I 
will only dignify the charges of bigots." 104 At the very 
least, Kelly recommended that Catholics adhere to the 
Coolidge Campaign slogan, "Keep Cool," maintaining a 
reasonable and proper perspective on this current 
anti-Catholic hysteria. 
Plenty of fertilizer will be used to propagate bigotry 
this fall. Let us use the DDT of common sense to keep 
it from growing in our own yards. The Catholic Church 
has survived much more vicious and much more 
i~telli~0gt attacks than these made by southern bigots. 
Ave Maria's editor, John C. Reedy, reiterated 
Kelley's sage advice. Charity was the proper Catholic 
reaction to bigotry which was a "sickness of mind and soul." 
Catholics had no reason to fear such a cancer. "This 
bigotry constitutes no threat to the Church in the United 
St t 11106 a es. Reedy reminded Catholics that they were no 
longer an immigrant minority but forty million full-fledged 
Americans. Because these forces of intolerance were 
innocuous, he discerned Catholic demeanor as the most 
ominous dimension of this potentially explosive situation. 
"The real danger comes from the difficulty in controlling 
ourselves, in the avoidance of political muscle-flexing by 
104 George Kelly, "A Time for Keeping on Shirts," 
America, September 24, 1960, pp. 700-701. 
lOSibid. 
106John Reedy, "The Editor's Desk, 11 Ave Maria, 
September 17, 1960, p. 2. 
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. d b d f . . . t "10 7 successful Americans an y a e ensive minori y. 
Later, he reported a large Catholic response of charity but 
still warned of the dangers of falling into a retreat of 
anger. 
The real issues in this all-important campaign are 
political and not religious. The greatest disservice 
we could do to our nation and our Church would be to 
allow the campaign to be dragged down to the depths by 
a handf11_\> 8 of rabble-rousing and religious hucksters. 
Although he admitted that " ••. I am hurt by their 
attacks, I feel a deep sense of frustration at their 
charges," Dale Francis in his syndicated column "To Talk of 
Many Things" implored Catholics to counter these 
unreasonable and unconscionable attacks with Christian 
patience and understanding. "We are the ones who must act. 
It will not be easy but we must meet hatred with kindness. 
It is a time for love. 11109 The Advocate, subsequent to 
Peale's fiasco, instructed members of the faith to perceive 
their predicament as "a wonderful opportunity of practicing 
the virtue of charity." Suspicion of Catholic patriotism 
107 John Reedy, "The Edi tor's Desk," Ave Maria, 
September 17, 1960, p. 2. 
108 John Reedy, "How Should We Answer Them?" Ave 
Maria, September 17, 1960, p. 2. 
109Dale Francis, "A Time for Love," Our Sunday 
Visitor, (National Edition), September 18, 1960, p. 6. He 
suggested that Catholics should react in the following way 
to prejudical attacks: "by being better Catholics, by loving 
even those who attack your faith, by not allowing them to 
make you angry or bitter." 
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stemmed from ignorance and not malice; it was this ignorance 
that had engendered the religious tension in the 1960 
presidential campaign. Catholics, therefore, were the true 
culprits. "They had failed to adequately explain their 
faith to non-Catholics. They had failed to live up to their 
responsibilities, in removing this non-Catholic shortcoming 
II 110 
. . . 
Renowned theologians and church leaders felt 
compelled to publicly state their positions during the 
campaign, becoming most conspicuous with the advent of Peale 
in Washington. John Courtney Murray asked Catholics to 
remain tranquil and imperturbable, despite his open 
admission that anti-Catholicism was in full bloom. 
The brutal fact became increasingly clear. 'The 
Oldest American Prejudice, ' as anti-Catholicism has 
rightly been called, is as poisonously alive today as 
it was in 1928, or in the eighteen nineties or even in 
the eighteen-forties • • . The ancient anti-Papal text 
is embellished by a new set of footnotes. The time 
worn anti-CatholifJ.. 1prejudice is cloaked in semblance 
of "rationality." 
Shocked by the renewal of anti-Catholicism, Bishop John 
Mussio of the Steubenville diocese in Pennsylvania denounced 
Peale's platform of "filthy insinuations and rigamarole of 
dirty innuendoes," and boasted that Catholics were true 
American patriots. 
llOEditorial, "With Charity," The Advocate, 
September 15, 1960, p. 8. 
111 Frontpage, America, September 24, 1960, p. 702. 
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We love our country with the same love we love our 
God. To betray the one would be to betray the other. 
If they will not take our proven word, what do they 
want? That we give up our Catholic faith? To force 
us into this choice in order to secure the full rights 
of American citizenship would be to make those very 
r~gh~s. henchllJ.~12 to tyranny and a mockery of their 
s1gn1f1cance. 
In spite of his unsettled state, Bishop Mussio demanded that 
his co-religionists remain "calm and controlled when faced 
with anti-Catholic agitation," asking them to adhere to the 
Church's policy for all American-Catholics -- to be good and 
1 1 't' 113 oya c1 1zens. 
This position of restraint and understanding 
compelled the leadership of the Church to penetrate and shed 
its ghetto mentality in order to respond rationally to 
anti-Catholic charges and to explain fully their faith to 
non-Catholics. Archbishop Karl L. Alter, in his essay 
"Nineteen Questions About A Catholic President," presented 
the official reply of the American Catholic Church. 114 
Methodically, he refuted all current accusations about the 
Church's role in American politics: Catholic loyalty, birth 
control and education policies, appointment of Vatican 
112 Press Release, "Bishop Mussio Condemns Spread of 
Anti-Catholic Bigotry in Presidential Campaign," September 
1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue Files of 
James Wine), Box No. 1016. 
113 Ibid. 
114Karl J. Alter, Archbishop of Cincinnati, 
"Nineteen Questions about a Catholic President," Catholic 
Mind, September-October 1960, pp. 440-449. Originally 
published in The Sign, July 1960, pp. 11-14, 65. 
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Ambassador, and the volatile church-state relationship. 
Alter wisely assuaged American fear of Catholic intolerance. 
The fear that we as Catholics will use religious 
tolerance here to gain ascendancy in our country and 
then, having achieved political hegemony, proceed to 
deprive our fellow citizens of freedom of speech in 
religion, freedom of conscience, or impose our 
convictions upon them, willy-nilly, is utterly 
unwarranted by any doctrine of the Catholic Church, as 
well as by the consistent pronouncements of the 
American Hierarchy. We seek no privileged status1 we 
proclaim our full adherence to the provisions 01 15he 
constitution as of now as well as for the future. 
Another official Catholic promulgation consistently 
referred to throughout the remainder of the campaign was an 
address given by Gustave Weigel, professor of Ecclesiology 
at Woodstock College in Maryland. Entitled "A Theological 
Consideration of the Relations between Church and State," 
Weigel' s address expressed his sense of disappointment, 
frustration, and even desperation with the persistence of 
non-Catholic doubts about the sincerity of Catholic 
commitment to the Constitution and religious freedom. 
Weigel divulged his trepidation. "At this moment what we 
are discussing can be explosive and destructive." 116 After 
discussing the roots of non-Catholic fears, the feasibility 
of dialogue, the Church's stand on church-state relation-
115Karl J. Alter, Archbishop of Cincinnati, 
"Nineteen Questions about a Catholic President," Catholic 
Mind, September-October 1960, pp. 440-449. Originally 
published in The Sign, July 1960, pp. 11-14, 65. 
11611Text of Father Gustave Weigel' s Address on 
Church and State," The Catholic Transcript, October 6, 1960, 
p. 11. 
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ship, and the extent of Catholic support of religious 
tolerance, he described all Catholics in public office as 
devoted servants of the nation's common good and as 
stalwarts of religious liberty. 
I conclude with a personal testimony. I have been 
working theology for 30 years. I have always admired 
and loved my country with its institutions and 
history. I can sincerely say that there is absolutely 
nothing in Catholic doctrine which would prevent a 
Catholic from holding public off ice on any level 
accorqi17g to the letter and spirit of our American 
laws. 
Weigel's and Alter's discourses on Catholicism and 
Americanism inspired America to remind non-Catholics that 
Catholic patriotism represented a two-hundred year heritage. 
The Church's leadership since its inception to the 
present -- Archbishop John Carroll, Bishop John England, 
Archbishop John Hughes, James Cardinal Gibbons, Archbishop 
John T. McNicholas -- was a strong advocate of religious 
freedom and tolerance. It was, in fact, because of this 
tradition, that the American Church had created "one of the 
most flourishing and promising Catholic communities that has 
ever existed. 11118 The magazine concluded that the real 
issue was not Kennedy's personal faith but the Catholic 
Church and its teachings. This tradition of Americanism 
117 
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Church and State," The Catholic Transcript, October 6, 1960, 
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118Editorial, "On Religious Toleration," America, 
September 24, 1960, pp. 690-696. 
should clarify all non-Catholic perceptions of Catholics 
being "Un-American," of their not accepting "the 
constitutional relationship between the government and 
religion as defined by the First Amendment. 11119 
This rational Catholic defense, based upon self-
138 
restraint, was the Church's public stance throughout the 
campaign. Such a posture entailed a neutral reaction to the 
Democratic presidential candidate, John F. Kennedy. Afraid 
of raising Catholic resentment, of reinforcing Protestant 
trepidation, and of revealing any inkling of favoritism 
towards Kennedy, Catholic clergy, journals, and newspapers 
were factual and not interpretative in their comments on 
Kennedy's Houston performance. Nevertheless, some members 
of the Catholic laity unleashed their anger and disgust. 
Mrs. Sylvia Murch, deeply impressed with Kennedy's Houston 
speech, admonished that Nixon had better not win because of 
anti-Catholic sentiment. "Senator Kennedy, I do not want to 
sound bitter, believe me, I am not. I am just disgusted and 
discouraged. I live in the suburbs where 3/4 of the 
families are Catholic and believe they are really bursting 
with anger over this religious matter. 11120 T. P. Cyrus of 
119Edi tori al, "On Religious Toleration," America, 
September 24, 1960, pp. 690-696. 
120Mrs. Sylvia Murck to John F. Kennedy, Letter, 
October 7, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue 
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1008. 
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Texas commended Kennedy on his oration but perceived it as 
appealing only to borderline moderates. "The Hardshell 
t . d .,121 Baptists were no convince • In order to completely 
alienate and isolate the beliefs and aims of these 
hardliners, Mr. Cyrus suggested the following scenario; one, 
he insisted, was his and not that of a crank's. 
I suggest that the Democratic Party itself prepare and 
circulate anti-Catholic literature and posters of the 
mostly vile and bigoted exaggeration -- I mean Hitler 
hatred stuff -- which I believe would effectively 
separate moderates from the extremists. 122what I propose to do is to out babble the Baptists. 
One hundred and sixty-six Catholic laymen also broke 
this official position of silence by the Church in an 
attempt to demonstrate to non-Catholics that Kennedy's views 
were congruous with other Arnerican-Catholics. 123 In 
defiance of clerical authority, these laymen resolved, that 
with bigotry rampant in the country, Catholics had a 
responsibility not to retreat in silence but to make their 
position clear to their fellow Americans as Kennedy was 
doing. Catholics must break out of their ghetto and explain 
their faith's devotion to religious liberty, and to the 
sanctity of private conscience. According to these laymen, 
121 T.P. Cyrus to John F. Kennedy, Letter, September 
13, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue Files of 
James Wine), Box No. 1003. 
122Ibid. 
123Barret, American Presidency, pp. 164-166. 
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catholics were not Catholic citizens but American citizens 
who happen to be Catholic. As true Americans, Catholics 
based their public and private acts upon the following 
precept. 
In his public acts as they affect the whole community 
the Catholic is bound in conscience to promote the 
common good and to avoid seeking any sectarian 
advantage. He is also bound to recognize t~2 4proper 
scope of independence of the political order. 
By October, Catholic clergy and laity had explained 
their position to non-Catholic neighbors and critics. 
Preaching calm and restraint, the American Church's reply to 
the Puerto Rico incident was very predictable and 
understandable. Richard Cardinal Cushing' s response was 
typical. He insisted that American Church leaders would be 
"totally out of step" in telling American voters how to 
vote. In an attempt to reassure fellow Americans that the 
American Catholic Church was a separate institution from 
Puerto Rico's Church, he said: 
We must repeat that whatever may be the custom 
elsewhere, the American tradition of which Catholics 
form so loyal a part, is satisfied simply to call to 
attention moral questions with their implications and 
leave to the conscience of the people the specific 
pol~tici~ 5 decision which comes in the act of 
voting. 
Sheerin in his Catholic World wrote: "This bombshell was a 
surprise and shock to us in view of our constant and 
124Barret, American Presidency, pp. 164-166. 
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"Kennedy Campaign Form Letter on Puerto Rico," 
October 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue Files 
of James Wine), Box No. 1015. 
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insistent assurances to Protestants that our hierarchy has 
no political aspirations." Throughout the campaign thus 
far, Sheerin insisted that the Church has purposely avoided 
meddling in politics or influencing the Catholic vote. Most 
clergy, in fact, "favored the non-Catholic candidate." In 
closing, Sheerin promised that what happened in Puerto Rico 
would never happen in America "because the American Bishops 
have no desire to cast suspicions on American Catholic 
126 loyalty to and support of the First Amendment." 
The Church's neutral political stance outraged a few 
lay Catholics like Mrs. Rita Menick. In a letter to Wine's 
Community Relations Committee, she complained that Kennedy 
was fighting the Catholic Church's battle "alone!." Such a 
cumbersome responsibility to fall upon the shoulders of one 
man was unfair and unjust. The Church and its hierarchy 
were pathetic in its stance of neutral retreat in this time 
of crisis. She conveyed to Wine that she failed in her 
efforts to provoke the entrance of the Church into the 
political fray in its own defense. Her request to Cardinal 
Spellman and the National Welfare Conference to reissue the 
1948 statement on separation of Church and State went 
unan~wered. Such action on the Church's part, she insisted, 
"was not necessarily to elect Kennedy, but to clear the air 
for millions of American Catholics who want to look at this 
126John Sheerin,"The Embarrassing Puerto Rican 
Pastoral," Catholic World, December 1960, pp. 132-136. 
. 11 127 
election unemotiona y. 
Concern over bigotry dominated the Catholic 
142 
comITiunity up to election day. As balloting day approached, 
the National Review printed some of the most commonly 
expressed Catholic jokes. "A Protestant slogan: Eliminate 
the Middleman and Vote for Pope John. Nixon's Slogan: If 
elected I will go to Rome. Definition of bigotry: A Yale 
catholic who won't vote for Kennedy because he want to 
Harvard. A Democratic cocktail: one part southern comfort, 
128 
and two parts Holy water." This satirical litany by the 
National Review divulged its disdain and its impatience with 
the survival of this "bogus issue." Father Gorman in the 
Sign revealed irritation with bigotry's longevity. "For 
several months, we have had an exhibition of religious 
bigotry similar to that of the presidential campaign of 
1928. Few thought there could be such an outbreak again. 
Even intelligent and experienced observers of the 1\.u1eLt•. • 
scene underestimated the power of what has been referred to 
as the Protestant 129 underworld." The major source of 
127Mrs. Rita Menick to James Wine, Letter, October 
26, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue Files of 
James Wine), Box No. 1008; Also follow-up letter of October 
27, 1960, Box No. 1008. 
128Editorial, "Going Around," The National Review, 
October 8, 1960, p. 201. 
129Father Gorman, "Bigots, 1960 Model," The Sign, 
November 1960, p. 14. 
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Gorman' s exasperation was the persistent repetition of 
questions by non-Catholics that had already been answered 
one hundred times before. "Such a constant recurrence 
signified a belief that American Catholics individually and 
as a group were lying when they declare their adherence to 
the Constitution. That is bigotry!" 130 Gorman advised 
catholics to ignore such bigoted importuning and to realize 
that the Church would neither lose or gain by the outcome of 
the presidential elections. 
Lawrence Fuchs in his article "Religious Vote-Fact 
or Fiction?" also argued that religion would be 
insignificant in the outcome of the election. 1928 was not 
relevant or even comparable to 1960. Nixon was not Hoover, 
and perhaps most important of all, Kennedy was not Smith. 
Fuchs was convinced that Kennedy would win in spite of his 
faith because he was the best qualified candidate. He did 
admit that Kennedy's Catholicism would affect the votes of 
Protestant liberals and Jews, anti-Catholic bigots, and 
conservative Catholics. But overall, Fuchs maintained that 
the election results would demonstrate, "the pluralism and 
variety of opinion within American Catholicism, and the 
primary party loyalty over religious faith." 
The Catholic factor, which will be talked about, will 
not be as important a vote determinant as people 
think. Millions of Catholics will swell with Catholic 
13
°Father Gorman, "Bigots, 1960 Model," The Sign, 
November 1960, p. 14. 
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pride because Jack Kennedy heads the Democratic party 
ticket, but the overwhelming1 j'iajori ty of them would have voted Democratic anyway. 
That religion was not and should not be a factor in 
the election became the Catholic theme during the final week 
of the campaign. The fact that the Church had maintained a 
neutral position concerning the candidates reflected the 
lack of religion's influence. The Catholic Sentinel boasted 
that no other religious group was as "neutral as the 
Catholic Church." Of the 53,796 Catholic priests listed in 
the 1960 Catholic Directory, only one priest injected 
himself into the political arena Father Juniper Caro1. 132 
Official Catholic reticence was illustrated in the St. 
Louis' Parish Bulletin of Bellevue, Washington. It 
published the following policy regarding campaign 
literature. 
No partisan campaign literature of a political nature 
should be distributed, or a speech given at a Guild 
meeting or any other parish function. Parish lists, 
Guild lists, or any list pertaining to the parish must 
not be given to advertising agencies, merchants, or 
political parties. This is the rul~ of the 
Archdiocese and must be strictly enforced. 
Monsignor George Casey, while praising his fellow priests 
131Lawrence Fuchs, "The Religious Vote-Fact 
Fiction?" The Catholic World, October 1960, pp. 9-16. 
or 
132Editorial, "President Kennedy," 
Sentinel, November 10, 1960, p. 1. 
Catholic 
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saint Louis Parish Bulletin, October 16, 1960 
(John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue Files of James 
Wine), Box No. 1007. 
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for doing a remarkable job of keeping politics out of the 
church, restated the noble purpose for imposing such self-
control. 
Let me also tell you that this determination of the 
Catholic priests of the United States to avoid 
politicking at this time is neither a tactic nor a 
feint. It is a high purpose to keep first things 
first, and that is the communication of God's will and 
the dispensing of his saving grace to souls. It is 
not fpf4 anybody's political sake, but for religion's 
sake. 
The Catholic press importuned Catholics to vote for 
the best qualified candidate regardless of his faith. The 
Boston Pilot commanded Catholics to vote and vote 
. 11' tl 135 inte igen y. Reedy in his Ave Maria advised his fellow 
Catholics to vote their conscience and not to feel 
embarrassed about voting for a non-Catholic "if for the 
right reason." Reedy reassured Catholics of religion's lack 
of influence on election day. "Our ballots will be cast on 
non-religious grounds • • • and we feel so will the ballots 
of the vast majority of Arnericans. 136 The Catholic Sentinel 
implored Catholics not to vote out of the hate for 
Protestants. Instead, "we must give back love, which as we 
134 George Casey, "Priest and Poli tics," Boston 
Pilot, October 22, 1960, p. 4. 
135Edi torial, "Time for Decision," Boston Pilot, 
November 5, 1960, p. 4. 
136Editorial, "How a Catholic Should Vote?" Ave 
Maria, November 5, 1960. 
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know is the basis for all Christ's teachings." 137 The Texas 
Catholic advised its readers not to cast a vote of revenge. 
"These bigots will receive their just punishment in the 
hereafter, when God will decide which souls will go to 
heaven and which souls will go to hell." 138 Finally, Our 
Sunday Visitor editor lamented that only six out of ten 
persons would vote in the upcoming election. He impressed 
upon Catholics that it was a moral duty to vote and to vote 
139 
wisely for the common good. 
Three days before the election the editor of America 
observed that there had been a larger circulation of hate 
literature in 1960 than in 1928. In spite of this 
augmentation, the editor commended his peers for their lack 
of resentment and bitterness and for never acting as a 
partisan protagonists of John F. Kennedy. "Catholics in the 
United States can be proud of how their priests and their 
Catholic press conducted themselves with such admirable 
. d . h . t' ,,140 restraint uring t ese trying imes. According to the 
137Editorial, "Vote As a Free Citizen," Catholic 
Sentinel, November 3, 1960, p. 1, 28. 
138Gordon O'Neill, "The Godless .•• Versus ... 
The Grace of God," The Texas Catholic, November 12, 1960, p. 
1. He penned article three weeks before election. 
139Editorial, "Politics and You," Our Sunday 
Visitor, (Lafayette Edition), October 19, 1960, p. 2A. 
140Edi torial, "Voting Is Our Duty," America, 
November 5, 1960, p. 162. 
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editor, Catholics will not base their franchise upon 
religion but upon two critical aspects of the country's 
needs exceptional leadership and a strong foreign 
1 . 141 po icy. 
Reedy in Ave Maria echoed similar sentiments as the 
campaign neared its end. He was pleased with Catholic 
moderation in spite of bigoted attacks and in spite of the 
harboring of inner resentment to these charges of 
"disloyalty or stupidity." Reedy insisted that if the 
Catholic candidate won the election, it would not be a 
victory for the Church, and if he lost, it would not be a 
defeat for the Church. The election was a political event 
whose ramifications would affect the entire citizenry of the 
country. Reedy, in his closing remarks, drew one lesson he 
hoped Catholics had learned as a result of this tumultuous 
campaign: "We also know that we have a serious obligation 
to make ourselves and the Church better known and better 
understand by our fellow citizens. 11142 
Robert Hoyt in the pages of Kansas City-St. Joseph 
Register provided the most realistic assessment of the 
campaign and its impact upon the Church on the eve of the 
election. Although he commended fellow Catholics for their 
141Edi tori al, "Voting Is Our Duty," America, 
November 5, 1960, p. 162. 
14 2 John Reedy, "The Edi tor' s Desk, " Ave Maria, 
November 5, 1960, p. 2. 
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restrained response to the unreasonable charges of 
anti-Catholics, he feared that the religious issue in the 
campaign and the election result would determine whether the 
American Catholic future would be directed by ghettoism or 
dialogue. The main thrust of his advice was really an 
attempt to separate the election results from the religious 
issue in the hopes of circumventing a retreat of bitterness 
on a larger scale than in 1928. 
My own feeling is that the Church does not stand to 
gain or lose greatly from the election itself. The 
general trend toward the integration of Catholics into 
the life of the country was not begun by Kennedy and 
its continuance does not depend on his personal 
fortune. The important question is not whether the 
trend continues, but whether Catholics will be able to 
preserve and deepen their Catholicity as they assume 
the responsibilities of full civic and social 
acceptance. The question is not only wha\ 4Satholics 
stand to gain, but what they have to offer. 
John F. Kennedy won the election, becoming the first 
Catholic president of the United States. Kennedy won 303 
electoral college votes to Nixon's 219. In terms of the 
popular vote, it was one of the closest in election history: 
Kennedy 34, 221, 349, and Nixon 34, 108, 456. 144 Most 
·contemporary commentators attributed Kennedy's one hundred 
thousand vote margin to his religion. Newsweek determined 
that Kennedy's Catholicism had a positive impact on the 
143Robert Hoyt, "Opinion Worth Nothing," America, 
(Reprint) November 4, 1960, pp. 171-175. 
144
catholic Quarterly Almanac, 86th Congress: 2nd 
Session, Vol. 16, pp. 804-809, 1025. 
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election results, because Kennedy's overall strategy was ... to 
trade the little states for the big states. "As a result of 
this strategy, one of the great issues of the campaign --
the Catholic faith of Kennedy -- took a turn that on balance 
145 
resounded to his advantage." Newsweek was willing to 
concede that religion had "contributed heavily if not 
decisively," to his losses in smaller states such as 
Tennessee, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Indiana, and Iowa. 
But these losses had been much more than offset by 
victories in New York, Pennsylvania, and 
Massachusetts. Kennedy's Catholicism had been a 
decided asset, not only because it won him many 
Catholic votes but also because the anti-Catholic 
propaganda it inspireq4~on him the sympathy of Liberal Protestants and Jews. 
Time magazine agreed with Newsweek's analysis of the 
election results. It concluded that Kennedy's Catholicism 
-----·~~.,.~.-.... -...... --,, "·•· -
"was certainly a factor in his favor in the big cities, 
where Catholics are most heavily concentrated, though the 
Catholic vote was not so monolithic as Kennedy had 
h d .. 147 ope . John Wicklein of the New York Times remarked 
that "a strong, silent Protestant vote cut into Senator John 
F. Kennedy's margin of victory •.. but was offset by a 
more strategically placed Catholic vote which aided the 
14511Election Blue Extra," Newsweek, November 14, 
19 6 0 I p. EE2. 
146Ibid. 
14711Analysts Disagree on Role of Religion Played in 
Elections," The Catholic Messenger, November 17, 1960, p. 1. 
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senator in large states he needed to win. 11148 Samuel Lubell, 
the political analyst, inferred the same rationale for 
Kennedy's victory over Nixon. "How the electoral vote fell 
-~· .,.~. .. . ~ 
indicates that Senator Kennedy's religion helped rather than 
hurt his ~l~.ction chances. 11149 Even the post-election 
Gallop Poll, taking into account that out of the country's 
population of 180 million, 40 million or 22.8 per cent were 
catholic, demonstrated that the Catholic vote for Kennedy 
was strongest in the regions that consisted of the big 
states with large electoral votes -- East and Midwest. 150 
Catholic Vote 
Region Kennedy Nixon 
East 77% 23% 
Midwest 81% 19% 
South 75% 25% 
West 74% 26% 
One year after the election, the Brookings Institute 
analyzed the election in The Presidential Election and 
14811Analysts Disagree on Role of Religion Played in 
Elections," The Catholic Messenger, November 17, 1960, p. 1. 
149 Ibid. 
15011 Post-Election Analysis-The Catholic Poll," 
Gallop Poll, 1960, pp. 1692-1693. Also provided a regional 
breakdown of the Protestant vote. Kennedy's greatest 
support among Protestants was in the south: Kennedy 47% and 
Nixon 53%. In the Midwest Kennedy received 38% of the 
Protestant vote, in the West 37% of the Protestant vote, and 
in the East only 28% of the Protestant vote. 
151 
Transition 1960-1961. 151 v.o. Key's essay "Interpreting the 
Election Results" acknowledged that "the most marked 
accreditations to Democratic strength 1956-1960 occurred in 
states with extremely high proportions of Roman Catholics," 
and confirmed previous interpretations that the religious 
factor "was of overwhelming importance in shifting voters in 
the 1960 election. 11152 He, however, perceived political 
loyalties as very intricate and complex. Although there was 
a dramatic increase in the Democratic vote in Catholic areas 
in the Northeast and Midwest, there were other heavily 
Catholic areas failing to produce such conspicuousl~ biased 
results. Al though Kennedy ran behind Stevenson in the 
Protestant South, there were other Protestant areas he ran 
ahead in. Key attributed these diverse voting trends to the 
religious issue's impact on party affiliations. "Of the 
appeals peculiar to the campaign, the religious issue 
evidently far outweighed the others. For some people, it 
reinforced the pull of partisanship; for others it ran 
153 
counter to the tugs of party loyalty." In the final 
analysis, Key maintained that Kennedy captured most but not 
all of the ·Democratic Catholic defectors of 1956 and 
151Paul T. David, The Presidential Election and 
Transition 1960-1961 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institute, 1961). 
152Ibid., pp. 150-176. 
153 Ibid., pp. 155-158, 174. 
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received the same vote amongst Protestant Democrats in 1960 
as in 1956 -- roughly 38%. This twin influence of party and 
religion convinced Key that "Probably the best guess is that 
Kennedy won in spite of rather than because of the fact that 
he was Catholic." 154 
Later scholars have also debated the detrimental or 
beneficial impact that religion had on Kennedy's election. 
Albert Menendez concluded: "He (Kennedy) could not have won 
without a respectable Protestant showing, but his 
outstanding triumph among Catholics and Jews who turned out 
in large numbers, saved the day for him. 11155 The net 
Catholic gain for Kennedy, according to Menendez, was 12.1 
million votes and net Protestant loss was 13.6 million. All 
told, therefore, 26 million of the 68 million presidential 
votes were determined by the religious issue. Due to 
traditional party preferences, Kennedy did best among the 
Southern Protestants with 47% of their vote and worst among 
Northeastern Protestants with 28% of their vote. The 
heaviest anti-Catholic voting occurred in the Border states 
such as rural Missouri, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Kentucky, and 
Tennessee. 156 Essentially, Menendez concluded, Kennedy owed 
154Paul T. David, The Presidential Election and 
Transition 1960-1961 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institute, 1961), pp. 175. 
155Albert J. Menendez, Religion at the Polls, 
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1977), p. 78. 
156Ibid., pp. 82-83. 
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his victory to both Protestants and Catholics. 
Paul Lopatto attributed Kennedy's victory to the 
Catholic vote. "This election contest, which witnessed an 
inordinate amount of attention being paid to Kennedy's 
religious affiliation, resulted in the mobilization of 
millions of Catholic voters behind the Democratic 
candidate. 11157 Taking a historical perspective of the 1960 
election in the 1980's, he determined that it was the last 
time a Democratic candidate would be the beneficiary of the 
heretofore traditional party loyalty amongst Catholics. 
Prejudice had induced Catholics to revert to their 
traditional party preference in 1960, despite the fact that 
their economic interest had drastically changed from the 
days of FDR. Social mobility since World War II had 
catapulted a large majority of Catholics from the working 
class to the middle and upper classes, which induced a swing 
to the Republican party. But this tenuous Catholic support 
of the Democratic party in the 1960 election was shattered 
by Kennedy's victory and assassination. These two events 
rendered anti-Catholicism null and void in subsequent 
presidential campaigns and elections and transformed 
Catholics into loyal Americans. According to Lopatto, "This 
new acceptance meant that in the future it would be easier 
157Paul Lapatto, Religion and the Presidential 
Elections, 1960-1980, (New York: Praeger Studies, 1985), pp. 
67, 162. 
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for many Catholics to support a Republican party that had so 
often in the past acted as a vehicle for the nativist and 
anti-Catholic elements in the political system." 158 Thus, 
over the next 20 years, more and more Catholics found it in 
their interest to join the Republican party. 159 
Whether Kennedy's political strategy of capturing 
Catholic ballots in states with the largest electoral votes 
allowed him to win the election because of, or in spite of, 
his faith does not detract from the importance of the 
candidate's and the Church's successful avoidance of a 
repeat of 1928 in the presidential campaign. Kennedy's 
Houston speech and Community Relations Committee cautiously 
undermined the charge of Catholic political disloyalty. The 
American Catholic Church discredited bigoted accusations by 
providing numerous explications on sensitive Church-State 
issues, by maintaining its stance of neutrality toward the 
political fortunes of either candidate, and by imploring its 
members to endure the crisis with impartiality and 
understanding. Al though Kennedy and the Church did not 
eradicate anti-Catholicism from the campaign, they did 
contain its hate and rancor. This containment dislodged 
bigotry as a significant factor in the election results, 
158 Paul Lapatto, Religion and the Presidential 
Elections, 1960-1980, (New York: Praeger Studies, 1985), pp. 
67, 162. 
159
rbid., pp. 162-163. 
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persuaded non-Catholics with honest doubts that Catholicism 
... ~ . 
and Americanism were compatible, and once and for all, 
shattered the seemingly ageless American tradition of "No 
ca-t:liolic in the White House." 
EPILOGUE 
The Catholic Church celebrated Kennedy's victory and 
its role in preventing a sectarian conflagration. The 
election of the first Catholic president represented a 
psychological victory that meant Catholics had become first-
class citizens. Edi tors of The Catholic Press declared 
boldly the death of bigotry and announced the ushering in of 
a "New Frontier in Religious Relations," characterized by 
tolerance and understanding. Monsignor Francis Lally, 
editor of the Boston Pilot, was pleased with the election 
results which proved that "The mass of Protestants 
considered the religious issue at least a secondary one" and 
which symbolized the death of bigotry. 
Kennedy was doubtless correct when he said he buried 
the religious issue in the Hills of West Virginia. He 
might have added that he preached its eulogy in 
Houston and that the American peop\e raised a massive 
monument over its grave on Tuesday. 
The Trenton Monitor declared that "Naturally, there 
is a pride among Catholics • • • and there will be fervent 
111 Religious Issue Dead," Monsignor Lally Says," The 
Catholic Messenger, November 17, 1960, p. 1. 
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prayer for his success." 2 The Providence Visitor proclaimed 
that never again will the hardcore bigotry "be dignified 
with public respectability." 3 The Catholic Herald-Citizen 
of Milwaukee proclaimed the official burial of Catholic 
American second-class citizen status. The San Francisco 
Monitor ordered fellow Catholics to tear up their second-
class citizen cards and declared that "The irresponsible 
teenage years are over. Catholics have matured to adulthood 
because Kennedy's victory broke the walls of prejudice and 
ended the days of Catholic exile in American society." 4 
Even The Tablet joined in the celebration. It 
congratulated Kennedy on his victory. "His is an historic 
triumph and all will rejoice in the fact that a Catholic has 
been elected president -- that 1960 has put to rest the 
allegation that this great land of ours practiced religious 
discrimination for its highest office." 5 The paper's editor 
reminded Margaret Sanger to keep her promise about moving 
out of the United States, and facetiously speculated how 
many Kennedys would Sanger have birth controlled out of 
211 Diocesan Papers See a Defeat for Bigotry," The 
Catholic Messenger, November 17, 1960, p. 1. 
3
rbid. 
4Editorial, "The Breakthrough," San Francisco 
Monitor, November 11, 1960, p. 16. 
5Editorial, "Our New President," The Tablet, 
November 12, 1960, p. 10 
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. t 6 ex1s ence. The Alamo Register exemplified the tribal pride 
as well as thanks for Kennedy's triumph. "A Catholic can be 
pardonably proud in Kennedy's election. He can be proud 
that a giant barricade to his own potential as a citizen has 
been rernoved. 117 Kennedy was a Catholic hero as well as an 
"American Hero. 118 Francis J. Connell in the American 
Ecclesiastical Review encouraged Catholics to share in 
celebration with all Americans. "We have reason to rejoice 
that at last a Catholic has been regarded worthy of the 
presidency by a sufficient number of Americans. But rejoice 
as Americans rather than Catholics. 119 
Kennedy's win engendered Catholic praise for the 
liberal secularists. America compared the New Republic's 
1928 and 1960 reaction to a Catholic presidential candidate. 
It discovered that in 1928 the New Republic ignored the 
Catholic issue, printing only one editorial, a book review, 
and two letters. 10 In contrast, thirty years later, the 
6Editorial, "Our New President," The Tablet, 
November 12, 1960, p. 10 
7Dick Meskill, "In the Shadow of San Fernando," The 
Alamo Register, November 10, 1960, p. 1. 
8 Ibid. 
9Francis J. Connell, "Now That the Election Is 
Over," American Ecclesiastical Review, June 1961, pp. 1-14. 
1 OEdi torial, "Catholicism Cornes of Age, 11 America, 
December 17, 1960, p. 389. 
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magazine devoted it~ March 21 issue to Catholics in America, 
printed numerous editorials defending Catholics, and 
published book reviews that clarified the Catholic position 
on Church-State issues. "This change in the treatment of 
the Catholic issue between 1928-1960 is a significant 
development in the liberal secular mind. On its own , it 
marks Catholicism's Corning of Age in American Society." 11 
This emotional bliss influenced the editor of the San 
Francisco Monitor to predict the rise of another minority in 
American society. "It is an indication that America is 
growing up, though painfully. It is now a time to ask 
another question: What about a Jew in the White House, or 
an American of yellow skin and slanted eyes, or a Negro? 
The day may not be far off." 12 
Catholic enthusiasm and optimism was infectious. 
James Wine, who fought in the trenches of religious bigotry 
throughout the campaign, declared the demise of intolerance 
and the birth of religious understanding. "Both Catholics 
and Protestants have been enlightened about each other. 
They found they had much more in common than they suspected 
before. Everyone knew where the differences lay -- they 
were the things that got talked about -- but no one bothered 
11Edi torial, "Catholicism Cornes of Age," America, 
December 17, 1960, p. 389. 
12Editorial, "The Breakthrough," San Francisco 
Monitor, November 11, 1960, p. 389. 
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to notice how much both groups shared. The climate is right 
for cooperation an.d the friendly exchange of ideas; now it's 
up to individuals -- and I think they are ready for it." 13 
Journalists of the secular press concurred with Wine. The 
New York Journal American described the election as "a 
momentous milestone on the road to religious tolerance. 1114 
The Pittsburg Post-Gazette offered Kennedy's triumph as 
proof that "religion is not a barrier to public office in 
the United States. 1115 Rabbi Richard C. Hertz of Detroit 
concluded: "Brotherhood is no longer a wild dream. I 
believe bigotry was dealt a hammer blow by those who realize 
that what a man stands for must become more decisive than 
what his religious label is. " 16 Finally, the bliss of 
winning seemed to temper Catholic assessment of the severity 
of their trial of bigotry. Robert Hoyt in Jubilee concluded 
that the anti-Catholicism of 1960 was less severe than past 
outbreaks and contemporary prejudices against Blacks and 
Jews. 
82. 
In retrospect, the ordeal of American Catholicism was 
not really much of an ordeal. This is easy to say 
now, of course, because the anti-Catholic agitation 
13 
"End of an Issue," Newsweek, November 28, 1960, p. 
1411 Religious 
November 17, 1960, p. 
Issues," 
12. 
The Catholic Messenger, 
15Ibid. 
1611 End of an Issue?" Newsweek, November 28, 1.960, p. 
82. 
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failed the accomplishment of its objective. It was 
tiresome, irritating sometimes, humiliating to listen 
to the slander and read the calumny; but despite all 
the noise, the thing was mild compared with the trials 
our Catholic forebears suffered here and those our 
contemporaries are suffering elsewhere. Suppose a Jew 
had been nominated; the filth would have piled up to 
our ears. Consider what happened when Mr. Lodge dared 
to suggest -- quelle folie -- the possibility of a 
Negro in the cabinet. I suggest that Catholics who 
felt they were being put 'tf?an ultimate test had lost 
their sense of proportion. 
In the aftermath of Kennedy's victory, some 
Catholic editors blamed their own community for the 
existence of bigotry in the presidential campaign. 
According to these observers, religion was an issue because 
of one major Catholic American shortcoming that was exhumed 
and accentuated by the presidential campaign the 
ostensible lack of religious educated leaders among its 
laity. The Providence Visitor argued that Kennedy's 
political struggle revealed "the horrifying ignorance" of 
Catholic lay persons about their faith. 18 This Catholic 
disability contributed to the distorted image that 
non-Catholics had of the Church. When lay persons were 
approached by other Americans with questions about their 
faith, "It was too plain that they did not have the 
17Robert Hoyt, "Kennedy, Catholicism, and the 
Presidency," Jubilee, December 1960, pp. 12-16. 
18Edi torial, "A First Catholic President," The 
Providence Visitor, November 10, 1960, p.4. 
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19 
answers." The Denver Catholic Register depicted Catholic 
lay persons as incapable and unwilling to explain their 
faith to concerned non-Catholics and recommended that such a 
deplorable shortcoming must be eradicated to avoid future 
calamities. 
I have the impression that there are many more 
Protestants than Catholics who are acquainted with the 
contents of Pope Pius IX's Syllabus of Errors. It is 
going to take more to dispel Protestant fears of the 
Church than the simple reassurances of Catholics who 
do not know the issues. It is going to take 
knowledge. 20 It is time we started gathering that knowledge. 
Ave Maria insisted that, now with a Catholic president, it 
was more urgent than ever for Catholics to be knowledgeable 
of Church doctrine. "John F. Kennedy, as well as you, will 
be constantly asked about your Church's position on any 
issue. Today's American Catholics will have to be better 
informed about the teachings of their religion than any 
previous generation was or they will be responsible for 
h . . 1121 t eir ignorance. 
The dearth of Catholic lay leadership was another 
significant source of non-Catholic misunderstanding and 
bigotry during the past year. Kennedy improved this area of 
19Edi to rial, "A First Catholic President," The 
Providence Visitor, November 10, 1960, p.4. 
20 Edward Smith, "Catholic Ignorance, Protestant 
Fear," Denver Catholic Register, November 17, 1960, p. 4. 
21 John Reedy, "The Edi tor's Desk," Ave Maria, 
November 26, 1960, p. 2. 
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deficiency by speaking out as a member of his faith, 
independent of the Church's hierarchy. "He asked no 
Cardinal, Bishop, or priest to become his spokesman. It 
probably amazed some American Protestants that thought this 
. .bl .,22 was even 1mposs1 e. Robert Hoyt was impressed with 
Kennedy's example of lay leadership in the Church. But he 
also noted the statement of the 166 laymen as another 
illustration of autonomous action. To Hoyt, the content of 
the statement was not as important as the act itself -- a 
conscious and public act by the laity entirely independent 
of clerical authority. "It was the confidence the signers 
displayed in taking this initiative; confidence, first, in 
their ability to express the American Catholic consensus; 
and second, in their right as Catholics to address 
themselves to the public without prior consultation with 
clerical authorities -- all this without creating any 
suggestion of disrespect for clerical prerogatives. 1123 In 
the end, Hoyt contended that this novel development in the 
Church -- the emergence of an independent Catholic lay 
leadership -- was quintessential if Catholics were to allay 
all Protestant fears and to erase all Protestant doubts 
about Catholic loyalty. 24 
22John J. Kane, "The New Frontier in Religious 
Relations," Ave Maria, November 26, 1960, p. 2. 
23Robert Hoyt, "Kennedy, Catholicism, and the 
Presidency," Jubilee, December 1960, pp. 12-16. 
24Robert Hoyt, "Kennedy, Catholicism, and the 
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Underlying this reasonable scruitiny of the sources 
of bigotry was a realistic foreboding over the Church's 
future role in this "New Frontier" in American religious 
relations. The Catholic Herald Citizen after its initial 
celebration cautioned fellow Catholics that the real trial 
. b . . 25 was JUSt eginning. The Michigan Catholic agreed that the 
first Catholic president and his community "will be more 
closely scrutinized. 1126 The New World of Chicago asked 
Catholics to pray for the president's and their community's 
successful passage through this crucial state in the process 
of becoming accepted Americans. 27 Father Ralph Gorman, 
editor of the Sign, argued that the major consequence of 
Kennedy's election and campaign was its divulging of a less 
than desirable and misconceived public image of the Church. 
Americans believed that the American Catholic Church owed 
Presidency," Jubilee, December 1960, pp. 12-16. Also, see 
Robert Hoyt, "Church-State Relations, 1960," Ave Maria, 
December 31, 1960, pp. 5-6. He noted that another positive 
aspect of the campaign was that "Catholics of high and low 
degree were forced to restate doctrine in terms of the 
modern American context." He listed the following as 
examples: speech by Gustave Weigel, questions and answers by 
Archbishop Karl Alter, statement of 166 Catholic lay 
persons, Murray 1 s We Hold These Truths, and Kennedy's 
Houston speech. 
25Editorial, "A Memorable Election," The Catholic 
Herald Citizen, November 19, 1960, p. 2. 
26Edi torial, "The World Watches," The Michigan 
Catholic, November 10, 1960, p. 1. 
27Editorial, "A Time for Prayers Rather than 
Cheers," New World, November 18, 1960, p. 4. 
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its first allegiance to a foreign power, wanted to destroy 
religious liberty in the country, sought union of church and 
state, desired to use civil legislation to impose its 
morality on all Americans, and as an organized interest 
group, feigned concern about others in society "when she 
thinks she can derive some selfish advantage." Horrified by 
such misconceptions and wanting to dispel them, Gorman 
called for "Operation Understanding." For such operation to 
be successful, an educated lay leadership was needed to 
emerge and to make a conscious and public effort on local, 
state, and national levels to disseminate the true image of 
American Catholicism. 28 
John F. Kane, former director of the National 
Conference of Christians and Jews, believed that the future 
of the American Church was inextricably linked to the 
fortunes of this first Catholic presidency, which would 
either promote religious harmony or disharmony in the 
country. Kennedy would have to walk a tightrope, displaying 
no favoritism toward the Catholic Church. Fellow Catholics, 
Kane admonished, must walk the same tightrope, fostering 
understanding, while not abusing their new status in society 
with an outburst of sectarianism. Kane resolved, "Kennedy 
must be viewed as an American president. One can only 
28 Ralph J. Gorman, "The New President," The Sign, 
January 1961, p. 6 and "Public Image of the Catholic 
Church," pp. 7-8. 
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sincerely hope that whatever his achievements may be and 
Americans may hope that these will be many -- there should 
be no Catholic tendency to make capital out of it on a 
1 . . b . 1129 re 1g1ous asis. George Kelly in the pages of America 
recognized the difficult role Catholics would have to 
undertake for the next four years. "Catholics face the 
paradoxical task of keeping shirts on and taking them off." 
Catholics must keep shirts on when President Kennedy is 
criticized by non-Catholics. Such critic ism must be 
perceived not as prejudice but as an honest difference of 
opinion. Catholics, on the other hand, must be willing to 
take their shirts off when attempting to explain their faith 
to other Americans. Although the old religious issue was 
badly :wounded on November 8, "We can do much to make that 
wound mortal during the next four years!" 3 o 
Foremost a realistic and skillful politician, 
Kennedy was more circumspect about this "New Frontier in 
Religious Relations." He disagreed with other Catholics 
that the religious issue was dead in American politics. His 
election demonstrated that a Catholic could be elected to 
the highest office in the land, "but the real test was not 
29 John J. Kane, "The New Frontier in Religious 
Relations," Ave Maria, December 17, 1960, pp. 9-11. 
30George Kelly, "The Years Ahead," America, January 
21, 1961, pp. 502-504. 
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his election but his administration." 31 The real test was 
the continued vigilance by his non-Catholic opposition as to 
whether or not he would succumb to the influence of his 
Church leaders while in office. Sorensen expressed both his 
and Kennedy's concern about the religious implications of 
his actions as president. "But if his conduct of the office 
was in keeping with his campaign pledge and constitutional 
oath, then, while unreasoning bigotry would always remain 
and legitimate church-state questions would always be 
raised, the unwritten law against a Catholic president would 
not only be temporarily broken but permanently repealed. 1132 
From the first days of his presidency, Kennedy 
walked a tightrope of religious neutrality, never advocating 
for his fellow Catholics, basing all of his policies on 
constitutional grounds, and frequently stressing in actions 
and words his independence from the hierarchy's authority 
and influence. Not to show any favoritism to any faith, 
Kennedy's staff and cabinet members consisted of Catholics, 
Protestants, Jews, and secularists. Pierre Salinger wrote: 
"President John F. Kennedy's personal staff was an unlikely 
mixture. We were Catholics, Protestants, Jews. We came 
from the East, Midwest, and the Far West, and from 
31 Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy, (New York: Ban tum 
Books, 1965), p. 400. 
32
rbid., pp. 400-401. 
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backgrounds of poverty and wealth." 33 Salinger observed, 
the only thing they held in common was salary and "a total" 
commitment to the president. 34 A simple response to Pope 
John XXIII's congratulatory note of January 20, 1960 proved 
to be a major and critical undertaking in the president's 
attempt to dispel suspicions of collusion between the 
Vatican and the White House. His advisors issued 
precautionary guidelines that he should follow in composing 
and sending his return note. Because the United States did 
not maintain diplomatic relations with the Vatican, he 
should send his note directly from the White House to the 
Pope without passing through the American embassy at Rome. 
Just as important to his advisors was this second 
stipulation: The text of the President's reply should not 
be released in Washington. 35 By following these procedures 
and by carefully crafting the note, Kennedy and his advisors 
believed they followed the course least likely to incite 
Protestant fears and suspicions of papal influence in the 
White House. 36 
33Pierre 
Doubleday, 1966), 
34
rbid. 
Salinger, _W_i_t_h ___ K_e_n_n_e_d_y_, 
pp. 63-70. 
(New York: 
35
walter J. Stoessel, Jr. to White House, 
Memorandum, February 1, 1961 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-
Presidential Papers, President's Office Files), Box No. 28. 
36
rbid., Also contains Kennedy's note of thanks to 
Pope John XXIII. Kennedy's papers contain additional 
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Unfortunately, Kennedy's vigilance of non-Catholic 
fears and sensitivities throughout his presidency terminated 
the Church's celebration of his victory and his "New 
Frontier in Religious Relations." The volatile Catholic 
dimension of the religious issue was revived. Like the days 
of the Look interview, the Church hierarchy and press took 
umbrage with the effect that Kennedy's appeasement had upon 
his presidential decisions. Catholic ire, disagreement, and 
frustration erupted over such issues as federal aid to 
parochial schools, prayer in the public classrooms, Civil 
Rights, Vietnam, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy's 
adroit handling of his presidential religious trial until 
his untimely death is another critical episode to be told by 
historians. But in the end, his assassination ensured that 
future presidents of the United States never again would 
have to face the same challenges of the oldest of American 
prejudices. 
correspondence to Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul VI. See 
John F. Kennedy to Pope John XXIII, Letter, May 7, 1963 
(John F. Kennedy Library: President's Office Files), Box No. 
31; Press Release on Pope John's death, June 1963, Box No. 
31, and Pope Paul VI to John F. Kennedy, Letter, July 11, 
1963, Box No. 32. 
CONCLUSION 
In 1960, John Fitzgerald Kennedy was elected the 
first Catholic President of the United States. The American 
tradition of "No Catholic in the White House" was shattered. 
Kennedy succeeded in 1960 for many reasons. In the postwar 
world, the United States was undergoing a cultural 
transformation. Protestant America was becoming 
pluralistic~. Catholic America was transforming. This 
~ -~-' --
religious cornrnuni ty was leaving its ghetto past behind, 
experiencing upward social and economic mobility, and was 
emerging as a potent force in American politics. Catholic-
America was becoming Americanized. 
Kennedy's rise to national prominence in the 1950's 
was built on the foundations of pluralism and the 
Americanized-Catholic community. Kennedy himself 
represented this new breed of an American-Catholic 
politician who felt comfortable with the country's 
Anglo-American tradition. His non-Catholic education and 
privileged upbringing also manifested themselves .in his 
public image of pure Americanism. Unlike Smith, his 
ethnicity and religion were afterthoughts to his pervasive 
Americanism. 
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Beginning in 1956 when he sought the vice-presidential 
bid of the Democratic party and up until his election in 
1960, Kennedy openly and directly confronted the religious 
issue. In 1956, he overcame the ghost of Al Smith by 
persuading Democratic leaders that there was a solid 
Catholic vote in the American electorate. His being a 
Catholic was, therefore, 
liability. Although he 
a political asset and not a 
lost the vice-presidential 
candidacy, he became a nationally recognized leader of the 
Democratic party and a viable contender for the presidency 
of the United States. 
Kennedy defended his faith throughout his pursuit of 
the highest office in the land. In 195 9, he assuaged 
During his primary 
speech to the 
Protestant fears in his Look interview. 
campaign, he delivered an overpowering 
Associated Society of Newspaper Editors in which he 
declared, "I am not a Catholic candidate." During the 
presidential campaign, he presented his Houston speech 
(perhaps the most eloquent of his career) in response to 
Peale's manifesto. Up until the last day of the campaign, 
Kennedy answered queries about the compatibility of his 
faith with the constitutional obligations of the presidency. 
Although at times exasperated, Kennedy, unlike Smith, never 
once retreated into a posture of bitterness, resentment, or 
defensiveness. By fielding all questions and by 
demonstrating his independence of the Church's hierarchy in 
172 
words and deeds, he conveyed to his fellow citizens an image 
of an American candidate who happened to be Catholic, and as 
a result, received 38% of the non-Catholic vote. 
Just as important as Kennedy's allaying of 
Protestant fears was the Catholic issue. Kennedy first 
encountered the unexpected Catholic dimension of the 
religious issue after his Look interview in 1959. His oath 
statement which severed religious and public life engendered 
the criticism and wrath of the Church's hierarchy and press. 
They perceived his comments as a shocking espousal of 
godless secularism and as a humiliating attempt to appease 
anti-Catholic bigots. Kennedy became a "Betrayer of his own 
Kind." The tension between Kennedy and his Church 
heightened over birth control. He was convinced that the 
untimely issuance of the bishops' pastoral letter on the eve 
of the campaign proved the hierarchy's inherent animosity 
for him and their disapprobation of his election. Filled 
with trepidation and anxiety over both the Catholic and 
Protestant dimensions of the religious issue, he announced 
his nomination in January of 1960. 
The fear of a repeat of the bigotry of 1928, 
however, brought the American Catholic Church and candidate 
into a fortuitous and cooperative defense of the faith. The 
West Virginia primary raised anti-Catholic fears and 
criticism of a Catholic vote. Now the Church and press 
perceived the candidate as a victim of bigotry and adhered 
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to certain principles in reacting to anti-Catholic charges. 
Together, they maintained a posture of political neutrality 
toward the political fortunes of any candidate, willingly 
explained the compatibility of Catholicism and Americanism 
to non-Catholics, and enjoined fellow Catholics to remain 
calm and to forgive their ignorant accusers. After Kennedy 
won in West Virginia and the nomination at the Democratic 
convention in July, the Church and press championed Kennedy 
as a "Defender of the Faith" and declared prematurely the 
demise of the religious issue. 
But in September, the Peale proclamation revived 
Catholic fears of bigotry's influence. Until election day, 
the Catholic hierarchy and press upheld Kennedy as defender 
of the faith and adhered to its primary strategy of Catholic 
neutrality and responsibility. Never once did they resort 
to name calling or to raising the walls of defensiveness or 
bitterness. Instead of generating a sectarian 
conflagration, the Church prevented it by containing the 
volatility of bigotry. On election day, Kennedy was deeply 
indebted to his most unlikely ally for his non-Catholic 
vote. 
Pluralism, an Americanized Church and candidate, 
Kennedy's direct confrontation of the religious issue, the 
fear of another 1928, and the strategically located Catholic 
vote were all significant factors in the election of this 
country's first Catholic president. But just as, or 
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perhaps, more important in Kennedy's election and the 
avoidance of a remake of 1928 was the campaign of neutrality 
and restraint conducted by the American Catholic hierarchy 
and press. All told, these factors converged to destroy the 
oldest of American prejudices -- "No Catholic in the White 
House." In the end, Kennedy's election removed 
anti-Catholicism as a serious consideration in future 
presidential politics, symbolized the demise of Protestant 
America and the birth of pluralistic America, and finally 
lowered the walls of Herberg's three cultures, opening up 
avenues for dialogue and understanding. 
In terms of the Catholic community, Kennedy's 
campaign and election represented a psychological victory 
and cultural triumph. Catholics had been raised to first-
class citizen status. They were now fully accepted 
Americans. These two years also exhumed the appalling 
ignorance of the Catholic laity and the frightening lack of 
lay leadership in the Church. Hierarchy and press alike 
realized that these shortcomings would have to be addressed 
to ensure the future of the American Catholic church. 
Finally Kennedy's and the 166 laymen's independent 
pronouncements represented a liberalizing trend in the 
Church that its hierarchy would have to face in the future 
and eventually accept. 
The question will always be asked: what would have 
happened if Kennedy had lost the election? Would the 
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country have been set back decades in religious relations? 
would the anti-Catholic tradition still be alive and well 
today? Would Catholics have returned to their ghettos and 
refused to embrace the ecumenical spirit of Vatican II? 
Fortunately, these are only "if" questions of which 
historians can make provocative speculations, an 
indebtedness historians owe to the American Catholic 
hierarchy and press. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 
VITAL STATISTICS OF THE AMERICAN 
CATHOLIC CHURCH IN 1960 
U.S. Catholic Population: 40,817,302 out of 171,238,845. 
Archdiocese: 26 Diocese: 113 Parishes: 16,896 
CLERGY 
Cardinals: 5 
Francis Cardinal Spellman, New York 
James Francis Cardinal Mcintyre, Los Angeles 
Richard Cardinal Cushing, Boston 
John Cardinal O'Hara, Philadelphia 
Albert Cardinal Meyer, Chicago 
Archbishops: 32 
Bishops: 170 
Priests (Diocesan and Religious): 53,796 
Brothers: 10,473 
Sisters: 168,572 
PRESS 
Readership: 25,932,461 
Publications: 575 
Diocesan Newspapers: 113 
Circulation (Leading Newspapers): Our Sunday Visitor: 
913,331; The Tablet: 140; The New World: 
178,139; San Francisco Monitor: 49,866; Boston 
Pilot: 86,288. 
Leading Periodicals: Catholic Digest: 760,744; The Sign: 
345,129; America: 48, 1004; Commonweal: 
20,006. 
Source: The Official Catholic Directory and The Catholic 
Almananc, 1960. 
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